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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
October 9, 1981 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 3 
No. 81-38 
CRAWFORD, @ 0~ Cert to Cal. Ct. App., 
2nd App. Dist. 
v. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION 
OF LOS ANGELES State/Civil Timely (by 
extension) 
1. SUMMARY: Petrs challenge the constitutionality of 
Proposition I, an amendment to the California constitution that 
prohibits ,.:tate ~ou£Ss from orderins m~~to~¼ student assj gnment 
or transportation 
of the Fourteenth 
D~-V 
unless necessary to remed a .. 
Am
endment. ~ y spec1f1c violation 
~\Jl {Dy- _!,lo . B I-~ :f \wl<- be«>""e ~ of 
\l,,.ls .,,,.,,,_,,,,;:Ji{ .;;.,J,. qr,Nf ,_.......,,..t,, .,.i.,,.. 
'10c.t,W~$k J-o : • ~ ,v 
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2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: This petition marks the 
latest stage in litigation aimed at desegregating the Los Angeles 
school system. In 1970 the Superior Court of Los Angeles County 
issued an opinion finding that segregation in the school district 
was de jure in nature and that resp had taken "affirmative" steps 
which it "knew or should have known" would perpetuate segregation 
in the district. In Crawford v. Board of Education, 17 Cal. 3d 
280, 551 P.2d 28 (1976), the California Supreme Court accepted 
the finding of de jure segregation, but did not base its 
affirmance of the Superior Court's order of mandatory busing on 
that ground. Instead, it held that the California Constitution 
obligated resp to alleviate racial segregation, regardless of its 
cause. 
In November 1979, article I, section 7(a) of the California 
Constitution was amended by way of a state referendum, 
Proposition I, which eliminated independent state grounds as a 
basis for court-ordered busing. The amendment provides that 
nothing in the California Constitution imposes on any 
governmental entity obligations that exceed those imposed by the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution "with respect 
to the use of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation." 
State courts are prohibited from using these methods except to 
remedy conduct that would constitute a violation of the federal 
Equal Protection Clause and "unless a federal court would be 
permitted under federal decisional law to impose that obligation 
or responsibility" to remedy such a violation. The amendment 
authorized the modification of all existing desegregation decrees 
- -
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to conform to its terms. Finally, the amendment expressly 
permitted school boards to "continu[e] or commenc[e] a school 
integration plan" voluntarily. 
Following passage of Proposition I, resp returned to 
Superior Court and argued that the court's 10-year-old findings 
did not justify a finding of a federal constitutional violation, 
or the system-wide remedy of mandatory assignment of children by 
race. In May 1980 the Superior Court rejected that argument, 
reasoning that the Cal. S. Ct., in Crawford, had affirmed the 
finding of de jure segregation and that, as a result, federal law 
would authorize the same remedy. In light of this holding, the 
court declined to address the constitutionality of Proposition I. 
In July the court entered a remedial order compelling the 
widespread reassignment of students affecting approximately 165 
elementary and junior high schools. 
On December 19, 1980, following an expedited appeal, the 
Cal. Ct. App. reversed. The court first held that Proposition I 
precluded the Superior Court from ordering mandatory reassignment 
of students. Following a review of this Court's school 
desegregation decisions, the court concluded that a violation of 
federal law requires "intentional segregative state action with 
discriminatory purpose," and that only such action would justify 
federally ordered busing. The Superior Court's 1970 findings 
were insufficient to prove a violation of federal law. "The 
thrust of the findings of the trial court was that passive 
maintenance by the Board of a neighborhood school system in the 






jure segregation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." App. 
to Pet. for Cert. at 35A. As a result, Proposition I prohibited 
the trial court from ordering assignment and transportation of 
students on the basis of race. 
The court then turned to petrs' constitutional attack on 
Proposition I. The court first emphasized that resp remained 
under a duty, by virtue of the State Constitution, to undertake 
reasonably feasible steps to alleviate school segregation, 
regardless of its cause. The trial court was obligated to 
supervise resp's compliance and, if necessary, to implement a 
desegregation plan of its own. The effect of Proposition I was 
merely to remove mandatory busing from the store of desegregation 
techniques available to the trial court in this case. 
Turning to petrs' arguments, the court first held that 
Proposition I did not eliminate a state right previously enjoyed 
by petrs, in violation of the rule in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 
369 (1967). Reitman struck down a constitutional initiative that 
repealed acts of the legislature which had prohibited private 
discrimination in residential housing. The state courts had 
interpreted the initiative as authorizing private racial 
discrimination as a basic policy. Proposition I does not create 
a right to discriminate, nor does it change the substantive law 
of rights. It merely removes busing as a remedy to cure state-
proscribed racial imbalance. The court also distinguished Hunter 
v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), which invalidated a city 
charter amendment that imposed more onerous prerequisites to the 
passage of ordinances against housing discrimination than other 
- -
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ordinances. Proposition I, however, merely rescinds a measure 
that the State was under no federal duty to adopt in the first 
place. It would be startling to hold that a State has violated 
the Federal Constitution by conforming its constitutional right 
of equal protection to that guaranteed by the Federal 
Constitution. 
Second, the court rejected the argument that Proposition I 
was enacted with segregative intent and discriminatory purpose. 
The amendment's declaration of purpose contains no evidence of 
such intent, and it would be "pure speculation" to suppose that 
the voters were so motivated. Avoidance of the burdens produced 
by busing - including the segregative effect of white flight -
would have been a sufficient motive. 
Finally, the court rejected the argument that Proposition I 
deprives minority children of their vested right to a 
desegregated education. The only deprivation effected by 
Proposition I is removal of busing from the courts' arsenal of 
remedies. "We do not believe any pupil has a vested right to 
require other pupils to be assigned to public schools on the 
basis of race." App. to Pet. for Cert. at 66A. The court once 
again emphasized that Proposition I does not eliminate the duty 
of school boards under state law affirmatively to redress racial 
imbalance in the schools. 
The Cal. s. Ct. denied a petition for hearing. 
3. CONTENTIONS: (1) Proposition I creates a racial 
classification in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Like 






initiative at issue in Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 
638 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980) , 1 it differentiates between the 
treatment of problems involving race and that afforded other 
matters in the same area (here, pupil assignment). Whether the 
rights and remedies burdened by the offensive enactments were 
required by the Fourteenth Amendment is irrelevant to the 
analysis. 
(2) Discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the 
passage of Proposition I. Minority public school students 
seeking relief from a segregated school system are "tied forever 
to the vagaries of changing federal decisional law"; all other 
equal protection plaintiffs may avail themselves of the more 
expansive rights and remedies guaranteed by the California 
Constitution. In light of the history of desegregation in 
California, and particularly in Los Angeles, the language of 
Proposition I is an obvious pretext for racial discrimination. 
As it did in Reitman v. Mulkey, supra, the Court should look 
behind the facial neutrality of the enactment to the obvious 
adverse consequences on minority school children. 
(3) The Superior Court's final judgment in 1970 created a 
vested right in minority schoolchildren to a desegregated 
education. By compelling the courts to reopen final judgments 
for modification, Proposition I divests petrs of that right in 
violation of the Due Process Clause. On its face, the amendment 
1A jurisdictional statement has been filed in this case 
and has been docketed No. 81-9. It is also scheduled for 





appears to abolish only one among many remedies. Nevertheless, 
the right is lost as well since no other techniques will be 
effective in desegregating Los Angeles schools. 
4. RESPONSE: (1) Proposition I does not eliminate court-
ordered student assignment and transportation. State courts 
still may employ such remedies, but only if they find a violation 
of the Federal Constitution. Minority litigants are under no 
greater burdens than those imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment 
itself. In fact, they still enjoy the broader rights and 
remedies guaranteed by the California Constitution. 
(2) Nothing in Proposition I conflicts with the Fourteenth 
Amendment. As this Court held in Dayton Board of Education v. 
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 413-14 (1977), repeal or rescission of a 
state enactment (there, a resolution concerning school 
desegregation) violates the Federal Constitution only if the 
enactment itself was required by a pre-existing federal 
constitutional duty. Unlike the charter amendment in Hunter v. 
Erickson, supra, Proposition I does not create a racial 
classification; at most it creates a classification among 
remedies available to correct de facto segregation. Every other 
case cited by petrs involved a state statute or constitutional 
provision that, unlike Proposition I, flatly prohibited 
reassignment of students. 
(3) Reitman v. Mulkey, supra, examined the "immediate 
objective," "ultimate effect," and "historical context" of 
another California proposition. There, this Court granted 
extreme deference to the conclusions drawn by the California 
- -
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Supreme Court. Similar deference should be afforded in this case 
to the Cal. Ct. App., which concluded that Proposition I does not 
have a discriminatory purpose. This Court has often stated that 
an otherwise constitutional statute should not be invalidated 
because of an alleged illicit legislative motivation. Even if 
the intent of the electorate were relevant, petrs have failed to 
show a specific intent to injure minority students. No court in 
this litigation has made a factual finding to support petrs' 
assertions to the contrary. 
(4) Petrs have failed to identify any pre-existing judgment 
or order which establishes a vested right in mandatory student 
reassignment. At the time Proposition I was enacted and invoked, 
the Superior Court was in the early stages of a six-month trial 
to determine the remedy required by the California Constitution. 
5. DISCUSSION: Petrs argue f/J t Proposition I explicitly 
creates a racial classification./ In the alternative, they 
contend that its enactment was motivated by discriminatory intent 
or purpose. The first argument strikes me as untenable. ~ its 
face, Proposition I does not abrogate any federal right. It does ----not even narrow the substantive rights whose protection minority 
schoolchildren may seek under the California Constitution. It 
/
only limit!, the power of a state court to order a particular kind 
of relief to cases in which plaintiffs prove a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
In Hunter v. Erickson, supra, the Court struck down a city 
charter amendment that repealed existing ordinances forbidding 




before any future ordinance could take effect. All other 
ordinances regulating the real estate market could become 
effective merely upon passage by the City Council. The Court 
stated that its holding did not forbid mere repeal of an existing 
ordinance. 393 U.S., at 390 n.5. Rather, the charter amendment 
was constitutionally flawed because it drew a racial distinction 
among that class of persons who would seek the enactment of 
ordinances regulating the real estate market, id. at 390, and 
because it placed "special burdens on racial minorities within 
the governmental process," id. at 391. In this case, however, 
petrs have not identified a class of otherwise similarly situated 
litigants who will have available to them the remedy denied to 
petrs. 
' 
Petrs' alternative argument -- that Proposition I has a 1tAJ 
~ 
discriminatory effect and was enacted with discriminatory intent~5 
-- faces an immediate obstacle. Petrs ask that the Court look ~~ ,, . ,. 
behind the facial neutEa .l_Uy of the provision, and yet no court ~~ 
..,:wa 
has made factual findings, regarding effect or purpose, 
---------------




Court never addressed the constitutionality of Proposition I, and 
the Cal. Ct. App. dismissed petrs' claims regarding motivation as 
"pure speculation." The Court struck down a facially neutral 
proposition in Reitman v. Mulkey, supra, not because it repealed 
existing laws prohibiting discrmination in housing, but because 
the California courts had found that it "expressly authorized and 
constitutionalized the private right to discriminate" and "would 




discrimination." 369 U.S., at 376. No similar findings exist in 
this case. 
Petrs' last argument claims a deprivation of vested rights 
in a prior judgment. Resp appears to be correct in asserting 
that no court has finally approved implementation of a specific 
remedial desegregation plan involving mandatory pupil assignment 
and transportation. In any event, there is little merit to the 
argument that petrs have a vested right to any particular 
remedial order in litigation of this kind. Whether busing is 
essential to preservation of any state right is another question 
this Court would have difficulty evaluating on the existing 
record. 
It is conceivable that Proposition I was enacted by the 
voters of California with the intent of discriminating against 
racial minorities. Leaving aside the problems inherent in 
proving such a claim, it does not appear to have been proven on 
this record. As a result, I would deny. 
There is a response. 
9/18/81 Folse Opns. in petn. 
.. 
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Draft: No. 81-38, Crawford v. Board of Education of the 
Court. 
City of Los Angeles 
, . 
Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the 
An amendment to the California Constitution 
provides that state courts shall not order mandatory pupil 
assignment or transportation unless a federal court would 
do so in order to remedy a violation of the Equal -
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 





is whether this provision is itself a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
I 
This litigation began almost twenty years ago in 
196 3 when minority students attending school in the Los 
Angeles Unified School District (District) filed a class 
action in state court seeking desegregation of the 
District's schools. 1 The case went to trial some five 
years later, and in 1970 the trial court issued an opinion 
finding that the District was substantially segregated in 
violation of the state and federal constitutions. The 
court ordered the District to prepare a desegregation plan 
for immediate use. 
On the District's appeal, the California Supreme 
Court affirmed, but on a different bas is. Crawford v. 
Board of Education, 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 P. 2d 28 (1976). 
1 1n 1980 the District included 562 schools with 
650,000 students in an area of 711 square miles. In 1968 
when the case went to trial, the District was 53.6% white, 
22.6% black, 20% hispanic, and 3.8% asian and other. By 
October 1980 the demographic composition had altered 
radically: 23.7% white, 23.35 black, 45.3% hispanic, and 
7. 7% asian and other. Between October 1976 and October 
1980 the white student enrollment in the District dropped 
from 219,359 to 125,654. t ( 
C 
,.3 (o(, .-tr!' 
1 
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11 J t ~ ~ ;- -~r1... ''? ~ 
I 




While the trial court had found de jure segregation in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, the California Supreme court based its 
affirmance solely upon the equal protection clause of the 
state constitution. 2 The court explained that under the 
California constitution "state school boards bear a 
constitutional obligation to take reasonable steps to 
alleviate segregation in the public schools, whether the 
segregation be de facto or de jure in origin." Id., at 34. 
The court remanded to the trial court for preparation of a 
"reasonably feasible" plan for school desegregation. 3 
211 The findings in this case adequately support 
the trial court's conclusion that the segregation in the 
defendant school district is de jure in nature. We shall 
explain, however, that we do not rest our decision on this 
characterization because we continue to adhere to our 
conclusion in [Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 
Cal. 2d 876, 31 C-a-1-. Rptr 6Q~ 382 P. 2d 878 (1963)] that 
school boards in California bear a constitutional 
obligation to take reasonably feasible steps to alleviate 
school segregation 'regardless of its cause.'" Crawford 
v. Board of Ed., 551 P. 2d 28, 30 (1976). The court 
explained that--rederal cases were not controlling: "In 
focusing primarily on ••• federal decisions .•. defendant 
ignores a significant line of California decisions, 
decisions which authoritatively establish that in this 
state school boards do bear a constitutional obligation to 
take reasonable steps to alleviate segregation in the 
public schools, whether the segregation be de facto or de 
jure in origin." Id., at 33-34. 
3In stating general principles to guide the trial 
court on remand, the State Supreme Court discussed the 
"busing" question: "While critics have sometimes 
attempted to obscure the issue, court decisions time and 
time again emphasized that 'busing' is not a 
constitutional end in itself but is simply one potential 
Footnote continued on next page. 
~-4 
4. 
On remand, the trial court rejected the 
District's mostly voluntary desegregation plan but 
ultimately approved a second plan that included 
substantial mandatory school reassignment and 
transportation--"busing"--on a racial and ethnic basis. 4 
The plan was put into effect in the fall of 1979, but 
after one year's experience, all parties to the litigation 
were dissatisfied. Although the plan continued in 
operation, the trial court began considering alternatives 
in October 1979. 
In November 1979 the voters of the State of 
tool which may be utilized to satisfy a school district's 
constitutional obligation in this field. • • • [I]n some 
circumstances busing will be an appropriate and useful 
element in a desegregation plan, while in other instances 
its 'costs,' both in financial and educational terms, will 
render its use inadvisable." Id. , at 4 7. It noted as 
well that a state court should not intervene to speed the 
desegregation process so long as the school board takes 
"reasonably feasible steps to alleviate school 
segregation," Id., at 45, and that "a court cannot 
properly issue -a-'busing' order so long as a school 
district continues to meet its constitutional 
obligations." Id., at 48. 
4The plan provided for the mandatory busing of 
approximately 40,000 students in the fourth through eighth 
grades. Some of these children were bused over long 
distances requiring dailyAbus rides of as long as two to 
four hours. In addition, the plan provided for the 
voluntary transfer of some 30,000 students. 
Respondent Bustop, Inc. unsuccessfully sought to stay 
implementation of the plan. See Bustop, Inc. v. Board of 
Education, 439 U.S. 1380 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., on 
application for stay); Bustop, Inc. v. Board of Education, 
439 U.S. 1384 (1978) (Powell, J., on reapplication for 
stay) . 
5. 
California ratified Proposition I, an amendment to the due 
process and equal protection clauses of the state 
constitution. 5 Proposition I conforms the power of state 
courts to order busing to that exercised by the federal 
courts under the Fourteenth Amendment: 
"[N]o court of this state may impose upon the 
State of California or any public entity, board, 
or official any obligation or responsibility 
with respect to the use of pupil school 
assignment or pupil transportation, (1) except 
to remedy a specific violation by such party 
that would also constitute a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, and (2) unless a 
federal court would be permitted under federal 
decisional law to impose that obligation or 
responsibility upon such party to remedy the 
specific
6 
violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause." 
5Proposition I was placed before the voters 
following a two-thirds vote of each house of the state 
legislature. Cal. Const. art. 18, §1. The state senate 
approved the Proposition by a vote of 28 to 6, the state 
assembly by a vote of 62 to 17. The voters favored the 
_ Pro...2Q..sition by a vote of 2,433,312 (68.6%) in favor to 
_r 1,112,923 (31.4%) opposed. ~ The Proposition received a 
majority of the vote in each of the State's 58 counties 
and in 79 of the State's 80 assembly districts. 
6Proposi tion I added a lengthy proviso to article 
1, §7(a) of the California Constitution. Following 
passage of Proposition I, §7 now provides, in relevant 
part: 
"(a) A person may not be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law 
or denied equal protection of the laws; 
provided, that nothing contained herein or 
elsewhere in this Constitution imposes upon the 
State of California or any public entity, board, 
or official any obligations or responsibilities 
which exceed those imposed by the Equal 
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the 
United States constitution with respect to the 
use of pupil school assignment or pupil 
transportation. In enforcing this subdivision 
or any other provision of this Constitution, no 
Footnote continued on next page. 
6. 
Following approval of Proposition I, the 
District asked the Superior Court to halt all mandatory 
reassignment and busing of pupils. App. 185. On May 19, 
1980, the court denied the District's application. The 
court reasoned that Proposition I was of no effect in this 
case in light of the court's 1970 finding of de jure 
segregation by the District in violation of the fourteenth 
court of this state may impose upon the State of 
California or any public entity, board, or 
official any obligation or responsibility with 
respect to the use of puil school assignment or 
pupil transportation, (1) except to remedy a 
specific violation by such party tht would also 
constitute a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, and (2) unless a federal 
court would be permitted under federal 
decisional law to impose that obligation or 
responsibility upon such party to remedy the 
specific violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the 14th Amendment of the United 
States Constitution. 
. . . . 
"Nothing herein shall prohibit the 
governing board of a school district from 
voluntarily continuing or commencing a school 
integration plan after the effective date of 
this subdivision as amended. 
"In amending this subdivision, the 
Legislature and people of the State of 
California find and declare that this amendment 
is necessary to serve compelling public 
interest, including those of making the most 
effective use of the limited financial resources 
now and prospectively available to support 
public education, maximizing the educational 
opportunities and protecting the health and 
safety of all public school puils, enhancing the 
ability of parents to participate in the 
educational process, preserving harmony and 
tranquility in this state and its public 
schools, preventing the waste of scarce fuel 







amendment. Shortly thereafter, the court ordered 
implementation of a revised desegregation plan, one that 
again substantially relied upon mandatory pupil 
reassignment and transportation. 7 
The California court of appeal reversed. The 
court found that the trial court's 1970 findings of fact 
would not support the conclusion that the District had 
violated the federal constitution through intentional 
segregation. 8 Thus, Proposition I was applicable to the 
trial court's desegregation plan and would bar that part 
of the plan requiring mandatory student reassignment and 
transportation. IL ~' ncluded that . J1A..AJ'),,t.., he co u r t co FutaerHIQ.Le' t 
Proposition I was 
i:r=f 
constitutional under the 
7The Superior Court ordered the immediate 
implementation of the revised plan. The District was 
unsuccessful in its effort to gain a stay of the plan 
pending appeal. See Board of Education v. Superior Court, 
448 U.S. 1343 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., on application for 
stay) . 
811when the 1970 findings of the trial court are 
reviewed in the light of the correct applicable federal 
law, it is apparent that no specific segregative intent 
with discriminatory purpose was found. The thrust of the 
findings of the trial court was that passive maintenance 
by the Board of a neighborhood school system in the face 
of widespread residential racial imbalance amounted to de 
jure segregation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
... But a school board has no duty under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to meet and overcome the ef feet of population 
movements." 
~r uv0 
---~. (,) f 




four teen th amendment. The court found no obligation on 
the part of the state to retain a greater remedy at state 
law against racial segregation than was provided by the 
federal constitution. Nor could the court find that 
Proposition I was ~ th a discriminatory purpose. 9 
Finding Proposition I to be applicable and 
cons ti tut ional, the court of appeals vacated the orders -- -
entered by the Superior Court. The California Supreme 
Court denied hearing.lo We granted certiorari. __ U.S. 
9The court of appeals also rejected the claim 
that Proposition I deprived minority children of a "vested 
right" to desegregated education in violation of due 
process. Petitioners no longer advance this claim. 
10on March 16, 1981, the District directed that 
mandatory pupil reassignment under the Superior Court's 
revised plan be terminated on April 20, 1981. On that 
date, parents of children who had been reassigned were 
given the option of returning their children to 
neighborhood schools. According to respondent, 
approximately 7,000 pupils took this option of whom 4,300 
were minority students. The remaining 16,000 students in 
paired and clustered schools continued to participate in 
the desegregation plan on a voluntary basis. 
The state courts refused to enjoin termination 
of the plan. On April 17, 1980, however, the United 
States District Court for the Central District of 
California issued a temporary restraining order preventing 
termination of the plan . Los Angeles NAACP v. Los Angeles 
Unified School District, 513 F. Supp. 717 (C.D. Cal. 
1981). The District Court found that there was a "fair 
chance" that intentional segregation by the District could 
be demonstrated. The District Court's order was vacated 
on the following day by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit. Los Angeles Unified v. School 
District v. District Court, 650 F. 2d 1004 (CA9 1981). On 
remand the District Court denied the District's motion to 
dismiss. This ruling has been certified for interlocutory 
appeal. 
On September 10, 1081, the Superior Court approved a 






We agree with the California court of appeals in 
:::--
rejecting the contention that once a state chooses to do 
"more" than the fourteenth amendment requires, it may 
never recede.11 We rs.£.use 
~f 
,e,.t~o- .;;ia,43el-f'e~~,... I\ a position so 
a- ) ;a 
destructive of eh-e states democratic processes and of 
I\ A 
~.:1~ 
1jh.e.k ability to experiment , '""ii J:' l earn. Nor iloes, -ri;is 
;\ j -µ,~ -
extreftte position ~ ~ support in the decisions of this 
Court. 
Proposition I does not inhibit enforcement of 
any federal law or constitutional requirement. Quite the 
contrary, by its plain language the Proposition seeks ~ 
~ 
to embrace the requirements of the federal constitution 
with respect to mandatory school assignments and 
/ 
transportation. ~ It would be 
l-'1~4£L~R ~  
paradoxical to finEI that 
/1 
~ 
11Respondent Inc. argues that far from · 
doing "more" than the ourteenth amendment requires, the 
State actually violat d the amendment by assigning 
students on the basis f race when such assignments were 
not necessary to r medy a federal constitutional 
not need to det:i~ this contention i-R--,--
dec:W-Qfl in this case. we express on 
~ ±-on orr this que.stion. ~ 
·J - ~ 12In this respect Proposition I is similar to to/ 
[)-~' Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, 20 u.s.c. 
~ Footnote continued on next page. 









~: ~~~4 10. 
41 
~ ~~ ~k<---l::Z#1A._; ~ 
~J;~u~~--
/# 
~~ tr/ ~ ~f-~ 
voters of me r e l y by adopting thel\ fourteenth amendment, the 
PK-~~ 
the state thereby had violated it• /V J.~ WOU,L Q oe-__ 
/l ~~ r ~~~;- h., J-it_R.._ 
particn1lu~to E-Q acl:h.., such a conc lusion jn t hi s case ~ 
~~-~vf~ 
~ iRe@ 'tne California constitution still imposes a greater 
..., ~ 
/ 
I, aveo state 
obligation under state law to order segregated school 
districts to use voluntary desegregation techniques, 
whether or not there has been a finding of intentional 
segregation. The school districts themselves retain a 
state law obligation to desegregate and remain free to 
adopt even mandatory reassignment and busing plans to 
? 
" ~ 
~•~effectuate desegregation, 13 
~ ~,Li~~ . 
~ ( §1701-1758. Section 1714 provides: "No court, 







to section 1713 of this title, order the implementation of 
a plan that would require the transportation of any 
student to a school other than the school closest or next 
closest to his place of residence." This provision must 
be read in conjunction with §1702 which provides that "the 
provisions of this chapter are not intended to modify or 
diminish the authority of the courts of the United States 
to enforce fully the fifth and fourteenth amendments to 
the Constitution of the United States." 
13 rn an opinion delivered after Proposition I was 
enacted, the California Supreme Court stated that "the 
amendment neither releases school districts from their 
state constitutional obligation to take reasonably 
feasible steps to alleviate segregation regardless of its 
cause, nor divests California courts of authority to order 
( desegregation measures other than pupil school assignment 
i or pupil transportation." McKinny v. Oxnard Union High 
Footnote continued on next page. 
11. 
--rfl ? ., 
Nonetheless, petitioners contend that 
Proposition I is unconstitutional on its face. They argue 
that Proposition I employs an "explicit racial 
classification" and imposes a "race-specific" burden on 
minorities seeking to vindicate state created rights. By 
limiting the power of state courts to enforce the state 
,,.. --
created right to 
rig~ may be vindicated by the state courts 
limitation on petitioners contend that 
Proposition I creates a "dual court system" 
discriminates on the basis of race. 14 Se characterH~ 
~ 
p etitioners argue 
~,,~~f-~,,~~4 
that /\ Proposition I must be -;: L/1-
~ nstitutional unless supported by a compelling state 
interest. 
School District Board of Trustees, Cal. 3d , P. 
2d (1982) (Slip-.- op. at 13-14) • Moreover-,-the 
Proposition only limits state courts when enforcing the 
state constitution. Thus, the Proposition would not bar 
state court enforcement of state statutes requiring busing 
for desegregation or for any other purpose. Cf. Brown v. 
Califano, 627 F. 2d 1221, 1230 (CADC 1980) (legislation 
limiting power of federal agency to require busing by 
local school boards held cons ti tut ional in view of the 
"effective avenues for desegregation" left open by the 
legislation). 
1411 [I]t is racial discrimination in the judicial 
apparatus of the state, not racial discrimination in the 
state's schools, that petitioners challenge under the 












We would agree that if Proposition I employed a 
racial classification it would be unconstitutional unless 
necessary to the -advane....,,..t ~ ~ ll ing state 
interest. "Official action that treats a person 
differently on account of his race or ethnic origin is 
inherently suspect and presumptively invalid." Fullilove 
~ 
I 
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 523 {Stewart, J., di~ en t ing). 
See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 {1964). But 
Proposition I 
,( a-
does not embody ~ expl ic!i) '1 racial 
I? ~~ ~ ~ ~ 
w~ 
dlJ //,(Arr 
classification. It flewhere direct ~ that persons are to be LI.A.,(_ 
I I ~ ~ • 
£>t/~ 
treated differently on account of their race. It simply 
forbids state courts from ordering pupil school assignment 
or transportation in the absence of a fourteenth amendment 
-fl, ~,A,-•L 'ft~~ -'½ ?0: 
violation. The benefit it seeks ~ r--neighborhood 
_V' 
schooling--is made available regardless of 
15A neighborhood school policy does not offend the 
fourteenth amendment in itself. See Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 28 {1971) {"Absent a 
constitutional violation there would be no basis for 
judicially ordering assignment of students on a racial 
basis. All things being equal, with no history of 
discrimination, it might well be desireable to assign 
pupils to schools nearest their homes."). Cf. 20 u.s.c. 
§1701: "{a) The Congress declares it to be the policy of 
the Unites States that--(1) all children enrolled in 
public schools are entitled to equal educational 
opportunity without regard to race, color, sex, or 
national or1g1n; and (2) the neighborhood is the 
appropriate basis for determining public school 
Footnote continued on next page. 
jJ-~ - ~ ?Z I ( p.2) /ZJ~-4./ 
~~~., ~~ ~ 13. 
~-~H<.e,,~"5~ 
I»<. ~ ~ ~ lA.--l A.,; ~ _? ~ 
Mu.,.,~;~~~~~ ✓ CS-
/3 ~~C4---~~~- -(3~~.u~L~ 
~ QI Indeed, if anything, the Proposition makes it less likely ~ ,~t 
~ 
f~ 
that the state will treat persons differently on account 
of their race. 
~ 
that Proposition I Nor eat1 it be said 
A 
;_f~~ 
discriminates on the basis of race simply because it has 
/\ 
an ef feet on racial ~ or because it deals with a 
matter closely connected to race relations. We have held 
that even when a neutral law has a disproportionately 
~ effect on a racial 
amendment is violated only if a 
minority, the fourteenth 







be shown. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, (1976}; 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 






has recognized A a 
distinction between state action that discriminates on the 
~ 
~~ ~~Lu{) 
basis of race and state action that addresses t-Q.e problems , 
/\ 
o f-½ aci-al disorimination. 16 This distinction is implicit 
a s s i g nm en ts • " ~ ~ 
16Proposition I is not limited to busi /4 for the 
purpose of racial desegregation. It appliesl \o "pupil 
school assignment or pupil transportation" in general. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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in the Court's repeated statement that the equal 
protection clause is not violated by the simple repeal of 
race related legislation or policies that were not 
required by the federal constitution in the first place. 
In Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 
~ A,t,e c~.-:;;,::1-
414 (1976}, AY found that the school board's mere 
repudiation of an earlier resolution calling for 
desegregation did not violate the fourteenth amendment in 
~~ 
itself. 17 In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 376 (1967}, 
and again in Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 390 n. 5 
(1969}, we were careful to note that the laws under review 
did more than "merely repeal" existing anti-discrimination 
legislation. 18 The simple repeal or modification of 
Even so, it seems clear that court ordered busing for the 
purpose of racial desegregation was the major concern of 
the amendment. 
17see Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 
U.S. 526, 531 n. 5 ("Racial imabalance, we noted in Dayton 
..!_, is not per se a constitutional violation, and 
rescission of prior resolutions proposing desegregation is 
unconstitutional only if the resolutions were required in 
the first place by the Fourteenth Amendment"}. 
18 In Hunter we noted: "we do not hold that mere 
repeal of an existing [anti-discrimination] ordinance 
violates the Fourteenth Amendment." 393 U.S., at 390 n. 
5. In Reitman the Court held that California Proposition 
14 was unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment not 
because it repealed two pieces of anti-discrimination 
legislation, but because the Proposition involved the 
State in private racial discrimination: "Here we are 
dealing with a provision whcih does not just repeal an 







desegregation or anti-discrimination laws has never been 
viewed as embodying a presumptively invalid racial 
classification merely because such repealing legislation 
inevitably deals with problems of race relations. 19 
Were we to hold that the mere repeal of race 
t...,,L 
related legislation { ~ unconstitutional, we would 
~f~~cj 6$St '-~~~ 
:r-- diseourag-e th0_,,{ states from -a.,:lempting to deal with ~ 
pf ~~9~~  
"y--mo-st: '.f)ress-iRS of. problems t\ by i-Ere¥oc~b-ly eommittirrg them 
s ~ ~ -b.L-~ 
~ to legislation that has proven harmful in 
an Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 
In 
411 U.S. 1, 50 
(1973), we noted that "[n]o area of social concern stands 
to profit more from a multiplicity of viewpoints and from 
a diversity of approaches than does public education." 
The same may be said of the desegregation of the public 
schools or of any other race related problem. The nation 
benefits whenever a state agrees to "serve as a 
existing law forbidding pr iv ate racial discriminations. 
Section 26 was intended to authorize, and does authorize, 
racial discrimination in the housing market." 
19of course, if the purpose of repealing 
legislation is to disadvantage a racial minority, the 
repeal is unconstitutional for this reason. See Arlington 







laboratory; and try novel social and 
. ,...,.. 
economic 
experiments." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. < 262, 280, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
that take a leadership role should not be punished 
deterred by a constitutional intepretation that would b[ nd 
·~ st-a-k.e-s. 
~ 
~ ~ / ertainly the purposes of the fourteenth 
amendment would not be advanced by an interpretation of 
that amendment that discouraged the states from providing 
greater protection to racial minorities. 20 Nor would the 
purposes of the amendment be t::::::!:a• ~ requiring the 
A:, 
states to maintain legislation designed to ameliorate race 
relations or to protect racial minorities but which has 
produced just the opposite effects. 21 
~ 
-¥e-t- -e-bQSe wottld be ~ 
sJS 
20see Palmer v. Thompson, 403 u.s. 217, 228 (1971) 
("To hold ••. that every public facility or service, once 
openp'ed, constitutionally "locks in" the public sponsor so 
that it may not be dropped ..• would plainly discourage 
the expansion and enlargement of needeA services in the 
long run") (Burger, C.J., concurring); Reitman v. Mulkey, 
387 U.S. 369, 395 (1967) ("Opponents of state 
antidiscrimination statutes are now in a position to argue 
that such legislation should be defeated because, if 
enacted, it may be unrepealable") (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
21 In his dissenting opinion in Reitman v. 
supra, Justice Harlan remarked upon the 
legislative flexibility when dealing with the 
and troublesome problems of race re lat ions. 
that have been and must be drawn in this area, 


















the results of requiring a state to maintain legislation 
that has proven unworkable or harmful when the 
under no obligation to adopt the legislation in the first 
? Moreover, and relevant to this case, when a 
state supreme court interprets a state constitution to 
require more than the fourteenth amendment demands, it is 
~ ~k:,;.j ~~~Lr(~ 
~l:¥ -J:9r:eper: thaat the people of the state should hav~ an ,.._ ,//.- ,., 
~ ~~-
g.p~o£t~8ity to disagree through means of a constitutional 
e would not interpret the fourteenth 
amendment to require the people of a state to submit to a 
court's interpretation of their constitution when th 
constitution itself vests final - -1.J[_ 




considerations by arguing that Proposition I is not a 
~ ~ 
"mere repeal." Relying I\ on ~~n in Hunter v. 
it is with human sensibilities and frailties of whatever 
race or creed, are difficult ones. The drawing of them 
requires understanding, patience, and compromise, and is 
best done by legislatures rather than be courts. When 
legislation in this field is unsuccessful there should be 
wide opportunities for legislative amendment, as well as 
for change through such processes as the popular 




Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), they con tend that 
Proposition I does not simply repeal a state created right 
..a...o 
but fundamentally alters the judicial system -stteh that 
.I\ 
"those seeking redress from racial isolation in violation 
of state law must be satisfied with less than full relief 
from a state court. 1122 
~ r;_ U-4-
We do not µ.n.d Hunter Ate -b'e 
controlling here, nor are we persuaded by petitioners' 
tJ,,~6-}'P~r.. 




In Hunter the Akron city charte~ ,.m.amended by 
the voters to provide that no ordinance regulating real 
estate on the basis of race, color, religion, or national 
origin could take effect until approved by a referendum ~o-£-7 




housing ordinance, adopted by the City Council at an 
earlier date, was no longer effective. In holding the 
charter amendment invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
22Transcript of Oral Argument 6. See id., at 7-8 
("The fact that a state may be free to removearight or 
remove a duty, does not mean that it has the same freedom 
to leave the right in place but simply, in a 





''~vi-~ :· 9 
~~- ~~ 








the Court~~ the charter amendment was not a 
~ 
simple repeal of the fair housing ordinance. The ~ 
amendment "not only suspended the operation of the 
existing ordinance forbidding housing discrimination, but 
also required the approval of the electors before any 
future [anti-discrimination] ordinance could take effect." 
Thus, whereas most ordinances regulating real property 
would take effect once enacted by the City Council, 
ordinances prohibiting racial discrimination in housing 
would be forced to clear an additional hurdle. 23 As such, 
the charter amendment placed an impermissible, "special 
burden[] on racial minorities within the governmental 
process."24 
23 "rn the case before us .•• the city of Akron has 
not attempted to allocate governmental power on the basis 
of any general principle. Here, we have a provision that 
has the clear purpose of making it more difficult for 
certain racial and religious minorities to achieve 
legislation that is in their interest." 393 U.S., at 395 
~
Harlan, J., concurring). '5"e
0
e, Estes v. Metropolital"!.t ,____-
Branches, Dallas NAA~~ 44 .S. 437, 4'~0-451 {1980)JO 
Powell, J., dissentin~ 
24The Hunter Court noted that although "the law on 
its face treats Negro and white, Jew and gentile in an 
identical manner," a charter amendment making it more 
difficult to pass anti-discrimination legislation could 
only disadvantage racial minorities in the governmental 
process. fT"ii""e limits to this analysis were made clear in 
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). There the CourtJ ? 
considered the constitutionality of a California • 
constitutional amendment providing that no low-rent 
housing project could be developed by the state until the { • ) 
Footnote continued on next page. ~
L)~ .· Wf 6 1 1/14 ~ Jf/16 ~ 
LAA, J/~~- .J ~'t ~ 









Simply stated, in Hunter racial minorities~ 
l,U7/vV ~ ht 
worse- ef:f ~le-wii:ig the charter 
11 
0 ee-€ore 'ena~ t--1:le fair hot.Ising ordinance, t.Fhis was 
trj,Hv..~~~; 




discrimination housing laws--~ ~ racial minorities--were 
"singled out for mandatory referendums while no other 
group ••. face[d] that obstacle." James v. Valtierra, 402 
U.S. 137, 142 (1971). By contrast, and assuming that 
racial minorities benefitted from the busing required by 
~~ It 
state law, Proposition I isAnet --e\'illl a ~e repeal" of 
~ ~,,c.:t--, 
the~ equal protection clause. As noted above, after 
'\ " 
~ 
Proposition I, the ~ia constitution still extends a 
project was approved by a majority of the local voters. 
Relying upon Hunter, a three-judge court held that the 
am~ndment discriminated on the basis of race and wealth. 
Th ~ Court reversed, holding that unlike the charter 
amendment in Hunter, this referendum provision could not 
be said to employ a racial classification. The record 
"would not support any claim that a law seemingly neutral 
on its face [was] in fact aimed at a racial minority," 
id., at 141, while a "lawmaking procedure that 
'°disadvantages' a particular group does not always deny 
equal protection." Id., at 142. 
Similarly,""areferendum making it more difficult 
to obtain court-ordered busing cannot be easily 
characterized as placing a burden on a racial minority or 
as employing a racial classification when there has been 
no finding of intentional discrimination. The burden of 
long busr ides falls on children of all races. It is not 
surprising that many minority parents elected to withdraw 
their children from the busing plan when mandatory 
participation was terminated, see note __ , supra, or, for 
example, that the Proposition received support from 73.9% 
of the voters in Los Angeles County which has a minority 
population of almost 50%. 
J ~ ~ ~ 
to. ...desegreg~tion than does the fourteenth 
Nor can it be said that Proposition I allocates 
governmental or judicial power on the basis of a 
discriminatory principle. "The Constitution does not 
require things which are different in fact or opinion to 
be treated in law as though they were the same." Tigner 
v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940). Remedies appropriate 
in one area of legislation may not be desireable in 
another. A "dual court system" is not established simply 
because civil rights remedies are different from those 
available in other areas. 25 Surely it was constitutional 
for the State supreme court to caution against excessive 
intervention in school desegregation and against 
the use of busing in all instances. See note 3 supra. It 
was equally appropriate for the people of the State to 
~~~ 
determine that the costs of mandatory busing--ord9rea 
25Petitioners contend that Proposition I only 
restricts busing for the purpose of racial discrimination. 
The Proposition I is neutral on its face, however, and 
respondents--as well as the State in its amicus brief--
take issue with petitioners' interpretation of the 
provision. See note 16, supra. 
22. 
under the state constitution--were too high. 26 
In short, whether Proposition I is understood as 
withdrawing a desegregation "remedy", withdrawing a 
"right" to court-ordered busing, or extending a right 
against involuntary busing makes little difference. 
Having gone beyond the requirements of the federal 
constitution, the state was free to recede. It could have 
conformed its equal protection clause to the federal 
constitution in every respect. That it chose to pull back 
only in part, and by preserving a greater right to 
desegregation than exists under the federal constitution, 
most assuredly does not render the Proposition 
unconstitutional on its face. 
-H-I- V ----
The California court of appeals also rejected 
petitioners' claim that Proposition I, if facially valid, 
26similarly a "dual constitution" is not 
established when the state chooses to go beyond the 
requirements of the federal constitution in some areas but 
not others. Nor is a "dual executive branch" created when 
an agency is given enforcement powers in one area but not 
in another. See Brown v. Califano, 627 F. 2d 1221 (CADC 
1980) (upholding congressional legislation that ensures 
that busing orders derive either from local school 










was nonetheless unconstitutional because enacted with a 
discriminatory purpose. The court reasoned that the 
purposes of the Proposition were well stated in the 
Proposition itself. Voters may have been motivated by any 
of these purposes, chief among them the educational 
benefits of neighborhood schooling. 27 Voters § a Y) also ) 
have considered that mandatory busing was actually 
creating a more segregated school system as whites 
continued to leave the system. See note 1, supra. The 
court found that petitioners' claim of discriminatory 
intent on the part of millions of voters was but "pure 
speculation." 
In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), the 
Court considered the constitutionality of another 
California Proposition. In that case, the California 
2711 [T]he Legislature and people of the st} e of 
California find and declare that this amendment is 
necessary to serve compelling public interests, including 
those of making the most effective use of the limited 
financial resources now and prospectively available to 
support public education, maximizing the educational 
opportunities and protecting the health and safety of all 
public school pupils, enhancing the ability of parents to 
participate in the educational process, preserving harmony 
and tranquility in this state and its public schools, 




Supreme Court had concluded that the Proposition was 
unconstitutional because it gave the state's approval to 
~ 
private racial discrimination. ~ Court agreed, 
deferring to the findings made by the California court. 
The Court noted that the Cal ifornia court was "armed .•. 
with the knowledge of the facts and circumstances 
concerning the passage and potential impact" of the 
Proposition and "familiar with the milieu in which that 
provision would operate." Id., at 378. Similarly, in 
this case, again involving the circumstances of passage 
and the potential impact of a Proposition adopted at a 
state-wide election, we see no reason to differ with the 
conclusions of the state appellate court. 28 
Under decisions of this Court, a law neutral on 
~-6-(?__ 
its face hr still I\ unconstitutional if motivated by a 
discriminatory purpose. In determining whether such a 
~ 
purpose was /1' motivating factor, the racially 
28cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) 
( "The extent of deference that one pays to the trial 
court's determination of the factual issue, and indeed, 
the extent to which one characterizes the intent issue as 
a question of fact or a question of law, will vary in 




disproportionate effect of official action provides "an 
important starting point." See Personnel Administrator of 
Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273-274 (1979}; 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 
U.S. 252, 264-266 (1977}; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 
229 (1976}. ,,Ve 
In this case it is far from clear that 
Proposition I has a disparate impact on a racial minority. 
The Proposition in no way purports to limit the power of 
state courts to remedy the effects of intentional 
segregation with its accompanying stigma. The benefits of~ 
,J,_" ~ ,,,..,~ =l,,J ~ -
neighborhood schooling arert--a~ valtlable to racial ~ 
~sesed:;)~.llJ"S ~~~ 
minof-i--t: i:e-s-- - iww cemp1: i-oinq I\ over 7 5% of the ~Los Angel~ 
~ 4 A, ,41t La! zzt.:z;.;~ 
public school bod~ -as they are to members of the 
~ ~ d.-,, ~~~. ~ul,,)12., 
rµ.a3g~ i-ey. Moreover, the Proposition_ simply removes one ~ 
means of achieving the state created right to desegregated 
education. School districts retain the obligation to 
alleviate segregation regardless of cause while the state 
courts may order other desegregation measures aside from 
pupil school assignment or pupil transportation. 29 








Even if we could assume that Proposition I has a 
disproportionate adverse effect on racial minorities, we 
See. /lo 
-- ~mttl:a li Lt.~ reason -to challenge the court of appeal's v ~ --
conclusion that the voters of the state were not motivated 
by a discriminatory purpose. / A - constitutional amendment 
adopted in a statewide election "that is supported by 
valid and articulable justifications cannot be invalid 
simply because some participants in the decisionmaking 
process were motivated by a purpose to disadvantage a 
minority group." Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 92 (1979) 
(Stevens, J., concurring). In this case the Proposition 
passed by an overwhelming majority of the electorate. It 
received support from members of all races. The purposes 
of the Proposition are stated in its text and are 
29 In Brown v. Califano, 627 F. 2d 1221, 1234 (CADC 
1980), the Court of Appeals found that legislation 
preventing the Department of Health, Eduction, and Welfare 
(HEW) from requiring busing "to a school other than the 
school which is nearest the student's home" was not 
unconstitutional. HEW retained authority to encourage 
school districts to desegregate through other means while 
the enforcement powers of the Department of Justice were 
untouched. The court ti,e.-refo~ concluded that the limits 
on HEW's ability to order mandatory busing did not have a 
discriminatory effect. And the court therefore refused to 
inquire into legislative motivation: "Absent 
discriminatory effect, judicial inquiry into legislative 




legitimate, nondiscriminatory objectives. In these 
circumstances we will not dispute the judgment of the 
court of appeal or impugn the motivation of the state's -- -
electorate. 
Accordingly the judgment of the court of appeal 
is 
Affirmed. 
lfp/ss 05/15/82 Rider A, p. 15 (Crawford) 
CRAW15 SALLY-POW 
The Court found that voters also may have considered that 
the extent of mandatory busing, authorized by state law, 
actually was aggravating rather than ameliorating the 
desegregation problem. 
David: This rider takes some liberty with what the 
California court actually said. Perhaps it would be better 
to quote exactly what it said. I would omit, however, the 
reference to white flight. This is anathema to some of our 
friends. 
lfp/ss 05/15/82 Rider A, p. 9 (Crawford) 
CRAW9 SALLY-POW 
There has been no showing in this case that 
Proposition I has a racially discriminatory effect. Even if 
there were some such effect, in view of the demographic mix 
of the district it is not clear as to which race or races 
would be affected the most or in what way. But even if some 
racially effect were shown, prior deicsions of this Court 
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FORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 
[May -, 1982) 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
An amendment to the California Constitution provides that 
state courts shall not order mandatory pupil assignment or 
transportation unless a federal court would do so to remedy a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. The ques-
tion for our decision is whether this provision is itself in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
I 
This litigation began almost twenty years ago in 1963, 
when minority students attending school in the Los Angeles 
Unified School District (District) filed a class action in state 
court seeking desegregation of the District's schools. 1 The 
case went to trial some five years later, and in 1970 the trial 
'In 1980 the District included 562 schools with 650,000 students in an 
area of 711 square miles. In 1968 when the case went to trial, the District 
was 53.6% white, 22.6% black, 20% Hispanic, and 3.8% Asian and other. 
By October 1980 the demographic composition had altered radically: 23. 7% 
white, 23.3% black, 45.3% Hispanic, and 7. 7% Asian and other. See 
Crawford v. Board of E ducation, 113 Cal. App. 3d 633, 642 (1~ , 
tween October 1976 and October 1980 the~ ite---studerlte1iro!Jment in the \ 




2 CRAWFORD v. LOS ANGELES BOARD OF EDUCATION 
court issued an opinion finding that the District was substan-
tially segregated in violation of the state and federal constitu-
tions. The court ordered the District to prepare a deseg-
regation plan for immediate use. App. 139. 
On the District's appeal, the California Supreme Court af-
firmed, but on a different basis. Crawford v. Board of Edu-
cation, 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 P. 2d 28 (1976). While the trial 
court had found de jure segregation in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, see 
App. 117, 120-121, the California Supreme Court based its 
affirmance solely upon the ftqual Protection Clause of the 
state constitution. 2 The court explained that under the Cali-
fornia constitution "state school boards ... bear a constitu-
tional obligation to take reasonable steps to alleviate segrega-
tion in the public schools, whether the segregation be de facto 
or de jure in origin." 17 Cal. 3d, at 290, 551 P. 2d, at 34. The 
court remanded to the trial court for preparation of a "rea-
sonably feasible" plan for school desegregation. 17 Cal. 3d, 
at 310, 551 P. 2d, at 48. 3 
2 "The findings in this case adequately support the trial court's conclu-
sion that the segregation in the defendant school district is de jure in na-
ture. We shall explain, however, that we do not rest our decision on this 
characterization because we continue to adhere to our conclusion in [Jack-
son v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P. 2d 878 (1963)) 
that school boards in California bear a constitutional obligation to take rea-
sonably feasible steps to alleviate school segregation 'regardless of its 
cause."' Crawford v. Board of Education, 17 Cal. 3d 280, 285, 551 P. 2d 
28, 30 (1976). The court explained that federal cases were not controlling: 
"In focusing primarily on ... federal decisions ... defendant ignores a sig-
nificant line of California decisions, decisions which authoritatively estab-
lish that in this state school boards do bear a constitutional obligation to 
take reasonable steps to alleviate segregation in the public schools, 
whether the segregation be de facto or de jure in origin." 17 Cal. 3d, at 290, 
551 P. 2d, at 33-34. 
3 In stating general principles to guide the trial court on remand, the 
State Supreme Court discussed the "busing" question: "While critics have 
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On remand, the trial court rejected the District's mostly 
voluntary desegregation plan but ultimately approved a sec-
ond plan that included substantial mandatory school reassign-
ment and transportation-"busing'' -on a racial and ethnic 
basis. 4 The plan was put into effect in the fall of 1978, but 
after one year's experience, all parties to the litigation were 
dissatisfied. See Crawford v. Board of Education, 113 Cal. 
App. 3d 633, 636 (1980). Although the plan continued in op-
eration, the trial court began considering alterna~ives in No-
vember 1979. 
In November 1979 the voters of the State of California rati-
fied Proposition I, an amendment to the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses of the state constitution. 5 Propo-
- --, 
again emphasized that 'busing' is not a constitutional end in itself but is 
simply one potential tool which may be utilized to satisfy a school district's 
constitutional obligation in this field. . . . [I]n some circumstances busing 
will be an appropriate and useful element in a desegregation plan, while in 
other instances its 'costs, ' both in financial and educational terms, will ren-
der its use inadvisable." 17 Cal. 3d, at 309, 551 P. 2d, at 47. It noted as 
well that a state court should not intervene to speed the desegregation 
process so long as the school board takes "reasonably feasible steps to al-
leviate school segregation," 17 Cal. 3d, at 305, 551 P. 2d, at 45, and that 
"a,court cannot properly issue a 'busing' order so long as a school district 
continues to meet its constitutional obligations." 17 Cal. 3d, at 310, 551 P. 
2d, at 48. 
'The plan provided for the mandatory busing of approximately 40,000 
students in the fourth through eighth grades. Some of these children 
were bused over long distances requiring daily round-trip bus rides of as 
long as two to four hours. In addition, the plan provided for the voluntary 
transfer of some 30,000 students. 
Respondent Bustop, Inc. unsuccessfully sought to stay implementation 
of the plan. See Bustop, Inc. v. Board of Education, 439 U. S. 1380 
(1978) (REHNQUIST, J ., in chambers); Bustop, Inc. v. Board of Education, 
439 U. S. 1384 (1978) (POWELL, J. , in chambers). 
• Proposition I was placed before the voters following a two-thirds vote 
of each house of the state legislature. Cal. Const. art. 18, § 1. The state 
senate approved the Proposition by a vote of 28 to 6, the state assembly by 
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sition I conforms the power of state courts to order busing to 
that exercised by the federal courts under the Fourteenth 
Amendment: 
"[N]o court of this state may impose upon the State of 
California or any public entity, board, or official any ob-
ligation or responsibility with respect to the use of pupil 
school assignment or pupil transportation, (1) except to 
remedy a specific violation by such party that would also 
constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
and (2) unless a federal court would be permitted under 
federal decisional law to impose that obligation or 71-
responsibility upon such party to remedy the specific ·_ 
olation of the Equal Protection Clause .... " 6 Follow-
2,433,312 (68.6%) to 1,112,923 (31.4%). The Proposition received a majority 
of the vote in each of the State's 58 counties and in 79 of the State's 80 
assembly districts. California Secretary of State, Statement of the Vote, 
Nov. 6, 1979 Election, 3--6, 43-46. 
6 Proposition I added a lengthy proviso to article 1, § 7(a) of the Califor-
nia Constitution. Following passage of.Proposition I, § 7 now provides, in 
relevant part: 
"(a) A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws; provided, that 
nothing contained herein or elsewhere in this Constitution imposes upon 
the State of California or any public entity, board, or official any obliga-
tions or responsibilities which exceed those imposed by the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution with 
respect to the use of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation. In 
enforcing this subdivision or any other provision of this Constitution, no 
court of this state may impose upon the State of California or any public 
entity, board, or official any obligation or responsibility with respect to the 
use of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation, (1) except to remedy 
a specific violation by such party that would also constitute a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, and (2) unless a federal court would be permitted under fed-
eral decisional law to impose that obligation or responsibility upon such 
party to remedy the specific violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
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ing approval of Proposition I, the District asked the Su-
perior Court to halt all mandatory reassignment and 
busing of pupils. App. 185. On May 19, 1980, the court 
denied the District's application. The court reasoned 
that Proposition I was of no effect in this case in light of 
the court's 1970 finding of de jure segregation by the 
District in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 
Shortly thereafter, the court ordered implementation of 
a revised desegregation plan, one that again substan-
tially relied upon mandatory pupil reassignment and 
transportation. 7 
The California Court of Appeal reversed. 113 Cal. 
App. 3d 633 (1980). The court found that the trial 
court's 1970 findings of fact would not support the con-
clusion that the District had violated the federal con-
stitution through intentional segregation. 8 Thus, Prop-
"Nothing herein shall prohibit the governing board of a school district 
from voluntarily continuing or commencing a school integration plan after 
the effective date of this subdivision as amended. 
"In amending this subdivision, the Legislature and people of the State of 
California find and declare that this amendment is necessary to serve com-
pelling public interests, including those of making the most effective use of 
the limited financial resources now and prospectively available to support 
public education, maximizing the educational opportunities and protecting 
the health and safety of all public school pupils, enhancing the ability of 
parents to participate in the educational process, preserving harmony and 
tranquility in this state and its public schools, preventing the waste of 
scarce fuel resources , and protecting the environment." 
7 The Superior Court ordered the immediate implementation of the re-
vised plan. The District was unsuccessful in its effort to gain a stay of the 
plan pending appeal. See Board of Education v. Superior Court, 448 
U. S. 1343 (1980) (REHNQUIST, J. , in chambers). 
8 "When the 1970 findings of the trial court are reviewed in the light of 
the correct applicable federal law, it is apparent that no specific segre-
gative intent with discriminatory purpose was found. The thrust of the 
findings of the trial court was that passive maintenance by the Board of a 
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osition I was applicable to the trial court's desegregation 
plan and would bar that part of the plan requiring man-
datory student reassignment and transportation. More-
over, the court concluded that Proposition I was con-
stitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 
654. The court found no obligation on the part of the 
State to retain a greater remedy at state law against ra-
cial segregation than was provided by the Federal Con-
stitution. Ibid. Nor eould the court find that Proposi- 7 
tion I was adopted with a discriminatory purpose. Id., · 
at 654-655. 9 
Determining Proposition I to be applicable and con-
stitutional, the Court of Appeal vacated the orders en-
tered by the Superior Court. The California Supreme 
Court denied hearing. App. to Pet. for Cert. C. 10 We 
granted certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1981). 
balance amounted to de ju.re segregation in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. . . . But a school board has no duty under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to meet and overcome the effect of population movements." 
Crawford v. Board of Education, supra, 113 Cal. App. 3d, at 645-646. 
• The Court of Appeal also rejected the claim that Proposition I deprived 
minority children of a "vested right" to desegregated education in violation 
of due process. See 113 Cal. App. 3d, at 655--656. Petitioners no longer 







10 On March 16, 1981, the District directed that mandatory pupil reas-
signment under the Superior Court's revised plan be terminated on April 
20, 1981. On that date, parents of children who had been reassigned were 
given the option of returning their children to neighborhood schools. Ac-
cording to respondent, approximately 7,000 pupils took this option of whom 
4,300 were minority students. The remaining 16,000 students in paired 
and clustered schools continued to participate in the desegregation plan on 
a voluntary basis. Brief for Respondent, at 10. 
~ 
~~-
The state courts refused to enjoin termination of the plan. On April 17, 
1980, however, the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California issued a temporary restraining order preventing termination of 
the plan. Los Angeles NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School District, 513 
F. Supp. 717 (CD Cal. 1981). The District Court found that there was a 
"fair chance" that intentional segregation by the District could be demon-
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II 
We agree with the California Court of Appeal in rejecting 
the contention that once a State chooses to do "more" than 
the Fourteenth Amendment requires, it may never recede. 11 
We reject an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment so 
destructive of a state's democratic processes and of its ability 
to experiment. This interpretation has no support in the de-
cisions of this Court. 
Proposition I does not inhibit enforcement of any federal 
law or constitutional requirement. Quite the contrary, by 
its plain language the Proposition seeks only to embrace the 
requirements of the Federal Constitution with respect to 
mandatory school assignments and transportation. It would 
be paradoxical to conclude that by adopting the equal protec-
tion component of the Fourteenth Amendment, the voters of 
the State thereby had violated it. Moreover, even after 
Proposition I, the California constitution still imposes a 
greater duty of desegregation than does the federal constitu-
tion. The state courts of California continue to have an ob-
ligation under state law to order segregated school districts 
to use voluntary desegregation techniques, whether or not 
there has been a finding of intentional segregation. The 
school districts themselves retain a state law obligation tclae-
strated. Id., at 720. The District Court's order was vacated on the fol-
lowing day by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
Los Angeles Unified v. School District v. District Court, 650 F . 2d 1004 
(CA9 1981). On remand the District Court denied the District's motion to 
dismiss. This ruling has been certified for interlocutory appeal. See Brief 
for Respondents 10, n. 4. 
On September 10, 1981, the Superior Court approved a new, voluntary 
desegregation plan. 
11 Respondent Bustop, Inc. argues that far from doing "more" than the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires, the State actually violated the amend-
ment by assigning students on the basis of race when such assignments 
were not necessary to remedy a federal constitutional violation. See Brief 
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segregatejand j emain free to adopt reassignment and busing 
plans to effectuate desegregation. 12 
Nonetheless, petitioners contend that Proposition I is un-
constitutional on its face. They argue that Proposition I em-
ploys an "explicit racial classification" and imposes a "race-
specific" burden on minorities seeking to vindicate state 
created rights. By limiting the power of state courts to en-
force the state created right to desegregated schools, peti-
tioners contend, Proposition I creates a "dual court system" 
that discriminates on the basis of race. 13 They emphasize 
that other state created rights may be vindicated by the state 
courts without limitation on remedies. Petitioners argue 
that the "dual court system" created by Proposition I is un-
constitutional unless supported by a compelling state 
interest. 
We would agree that if Proposition I employed a racial 
classification it would be unconstitutional unless necessary to 
further a compelling state interest. "Because the core of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of meaningful and 
unjustified offical distinctions based on race ... racial classi-
12 In an opinion delivered after Proposition I was enacted, the California 
Supreme Court stated that "the amendment neither releases school dis-
tricts from their state constitutional obligation to take reasonably feasible 
steps to alleviate segregation regardless of its cause, nor divests California 
courts of authority to order desegregation measures other than pupil 
school assignment or pupil transportation." McKinny v. Oxnard Union 
High School District Board of Trustees, -- Cal. 3d--, -- P. 2d--
(1982) (Slip. op. at 13-14). Moreover, the Proposition only limits state 
courts when enforcing the state constitution. Thus, the Proposition would 
not bar state court enforcement of state statutes requiring busing for de-
segregation or for any other purpose. Cf. Brown v. Califano, 627 F. 2d 
1221, 1230 (CADC 1980) (legislation limiting power of federal agency to re-










~tive avenues for desegregation" left open by the legislation). 
13 "[I]t is racial discrimination in the judicial apparatus of the state, not ~-
racial discrimination in the state's schools, that petitioners challenge under /"t _ 
the Fourteenth Amendment in this case." Brief for Petitioner 48. ~ ~ 
~~ 
~7 
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CRAW9 SALLY-POW 
There has been no showing in this case that 
Proposition I has a racially discriminatory effect. ~ j f 
there were some such effect, in view of the demographic mix 
of the district it is not clear as to which race or races 
,:;: 
would be affected the most or in what way. But even if some 
racially effect were shown, prior deicsions of this Court 
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fications aJe 'constitutionally suspect," ... and subject to the 
'most figicf\ crutiny' .... " Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S. 
385, 39r-:392 (1969) (citations omitted). See McLaughlin v. 
Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 196 (1964). But Proposition I does 
not embody a racial classification. It neither says nor im-
plies that persons are to be treated differently on account of 
their race. It simply forbids state courts from ordering pu-
pil school assignment or transportation in the absence of a 
Fourteenth Amendment violation. The benefit it seeks to 
confer-neighborhood schooling-is made available regard-
less of race in the discretion of school boards. 14 Indeed, if 
anything, the Proposition makes it less likely that the State 
will treat persons differently on account of their race. ill or could it be said that Proposition I discriminates on the 
oasis of race simply because it could have an effect on racial ~~ 
groups or because it deals with a matter closely connected to 
I.A,6.':-Cc- - /) r f-f 
race relations. 15 We have held that even when a neutral la 
has a disproportionately adverse effect on a racial minority, 
the Fourteenth Amendment is violated only if a discrimina-
tory purpose can be shown. See Washington v. Davis, 426 
U. S. 229, 238-248 (1976); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
14 A neighborhood school policy does not offend the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in itself. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 
U. S. 1, 28 (1971) ("Absent a constitutional violation there would be no 
basis for judicially ordering assignment of students on a racial basis. All 
things being equal, with no history of discrimination, it might well be desir-
able to assign pupils to schools nearest their homes."). Cf. 20 U. S. C. 
§ 1701: "(a) The Congress declares it to be the policy of the Unites States 
that-(1) all children enrolled in public schools are entitled to equal educa-
tional opportunity without regard to race, color, sex, or national origin; and 
(2) the neighborhood is the appropriate basis for determining public school 
assignments." 
15 In the Los Angeles school district, white students are now the racial 
minority, see note 1, supra. Similarly, in Los Angeles County, racial mi-
norities , including those of Spanish origin, constitute the majority of the 
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Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 265 (1977); James v. 
Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 141 (1971). 
Similarly, the Court has recognized that a distinction may 
exist between state action that discriminates on the basis of 
race and state action that addresses, in neutral fashion, race 
relatedef:reblems. 16 This distinction is implicit in the Court's 
repeate statement that the E ual Protection Clause is not 
violated by the sim~lc epeal of race related legis ation or po -
icies that were not required by the Federal Constitution in 
the first place. In Dayton Bd. of Education v. Brinkman, 
433 U. S. 406, 414 (1977), we found that the school board's 
mere repudiation of an earlier resolution calling for deseg-
regation did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 17 In 
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369, 376 (1967), and again in 
Hunter v. Erickson, supra, at 390, n. 5 (1969), we were care-
ful to note that the laws under review did more than 
"mere[ly] repeal" existing anti-discrimination legislation. 18 
J M,.,' ~I "-7he simple repeal or modification of desegregation or anti-
~ 
IA..- I 
16 Proposition I is not limited to busing r the purpose of racial deseg- ~ 
regation. It applies neutrally to "pupil s ool assignment or pupil trans- / LA-(, ,T ,1--
portation" in general. Even so, it seems ear that court ordered busing,( ~tr/ ~ 
("<5 fmt. th~e-gf racial rlesegregatioo was the majo1 concern of the • 
· ~nt. ~- _ 
,,,,--- Z::S 11 See Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman, 443 U. S. 526, 531, n. 5 (1979) ~ ~ 
("Racial imabalance, we noted in Dayton I, is not per sea constituti.onal d  
violation, and rescission of prior resolutions proposing desegregation is un- ILi- .1 
constitutional only if the resolutions were required in the first place by the .a.,.-i...., d'>t..-e.--
Fourteenth Amendment."). 
18 In Hunter we noted that "we do not hold that mere repeal of an exist-
ing [anti-discrimination] ordinance violates the Fourteenth Amendment." 
393 U. S., at 390, n. 5. In Reitman the Court held that California Propo-
sition 14 was unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment not be-
cause it repealed two pieces of anti-discrimination legislation, but because 
the Proposition involved the State in private racial discrimination: "Here 
we are dealing with a provision whcih does not just repeal an existing law 
forbidding private racial discriminations. Section 26 was intended to au-
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discriminatio~ ws J 1ever has been viewed as embodying a 
presumptively invalld racial classification . ~
- ~ ¼egi.slftW;la-iae11itably deals •:Vi1b prob)eros->0f 
/0~ 
-------"b- ,_, Were we to hold that the mere repeal of race related legis-
lation is unconstitutional, we would limit seriously the au-
thority of States to deal with the problems of our heteroge-
neous population. States would be committed irr t 
legislation that has proven armful m practice. And cer- ~ ~ 
tainly the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment would not 
be advanced by an interpretation that discouraged the States 
from providing greater protection to racial minorities. 20 Nor 
would the purposes of the Amendment be furthered by re-
quiring the States to maintain legislation designed to amelio-
rate race relations or to protect racial minorities but which 
has produced just the opposite effects. 21 Yet these would be 
1
• Of course, if the purpose of repealing legislation is to disadvantage a 
racial minority, the repeal is unconstitutional for this reason. See 
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 (1967). 
20 See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217,228 (1971) ("To hold ... that 
every public facility or service, once opended, constitutionally 'locks in' the 
public sponsor so that it may not be dropped ... would plainly discourage 
the expansion and enlargement of needed services in the long run") (BUR-
GER, C. J., concurring); Reitman v. Mulkey, supra, at 395 ("Opponents of 
state antidiscrimination statutes are now in a position to argue that such 
legislation should be defeated because, if enacted, it may be unrepealable") 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). 
21 In his dissenting opinion in Reitman v. Mulkey, supra, at 395, Justice 
Harlan remarked upon the need for legislative flexibility when dealing with 
the "delicate and troublesome problems of race relations." He noted: 
"The lines that have been and must be drawn in this area, fraught as it is 
with human sensibilities and frailties of whatever race or creed, are diffi-
cult ones. The drawing of them requires understanding, patience, and 
compromise, and is best done by legislatures rather than be courts. When 
legislation in this field is unsuccessful there should be wide opportunities 
for legislative amendment, as well as for change through such processes as 
the popular initiative and referendum." Id. , at 395-396. 
81-38-OPINION 
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the results of requiring a State to maintain legislation that 
has proven unworkable or harmful when the State was under 
no obligation to adopt the legislation in the first place. 
Moreover, and relevant to this case, we would not interpret 
the Fourteenth Amendment to require the people of a State 
to adhere to a judicial construction of their state constitution 
when that constitution itself vests final authority in the 
people. 
III 
Petitioners seek to avoid the force of the foregoing consid-
erations by arguing that Proposition I is not a "mere repeal." 
Relying primarily on the decision in Hunter v. Erickson, 
supra, they contend that Proposition I does not simply repeal 
a state created right but fundamentally alters the judicial 
system so that "those seeking redress from racial isolation in 
violation of state law must be satisfied with less than full re-
lief from a state court." 22 We do not view Hunter as control-
ling here, nor are we persuaded by petitioners' characteriza-
tion of Proposition I as something more than a mere repeal. 
In Hunter the Akron city charter had been amended by the 
voters to provide that no ordinance regulating real estate on 
the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin could take 
effect until approved by a referendum. As a result of the 
charter amendment, a fair housing ordinance, adopted by the 
City Council at an earlier date, was no longer effective. In 
holding the charter amendment invalid under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court held that the charter amendment was 
not a simple repeal of the fair housing ordinance. The 
amendment "not only suspended the operation of the existing 
ordinance forbidding housing discrimination, but also re-
"" Transcript of Oral Argument 6. See id., at 7-8 ("The fact that a state 
may be free to remove a right or remove a duty, does not mean that it has 
the same freedom to leave the right in place but simply, in a discriminatory 
way we argue, provide less than full judicial remedy"). 
81-38-0PINION 
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quired the approval of the electors before any future [anti-
discrirnination] ordinance could take effect." 393 U. S., at 
389-390. Thus, whereas most ordinances regulating real 
property would take effect once enacted by the City Council, 
ordinances prohibiting racial discrimination in housing would 
be f9rced to clear an additional hurdle. 23 As such, the char-
ter amendment placed an impermissible, "special burden[] on 
racial minorities within the governmental process." Id., at 
391. 24 
Simply stated, in Hunter the position of racial minorities 
was worsened by the charter amendment. It was more than 
a "mere repeal" of the fair housing ordinance; persons seek-
ing anti-discrimination housing laws-presumptively racial 
minorities-were "singled out for mandatory referendums 
while no other group ... face[d] that obstacle." James v. 
Valtierra, SU'J)'ro, at 142. By contrast, even on the assump-
tion that racial minorities benefitted from the busing re-
quired by state law, Proposition I is less than a "repeal" of 
the California Equal Protection Clause. As noted above, 
after Proposition I, the state constitution still places upon 
school boards a greater duty to desegregate than does the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Nor can it be said that Proposition I allocates govern-
mental or judicial power on the basis of a discriminatory prin-
ciple. "The Constitution does not require things which are 
different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they 
23 "In the case before us ... the city of Akron has not attempted to allo-
cate governmental power on the basis of any general principle. Here, we 
have a provision that has the clear purpose of making it more difficult for 
certain racial and religious minorities to achieve legislation that is in their 
interest." 393 U. S., at 395 (Harlan, J ., concurring). 
:u The Hunter Court noted that although "the law on its face treats Ne-
gro and white, Jew and gentile in an identical manner," 393 U. S., at 391, a 
charter amendment making it more difficult to pass anti-discrimination leg-
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were the same." Tigner v. Texas, U. S. 141, 147 (19~ 
Remedies appropriate in one area of le · ation may not be 
desirable in another. A "dual court syste " is not estab-
lished simply because civil rights remedies are · ferent from 
those available in other areas. 25 Surely it was co titutional 
~ e §_Upreme _£ourt to caution against excess e judi-
cial interventfon in sclfool desegregation and against t e use 
of busing in all instances. See note 3 supra. It was eq ally 
appropriate for the people of the State to determine that l:te 
n-
IV 
The California Court of Appeal also rejected petitioners' 
claim that Proposition I, if facially valid, was nonetheless un-
constitutional because enacted with a discriminatory pur-
pose. The court reasoned that the purposes of the Proposi-
25 Petitioners contend that Proposition I only restricts busing for the 
purpose of racial discrimination. The Proposition I is neutral on its face, 
however, and respondents-as well as the State in its amicus brief-take 
issue with petitioners' interpretation of the provision. 
26 Similarly, a "dual constitution" is not established when the State 
chooses to go beyond the requirements of the Federal Constitution in some 
areas but not others. Nor is a "dual executive branch" created when an 
agency is given enforcement powers in one area but not in another. Cf. 
Brown v. Califano, 627 F . 2d 1221 (CADC 1980) (upholding federal legisla-
tion prohibiting a federal executive agency, but not local school officials or 
federal courts, from requiring busing). 















:p/ss 05/15/82 Rider A, p. 15 (Crawford) 
~RAW15 SALLY-POW 
The Court found that voters also may have considered that 
the extent of mandatory busing, authorized by state law, 
actually was aggravating rather than ameliorating the 
desegregation problem. 
David: This rider takes some liberty with what the 
California court actually said. Perhaps it would be better 
to quote exactly what it said. I would omit, however, the 
reference to white flight. This is anathema to some of our 
friends. 
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tion were well stated in t~roposition itself. 
have been motivated by any o{ these purposes,~ among 
them the educational benefits 'o neighborhood schooling. <n 
e~ court found that voters also ·· ay have- considered-t~ 
mandatory busing was actually crea ing a more segregated 
school system as white students cont ued to leave the sys-
~ Bee iwte I, :S~liecotirt oundt hatp etitioners 
,r caiinof discriminatory intent on the part of millions of voters 
was but "pure speculation." 113 Cal. App. 3d, at 655. 
In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 (1967), the Court 
considered the constitutionality of another California Propo-
sition. In that case, the California Supreme Court had con-
~ 
cluded that the Proposition was unconstitutional because it ~ 
gave the State's approval to private racial discrimination. 
This Court agreed, deferring to the findings made by the 
California court. The Court noted that the California court 
was "armed ... with the knowledge of the facts and circum-
stances concerning the passage and potential impact" of the 
Proposition and "familiar with the milieu in which that provi-
sion would operate." Id., at 378. Similarly, in this case, 
again involving the circumstances of passage and the poten-
tial impact of a Proposition adopted at a state-wide election, 
we see no reason to differ with the conclusions of the state 
appellate court. 28 
27 The Proposition contains its own statement of purpose: 
"[T]he Legislature and people of the State of California find and declare 
that this amendment is necessary to serve compelling public interests, in-
cluding those of making the most effective use of the limited financial re-
sources now and prospectively available to support public education, maxi-
mizing the educational opportunities and protecting the health and safety 
of all public school pupils, enhancing the ability of parents to participate in 
the educational process, preserving harmony and tranquility in this state 
and its public schools, preventing the waste of scarce fuel, resources, and 
protecting the environment." 
28 Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 253 (1976) ("The extent of 
deference that one pays to the trial court's determination of the factual 
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Under decisions of this Court, a law neutral on its face still 
may be unconstitutional if motivated by a discriminatory pur-
pose. In determining whether such a purpose was the moti-
vating factor, the racially disproportionate effect of official 
action provides "an important starting point." Personnel 
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 
274 (1979), quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Dev. Co~ supra, 429 U.S. 252, at 266. 
nthis case' ii fa:r Il"8m elear that Proposition I has a dis-
parate impact on a racial minority. The Proposition in no 
way purports to limit the power of state courts to remedy the 
effects of intentional segregation with its accompanying 
stigma. The benefits of neighborhood schooling are racially 
neutral. This manifestly is true in Los Angeles where over 
75%, of the public school body is composed of groups viewed 
as racial minorities. See notes 1 & 15, supra. Moreover, 
the Proposition simply removes one means of achieving the 
state created right to desegregated education. School dis-
tricts retain the obligation to alleviate segregation regardless 
of cause. And the state courts still may order desegregation 
measures other than pupil school assignment or pupil 
transportation. 29 
issue, and indeed, the extent to which one characterizes the intent issue as 
a question of fact or a question of law, will vary in different contexts.") ( 
STEVENS, J., concurring). 
29 In Brown v. Califano, supra, the Court of Appeals found that a fed-
eral statute preventing the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW) from requiring busing "to a school other than the school which is 
nearest the student's home," 42 U. S. C. § 2000d (1976), was not uncon-
stitutional. HEW retained authority to encourage school districts to de-
segregate through other means, and the enforcement powers of the De-
partment of Justice were left untouched. The court therefore concluded 
that the limits on HEW's ability to order mandatory busing did not have a 
discriminatory effect. And, having done so, it refused to inquire into leg-
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Finally, even if we could assume that Proposition I has a 
disproportionate adverse effect on racial minorities, we see 
no reason to challenge the Court of Appeal's conclusion that 
the voters of the State were not motivated by a discrimina-
tory purpose. See 113 Cal. App. 3d, at 654-655. In this 
case the Proposition passe~ by an overwlielming maJonty ol 
the electorate. 30 It received support from members of all 
races. 31 The purposes of the Proposition are stated in its 
text and are legitimate, nondiscriminatory objectives. In 
these circumstances, we will not dispute the judgment of the 
islative motivation is unnecessary, as well as undesirable." Id., at 1234. 
30 Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,253 (1976) (STEVENS, J., con-
curring) ("It is unrealistic ... to invalidate otherwise legitmate action sim-
ply because an improper motive affected the deliberation of a participant in 
the decisional process. A law conscripting clerics should not be invali-
dated because an atheist voted for it."). 
31 Proposition 1 received support from 73.9% of the voters in Los Ange-
les county which has a "minority" population-including those of Spanish 
origin-of over 50%. California Secretary of State, Statement of the 
Vote, November 6, 1979 Election, 3. See note 15 supra. By contrast, 
the Proposition received the lowest percentage of the vote in Humboldt 
and Marin counties which are nearly all-white in composition. 
The Ballot Pamphlet, prepared by the State Secretary of State and sent 
to the voters, included the following statement in support of Proposition I 
by Reverend W.C. Jackson: 
"One of the great myths of our society is that blacks and other minority 
children can only receive an effective and equal education through the use 
of forced busing programs. This is simply not true. The use of forced 
busing hinders voluntary integration participation and other steps which 
could improve the quality of education available in our schools. 
"AS MAYOR TOM BRADLEY HAS SAID, 'MOST PARENTS, 
WHATEVER THEIR COLOR, WHATEVER THEIR BACKGOUND, 
WHEREVER THEY LIVE, DON'T WANT THEIR KIDS TRANS-
PORTED BACK AND FORTH ACROSS THE CITY.' 
"As a black parent and minister who cares about children, I urge you to 
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Court of Appeal or impugn the motivation of the State's 
electorate. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
An amendment to the California Constitution provides that 
state courts shall not order mandatory pupil assignment or 
transportation unless a federal court would do so to remedy a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. The ques-
tion for our decision is whether this provision is itself in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
I 
This litigation began almost twenty years ago in 1963, 
when minority students attending school in the Los Angeles 
Unified School District (District) filed a class action in state 
court seeking desegregation of the District's schools. 1 The 
case went to trial some five years later, and in 1970 the trial 
court issued an opinion finding that the District was substan-
tially segregated in violation of the State and Federal Con-
1 In 1980 the District included 562 schools with 650,000 students in an 
area of 711 square miles. In 1968 when the case went to trial, the District 
was 53.6% white , 22.6% black, 20% Hispanic, and 3.8% Asian and other. 
By October 1980 the demographic composition had altered radically: 23. 7% 
white, 23.3% black, 45.3% Hispanic, and 7. 7% Asian and other. See 
Crawford v. Board of Education, 113 Cal. App. 3d 633, 642 (1980). 
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stitutions. The court ordered the District to prepare a de-
segregation plan for immediate use. App. 139. 
On the District's appeal, the California Supreme Court af-
firmed, but on a different basis. Crawford v. Board of Edu-
cation, 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 P. 2d 28 (1976). While the trial 
court had found de jure segregation in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, see 
App. 117, 120-121, the California Supreme Court based its 
affirmance solely upon the Equal Protection Clause of the 
State Constitution. 2 The court explained that under the 
California Constitution "state school boards . . . bear a con-
stitutional obligation to take reasonable steps to alleviate 
segregation in the public schools, whether the segregation be 
de facto or de jure in origin." 17 Cal. 3d, at 290, 551 P. 2d, at 
34. The court remanded to the trial court for preparation of 
a "reasonably feasible" plan for school desegregation. 17 
Cal. 3d, at 310, 551 P. 2d, at 48. 3 
2 "The findings in this case adequately support the trial court's conclu-
sion that the segregation in the defendant school district is de jure in na-
ture. We shall explain, however, that we do not rest our decision on this 
characterization because we continue to adhere to our conclusion in [Jack-
son v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P. 2d 878 (1963)) 
that school boards in California bear a constitutional obligation to take rea-
sonably feasible steps to alleviate school segregation 'regardless of its 
cause."' Crawford v. Board of Education, 17 Cal. 3d 280, 285, 551 P. 2d 
28, 30 (1976). The court explained that federal cases were not controlling: 
"In focusing primarily on . . . federal decisions . . . defendant ignores a sig-
nificant line of California decisions, decisions which authoritatively estab-
lish that in this state school boards do bear a constitutional obligation to 
take reasonable steps to alleviate segregation in the public schools, 
whether the segregation be de facto or de jure in origin." 17 Cal. 3d, at 290, 
551 P. 2d, at 33-34. 
3 In stating general principles to guide the trial court on remand, the 
State Supreme Court discussed the 'busing' question: "While critics have 
sometimes attempted to obscw·e the issue, court decisions time and time 
again emphasized that 'busing' is not a constitutional end in itself but is 
simply one potential tool which may be utilized to satisfy a school district's 
constitutional obligation in this field. . . . [l]n some circumstances busing 
81-38-OPINION 
CRAWFORD v. LOS ANGELES BOARD OF EDUCATION 3 
On remand, the trial court rejected the District's mostly 
voluntary desegregation plan but ultimately approved a sec-
ond plan that included substantial mandatory school reassign-
ment and transportation-"busing''-on a racial and ethnic 
basis. 4 The plan was put into effect in the fall of 1978, but 
after one year's experience, all parties to the litigation were 
dissatisfied. See Crawford v. Board of Education, 113 Cal. 
App. 3d 633, 636 (1980). Although the plan continued in op-
eration, the trial court began considering alternatives in Oc-
tober 1979. 
In November 1979 the voters of the State of California rati-
fied Proposition I, an amendment to the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses of the State Constitution. 5 Propo-
will be an appropriate and useful element in a desegregation plan, while in 
other instances its 'costs,' both in financial and educational terms, will ren-
der its use inadvisable." 17 Cal. 3d, at 309, 551 P. 2d, at 47. It noted as 
well that a state court should not intervene to speed the desegregation 
process so long as the school board takes "reasonably feasible steps to al-
leviate school segregation," 17 Cal. 3d, at 305, 551 P. 2d, at 45, and that 
"a court cannot properly issue a 'busing' order so long as a school district 
continues to meet its constitutional obligations." 17 Cal. 3d, at 310, 551 P. 
2d, at 48. 
' The plan provided for the mandatory reassignment of approximately 
40,000 students in the fourth through eighth grades. Some of t) -,ese chil-
dren were bused over long distances requiring daily round-trip bu:; rides of 
as long as two to four hours. In addition, the plan provided for the volun-
tary transfer of some 30,000 students. 
Respondent Bustop, Inc. unsuccessfully sought to stay implementation 
of the plan. See Bustop, Inc. v. Board of Education, 439 U. S. 1380 
(1978) (REHNQUIST, J. , in chambers); Bustop, Inc. v. Board of Education, 
439 U. S. 1384 (1978) (POWELL, J. , in chambers). 
5 Proposition I was placed before the voters following a two-thirds vote 
of each house of the state legislature. Cal. Const. art. 18, § 1. The state 
senate approved the Proposition by a vote of 28 to 6, the state assembly by 
a vote of 62 to 17. The voters favored the Proposition by a vote of 
2,433,312 (68.6%) to 1,112,923 (31.4%). The Proposition received a majority 
of the vote in each of the State's 58 counties and in 79 of the State's 80 
assembly districts. California Secretary of State, Statement of the Vote, 
81--38---OPINION 
4 CRAWFORD v. LOS ANGELES BOARD OF EDUCATION 
sition I conforms the power of state courts to order busing to 
that exercised by the federal courts under the Fourteenth 
Amendment: 
"[N]o court of this state may impose upon the State of 
California or any public entity, board, or official any ob-
ligation or responsibility with respect to the use of pupil 
school assignment or pupil transportation, (1) except to 
remedy a specific violation by such party that would also 
constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
and (2) unless a federal court would be permitted under 
federal decisional law to impose that obligation or 
responsibility upon such party to remedy the specific vi-
olation of the Equal Protection Clause. " 6 
November 6, 1979 Election, 3-6, 43-46. 
6 Proposition I added a lengthy proviso to article 1, § 7(a) of the Califor-
nia Constitution. Following passage of Proposition I, § 7 now provides, in 
relevant part: 
"(a) A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws; provided, that 
nothing contained herein or elsewhere in this Constitution imposes upon 
the State of California or any public entity, board, or official any obliga-
tions or responsibilities which exceed those imposed by the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the 14th Amendmr :1t to the United States Constitution with 
respect to the use of pupil schoo, assignment or pupil transportation. In 
enforcing this subdivision or any other provision of this Constitution, no 
court of this state may impose upon the State of California or any public 
entity, board, or official any obligation or responsibility with respect to the 
use of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation, (1) except to remedy 
a specific violation by such party that would also constitute a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, and (2) unless a federal court would be permitted under fed-
eral decisional law to impose that obligation or responsibility upon such 
party to remedy the specific violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
"Nothing herein shall prohibit the governing board of a school district 
from voluntarily continuing or commencing a school integration plan after 
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Following approval of Proposition I, the District asked the 
Superior Court to halt all mandatory reassignment and bus-
ing of pupils. App. 185. On May 19, 1980, the court denied 
the District's application. The court reasoned that Proposi-
tion I was of no effect in this case in light of the court's 1970 
finding of de jure segregation by the District in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Shortly thereafter, the court 
ordered implementation of a revised desegregation plan, one 
that again substantially relied upon mandatory pupil reas-
signment and transportation. 7 
The California Court of Appeal reversed. 113 Cal. App. 3d 
633 (1980). The court found that the trial court's 1970 find-
ings of fact would not support the conclusion that the District 
had violated the Federal Constitution through intentional 
segregation. 8 Thus, Proposition I was applicable to the trial 
the effective date of this subdivision as amended. 
"In amending this subdivision, the Legislature and people of the State of 
California find and declare that this amendment is necessary to serve com-
pelling public interests, including those of making the most effective use of 
the limited financial resources now and prospectively available to support 
public education, maximizing the educational opportunities and protecting 
the health and safety of all public school pupils, enhancing the ability of 
parents to participate in the educational process, preserving harmony and 
t ·anquility in this state and its public schools, preventing the waste of 
scarce fuel resources, and protecting the environment." 
7 The Superior Court ordered the immediate implementation of the re-
vised plan. The District was unsuccessful in its effort to gain a stay of the 
plan pending appeal. See Board of Education v. Superior Court, 448 
U. S. 1343 (1980) (REHNQUIST, J., in chambers). 
8 "When the 1970 findings of the trial court are reviewed in the light of 
the correct applicable federal law, it is apparent that no specific segre-
gative intent with discriminatory purpose was found. The thrust of the 
findings of the trial court was that passive maintenance by the Board of a 
neighborhood school system in the face of widespread residential racial im-
balance amounted to de jure segregation in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. . . . But a school board has no duty under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to meet and overcome the effect of population movements." 
Crawford v. Board of Education , supra, 113 Cal. App. 3d, at 645-646. 
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court's desegregation plan and would bar that part of the plan 
requiring mandatory student reassignment and transporta-
tion. Moreover, the court concluded that Proposition I was 
constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 
654. The court found no obligation on the part of the State 
to retain a greater remedy at state law against racial seg-
regation than was provided by the Federal Constitution. 
Ibid. r The court rejected the claim that Proposition I was 
adopted with a discriminatory purpose. Id., at 654-655. 9 
Determining Proposition I to be applicable and constitu-
tional, the Court of Appeal vacated the orders entered by the 
Superior Court. The California Supreme Court denied hear-
ing. App. to Pet. for Cert. C. 10 We granted certiorari. - -
U. S. - (1981). 
9 The Court of Appeal also rejected the claim that Proposition I deprived 
minority children of a "vested right" to desegregated education in violation 
of due process. See 113 Cal. App. 3d, at 655-656. Petitioners no longer 
advance this claim. 
10 On March 16, 1981, the District directed that mandatory pupil reas-
signment under the Superior Court's revised plan be terminated on April 
20, 1981. On that date, parents of children who had been reassigned were 
given the option of returning their children to neighborhood schools. Ac-
cording to respondent, approximately 7,000 pupils took this option of whom 
4,300 were minority students. Brief for Respondent, 10. 
The state courts refused to enjoin termination of the plan. On April 17, 
1980, however, the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California issued a temporary restraining order preventing termination of 
the plan. Los Angeles NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School District, 
513 F. Supp. 717 (CD Cal. 1981). The District Court found that there was 
a "fair chance" that intentional segregation by the District could be demon-
strated. Id. , at 720. The District Court's order was vacated on the fol-
lowing day by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
Los Angeles Unified School District v. District Court, 650 F. 2d 1004 (CA9 
1981). On remand the District Court denied the District's motion to dis-
miss. This ruling has been certified for interlocutory appeal. See Brief for 
Respondents 10, n. 4. 
On September 10, 1981, the Superior Court approved a new, voluntary 
desegregation plan. 
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II 
We agree with the California Court of Appeal in rejecting 
the contention that once a State chooses to do "more" than 
the Fourteenth Amendment requires, it may never recede. 11 
We reject an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment so 
destructive of a state's democratic processes and of its ability 
to experiment. This interpretation has no support in the de-
cisions of this Court. 
Proposition I does not inhibit enforcement of any federal 
law or constitutional requirement. Quite the contrary, by 
its plain language the Proposition seeks only to embrace the 
requirements of the Federal Constitution with respect to 
mandatory school assignments and transportation. It would 
be paradoxical to conclude that by adopting the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the voters of 
the State thereby had violated it. Moreover, even after 
Proposition I, the California Constitution still imposes a 
greater duty of desegregation than does the Federal Con-
stitution. The state courts of California continue to have an 
obligation under state law to order segregated school dis-
tricts to use voluntary desegregation techniques, whether or 
not there has been a finding of intentional segregation. The 
school districts themselves retain a state law obligation to 
take reasonably feasible steps to desegregate, and they re-
main free to adopt reassignment and busing plans to eff ectu-
ate desegregation. 12 
11 Respondent Bustop, Inc. argues that far from doing "more" than the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires, the State actually violated the amend-
ment by assigning students on the basis of race when such assignments 
were not necessary to remedy a federal constitutional violation. See Brief 
for Respondent 10-18. We do not reach this contention. 
12 In an opinion delivered after Proposition I was enacted, the California 
Supreme Court stated that "the amendment neither releases school dis-
tricts from their state constitutional obligation to take reasonably feasible 
steps to alleviate segregation regardless of its cause, nor divests California 
courts of authority to order desegregation measures other than pupil 
<' 
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Nonetheless, petitioners contend that Proposition I is un-
constitutional on its face. They argue that Proposition I em-
ploys an "explicit racial classification" and imposes a "race-
specific" burden on minorities seeking to vindicate state 
created rights. By limiting the power of state courts to en-
force the state created right to desegregated schools, peti-
tioners contend, Proposition I creates a "dual court system" 
that discriminates on the basis of race. 13 They emphasize 
that other state created rights may be vindicated by the state 
courts without limitation on remedies. Petitioners argue 
that the "dual court system" created by Proposition I is un-
constitutional unless supported by a compelling state 
interest. 
We would agree that if Proposition I employed a racial 
classification it would be unconstitutional unless necessary to 
further a compelling state interest. "A racial classification, 
regardless of purported motivation is presumptively invalid 
and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification." 
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 
U. S. 256, 272 (1979). See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 
U. S. 184, 196 (1964). But Proposition I does not embody a 
racial classification. It neither says nor implies that persons 
are to be treated differently on account of their race. It sim-
ply forbids state courts from ordering pupil school assign-
school assignment or pupil transportation." McKinny v. Oxnard Union 
High School District Board of Trustees, -- Cal. 3d--, -- P. 2d--
(1982) (Slip. op. at 13-14). Moreover, the Proposition only limits state 
courts when enforcing the state constitution. Thus, the Proposition would 
not bar state court enforcement of state statutes requiring busing for de-
segregation or for any other purpose. Cf. Brown v. Califano, 627 F. 2d 
1221, 1230 (CADC 1980) (legislation limiting power of federal agency to re-
quire busing by local school boards held constitutional in view of the "effec-
tive avenues for desegregation" left open by the legislation). 
13 "[l]t is racial discrimination in the judicial apparatus of the state, not 
racial discrimination in the state's schools, that petitioners challenge under 
the Fourteenth Amendment in this case." Brief for Petitioner 48. 
81-38-OPINION 
CRAWFORD v. LOS ANGELES BOARD OF EDUCATION 9 
ment or transportation in the absence of a Fourteenth 
Amendment violation. The benefit it seeks to confer-
neighborhood schooling-is made available regardless of race 
in the discretion of school boards. 14 Indeed, even if Proposi-
tion I had a racially discriminatory effect, in view of the de-
mographic mix of the District it is not clear which race or 
races would be affected the most or in what way. 15 In addi-
tion, prior decisions of this Court make clear that even when 
a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse effect on a ra-
cial minority, the Fourteenth Amendment is violated only if a 
discriminatory purpose can be shown. 16 
Similarly, the Court has recognized that a distinction may 
exist between state action that discriminates on the basis of 
race and state action that addresses, in neutral fashion, race 
related matters. 17 This distinction is implicit in the Court's 
14 A neighborhood school policy does not offend the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in itself. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 
U. S. 1, 28 (1971) ("Absent a constitutional violation there would be no 
basis for judicially ordering assignment of students on a racial basis. All 
things being equal, with no history of discrimination, it might well be desir-
able to assign pupils to schools nearest their homes. "). Cf. 20 U. S. C. 
§ 1701: "(a) The Congress declares it to be the policy of the Unites States 
that-(1) all children enrolled in public schools are entitled to equal educa-
tional opportunity without regard to race, color, sex, or national origin; and 
(2) the neighborhood is the appropriate basis for determining public school 
assignments." 
15 In the Los Angeles school district, white students are now the racial 
minority, see note 1, supra. Similarly, in Los Angeles County, racial mi-
norities, including those of Spanish origin, constitute the majority of the 
population. See 1980 Census of Population and Housing, Advance Re-
ports 6. 
16 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 238-248 (1976); Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. , 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977); 
James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 141 (1971). 
17 Proposition I is not limited to busing for the purpose of racial deseg-
regation. It applies neutrally to "pupil school assignment or pupil trans-
portation" in general. Even so, it is clear that court ordered busing in ex-
cess of that required by the Fourteenth Amendment, as one means of 
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repeated statement that the Equal Protection Clause is not 
violated by the mere repeal of race related legislation or poli-
cies that were not required by the Federal Constitution in 
the first place. In Dayton Bd. of Education v. Brinkman, 
433 U. S. 406, 414 (1977), we found that the school board's 
mere repudiation of an earlier resolution calling for deseg-
regation did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 18 In 
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369, 376 (1967), and again in 
Hunter v. Erickson, supra, at 390, n. 5 (1969), we were care-
ful to note that the laws under review did more than 
"mere[ly] repeal" existing anti-discrimination legislation. 19 In 
sum, the simple repeal or modification of desegregation or 
anti-discrimination laws, without more, never has been 
viewed as embodying a presumptively invalid racial 
classification 20 
Were we to hold that the mere repeal of race related legis-
lation is unconstitutional, we would limit seriously the au-
desegregating schools , prompted the initiation and probably the adoption 
of Proposition I. 
1
• See Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman, 443 U. S. 526, 531, n. 5 (1979) 
("Racial imbalance, we noted in Dayton I , is not per se a constitutional vi-
olation, and rescission of prior resolutions proposing desegregation is un-
constitutional only if the resolutions were required in the first place by the 
Fourteenth Amendment."). 
19 In Hunter we noted that "we do not hold that mere repeal of an exist-
ing [anti-discrimination] ordinance violates the Fourteenth Amendment." 
393 U. S., at 390, n. 5. In R eitman the Court held that California Propo-
sition 14 was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment not be-
cause it repealed two pieces of anti-discrimination legislation, but because 
the Proposition involved the State in private racial discrimination: "Here 
we are dealing with a provision which does not just repeal an existing law 
forbidding private racial discriminations. Section 26 was intended to au-
thorize, and does authorize, racial discrimination in the housing market." 
20 Of course, if the purpose of repealing legislation is to disadvantage a 
racial minority, the repeal is unconstitutional for this reason. See 
R eitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 (1967). 
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thority of States to deal with the problems of our heteroge-
neous population. States would be committed irrevocably to 
legislation that has proven unsuccessful or even harmful in 
practice. And certainly the purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment would not be advanced by an interpretation that 
discouraged the States from providing greater protection to 
racial minorities. 21 Nor would the purposes of the Amend-
ment be furthered by requiring the States to maintain legis-
lation designed to ameliorate race relations or to protect ra-
cial minorities but which has produced just the opposite 
effects. 22 Yet these would be the results of requiring a State 
to maintain legislation that has proven unworkable or harm-
ful when the State was under no obligation to adopt the legis-
lation in the first place. Moreover, and relevant to this case, 
we would not interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to re-
quire the people of a State to adhere to a judicial construction 
of their state constitution when that constitution itself vests 
final authority in the people. 
21 See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217, 228 (1971) ("To hold ... that 
every public facility or service, once opened, constitutionally 'locks in' the 
public sponsor so that it may not be dropped . .. would plainly discourage 
the expansion and enlargement of needed services in the long run") (BUR-
GER, C. J ., concurring); R eitman v. M u lkey , supra, at 395 ("Opponents of 
state antidiscrimination statutes are now in a position to argue that such 
legislation should be defeated because, if enacted, it may be unrepealable") 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). 
22 In his dissenting opinion in R eitman v. M u lkey , supra, at 395, Justice 
Harlan remarked upon the need for legislative flexibility when dealing with 
the "delicate and troublesome problems of race relations. " He noted: 
"The lines that have been and must be drawn in this area, fraught as it is 
with human sensibilities and frailties of whatever race or creed, are diffi-
cult ones. The drawing of them requires understanding, patience, and 
compromise, and is best done by legislatures rather than by courts. When 
legislation in this field is unsuccessful there should be wide opportunities 
for legislative amendment, as well as for change through such processes as 
the popular initiative and referendum." Id., at 395-396. 
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III 
Petitioners seek to avoid the force of the foregoing consid-
erations by arguing that Proposition I is not a "mere repeal." 
Relying primarily on the decision in Hunter v. Erickson, 
supra, they contend that Proposition I does not simply repeal 
a state created right but fundamentally alters the judicial 
system so that "those seeking redress from racial isolation in 
violation of state law must be satisfied with less than full re-
lief from a state court." 23 We do not view Hunter as control-
ling here, nor are we persuaded by petitioners' characteriza-
tion of Proposition I as something more than a mere repeal. 
In Hunter the Akron city charter had been amended by the 
voters to provide that no ordinance regulating real estate on 
the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin could take 
effect until approved by a referendum. As a result of the 
charte~ amendment, a fair housing ordinance, adopted by the 
City Council at an earlier date, was no longer effective. In 
holding the charter amendment invalid under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court held that the charter amendment was 
not a simple repeal of the fair housing ordinance. The 
amendment "not only suspended the operation of the existing 
ordinance forbidding housing discrimination, but also re-
quired the approval of the electors before any future [anti-
discrimination] ordinance could take effect." 393 U. S., at 
389-390. Thus, whereas most ordinances regulating real 
property would take effect once enacted by the City Council, 
ordinances prohibiting racial discrimination in housing would 
be forced to clear an additional hurdle. 24 As such, the char-
"' Tr. of Oral Argument 6. See id., at 7-8 ("The fact that a state may be 
free to remove a right or remove a duty, does not mean that it has the same 
freedom to leave the right in place but simply, in a discriminatory way we 
argue, provide less than full judicial remedy"). 
24 "In the case before us ... the city of Akron has not attempted to allo-
cate governmental power on the basis of any general principle. Here, we 
have a provision that has the clear purpose of making it more difficult for 
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ter amendment placed an impermissible, "special burden[] on 
racial minorities within the governmental process." Id., at 
391. 25 
Hunter involved more than a "mere repeal" of the fair 
housing ordinance; persons seeking anti-discrimination hous-
ing laws---presumptively racial minorities---were "singled out 
for mandatory referendums while no other group ... face[d] 
that obstacle." James v. Valtierra, supra, at 142. By con-
trast, even on the assumption that racial minorities benefit-
ted from the busing required by state law, Proposition I is 
less than a "repeal" of the California Equal Protection 
Clause. As noted above, after Proposition I, the state con-
stitution still places upon school boards a greater duty to de-
segregate than does the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Nor can it be said that Proposition I allocates govern-
mental or judicial power on the basis of a discriminatory prin-
ciple. "The Constitution does not require things which are 
different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they 
were the same." Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141, 147 (1940). 
Remedies appropriate in one area of legislation may not be 
desirable in another. The remedies available for violation of 
the antitrust laws, for example, are different than those 
available for violation of the Civil Rights Acts. Yet a "dual 
court system"-one for the racial majority and one for the ra-
cial minority-is not established simply because civil rights 
remedies are different from those available in other areas. 26 
certain racial and religious minorities to achieve legislation that is in their 
interest." 393 U. S., at 395 (Harlan, J. , concurring). 
25 The H unter Court noted that although "the law on its face treats Ne-
gro and white, Jew and gentile in an identical manner," 393 U. S., at 391, a 
charter amendment making it more difficult to pass anti-discrimination leg-
islation could only disadvantage racial minorities in the governmental 
process. 
26 Petitioners contend that Proposition I only restricts busing for the 
purpose of racial discrimination. The Proposition I is neutral on its face, 
however, and respondents-as well as the State in its amicus brief-take 
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Surely it was constitutional for the California Supreme Court 
to caution that although "in some circumstances busing will 
be an appropriate and useful element in a desegregation 
plan," in other circumstances "its 'costs,' both in financial and 
educational terms, will render its use inadvisable." See note 
3, supra. It was equally constitutional for the people of the 
State to determine that the standard of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was more appropriate for California courts to 
apply in desegregation cases than the standard repealed by 
Proposition I.~ 
In short, having gone beyond the requirements of the Fed-
eral Constitution, the State was free to return in part to the 
standard prevailing generally throughout the United States. 
It could have conformed its law to the Federal Constitution in 
every respect. That it chose to pull back only in part, and by 
preserving a greater right to desegregation than exists under 
the Federal Constitution, most assuredly does not render the 
Proposition unconstitutional on its face. 
IV 
The California Court of Appeal also rejected petitioners' 
claim that Proposition I, if facially valid, was nonetheless un-
constitutional because enacted with a discriminatory pur-
pose. The court reasoned that the purposes of the Proposi-
tion were well stated in the Proposition itself. 28 Voters may 
issue with petitioners' interpretation of the provision. 
27 Similarly, a "dual constitution" is not established when the State 
chooses to go beyond the requirements of the Federal Constitution in some 
areas but not others. Nor is a "dual executive branch" created when an 
agency is given enforcement powers in one area but not in another. Cf. 
Brown v. Califano, 627 F. 2d 1221 (CADC 1980) (upholding federal legisla-
tion prohibiting a federal executive agency, but not local school officials or 
federal courts, from requiring busing). 
28 The Proposition contains its own statement of purpose: 
"[T]he Legislature and people of the State of California find and declare 
that this amendment is necessary to serve compelling public interests, in-
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have been motivated by any of these purposes, chief among 
them the educational benefits of neighborhood schooling. 
The Court found that voters also may have considered that 
the extent of mandatory busing, authorized by state law, ac-
tually was aggravating rather than ameliorating the deseg-
regation problem. See note 1, supra. It characterized peti-
tioners' claim of discriminatory intent on the part of millions 
of voters as but "pure speculation." 113 Cal. App. 3d, at 655. 
In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 (1967), the Court 
considered the constitutionality of another California Propo-
sition. In that case, the California Supreme Court had con-
cluded that the Proposition was unconstitutional because it 
gave the State's approval to private racial discrimination. 
This Court agreed, deferring to the findings made by the 
California court. The Court noted that the California court 
was "armed . . . with the knowledge of the facts and circum-
stances concerning the passage and potential impact" of the 
Proposition and "familiar with the milieu in which that provi-
sion would operate." Id., at 378. Similarly, in this case, 
again involving the circumstances of passage and the poten-
tial impact of a Proposition adopted at a state-wide election, 
we see no reason to differ with the conclusions of the state 
appellate court. 29 
Under decisions of this Court, a law neutral on its face still 
eluding those of making the most effective use of the limited financial re-
sources now and prospectively available to support public education, maxi-
mizing the educational opportunities and protecting the health and safety 
of all public school pupils , enhancing the ability of parents to participate in 
the educational process, preserving harmony and tranquility in this state 
and its public schools, preventing the waste of scarce fuel , resources, and 
protecting the environment." 
29 Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 253 (1976) ("The extent of 
deference that one pays to the trial court's determination of the factual 
issue, and indeed, the extent to which one characterizes the intent issue as 
a question of fact or a question of law, will vary in different contexts. ") 
(STEVENS, J. , concurring). 
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may be unconstitutional if motivated by a discriminatory pur-
pose. In determining whether such a purpose was the moti-
vating factor, the racially disproportionate effect of official 
action provides "an important starting point." Personnel 
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 
274 (1979), quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Dev. Corp., supra, 429 U. S. 252, at 266. 
Proposition I in no way purports to limit the power of state 
courts to remedy the effects of intentional segregation with 
its accompanying stigma. The benefits of neighborhood 
schooling are racially neutral. This manifestly is true in Los 
Angeles where over 75% of the public school body is com-
posed of groups viewed as racial minorities. See notes 1 and 
15, supra. Moreover, the Proposition simply removes one 
means of achieving the state created right to desegregated 
education. School districts retain the obligation to alleviate 
segregation regardless of cause. And the state courts still 
may order desegregation measures other than pupil school 
assignment or pupil transportation. 30 
Even if we could assume that Proposition I had a dispro-
portionate adverse effect on racial minorities, we see no rea-
son to challenge the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the 
voters of the State were not motivated by a discriminatory 
purpose. See 113 Cal. App. 3d, at 654-655. In this case the 
30 In Brown v. Califano, supra, the Court of Appeals found that a fed-
eral statute preventing the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW) from requiring busing "to a school other than the school which is 
nearest the student's home," 42 U. S. C. § 2000d (1976), was not uncon-
stitutional. HEW retained authority to encourage school districts to de-
segregate through other means, and the enforcement powers of the De-
partment of Justice were left untouched. The court therefore concluded 
that the limits on HEW's ability to order mandatory busing did not have a 
discriminatory effect. And, having done so, it refused to inquire into leg-
islative motivation: "Absent discriminatory effect, judicial inquiry into leg-
islative motivation is unnecessary, as well as undesirable." Id., at 1234. 
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Proposition was approved by an overwhelming majority of 
the electorate. 31 It received support from members of all 
races. 32 The purposes of the Proposition are stated in its 
text and are legitimate, nondiscriminatory objectives. In 
these circumstances, we will not dispute the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal or impugn the motivation of the State's 
electorate. 
Accordingly the judgment of the California Court of Ap-
peal is 
Affirmed. 
31 Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 253 (1976) (STEVENS, J., con-
curring) ("It is unrealistic ... to invalidate otherwise legitmate action sim-
ply because an improper motive affected the deliberation of a participant in 
the decisional process. A law conscripting clerics should not be invali-
dated because an atheist voted for it."). 
32 Proposition 1 received support from 73.9% of the voters in Los Ange-
les county which has a "minority" population-including persons of Spanish 
origin-of over 50%. California Secretary of State, Statement of the 
Vote, November 6, 1979 Election, 3. See note 15 supra. By contrast, 
the Proposition received its smallest percentage of the vote in Humboldt 
and Marin counties which are nearly all-white in composition. 
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Dear Lewis: 
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opinion in the Seattle case, I am now prepared 
to join your opinion in this case. I do, 
however, have two suggestions that I would like 
to propose for your consideration. 
First, there is some tension between what 
I propose to write in my dissent in Rogers v. Lodge 
and the following sentence on page 9 of your draft: 
"In addition, prior decisions of this Court make 
clear that even when a neutral law has a dis-
proportionately adverse effect on a racial minority, 
the Fourteenth Amendment is violated only if a 
discriminatory purpose can be shown." 
In some situations--for example, the one- person 
one-vote cases--I think an invidious intent is really 
irrelevant to the equal protection analysis. I 
wonder, therefore, if you might make some language 
changes in the sentence to make it read something 
like this: "In addition, this Court has previously 
held that even when a neutral law " 
My second suggestion is that, perhaps in a footnote, 
either on page 7 where you now have footnote 12, or on 
page 9 where you now have footnote 14, that you consider 
inserting a sentence pointing out that in this respect 
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this case is different from the Seattle case, Some 
people are going to think that those of us who have 
joined both majorities have been acting somewhat 
inconsistently, and a comment to that effect might 
be helpful to us. 
As I have said, I will join you whether you 
adopt these suggestions or not but I would be grateful 
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2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81--38 
MARY ELLEN CRAWFORD, A MINOR, ETC., ET AL., PE-
TITIONERS v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY 
OF LOS ANGELES ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALI-
. FORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 
[June-, 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
An amendment to the California Constitution provides that 
state courts shall not order mandatory pupil assignment or 
transportation unless a federal court would do so to remedy a 
violation of the Equal Protecti( 1 Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. The ques-
tion for our decision is whether this provision is itself in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
I 
This litigation began almost twenty years ago in 1963, 
when minority students attending school in the Los Angeles 
Unified School District (District) filed a class action in state 
court seeking desegregation of the District's schools. 1 The 
case went to trial some five years later, and in 1970 the trial 
court issued an opinion finding that the District was substan-
tially segregated in violation of the State and Federal Con-
1 In 1980 the District included 562 schools with 650,000 students in an 
area of 711 square miles. In 1968 when the case went to trial, the District 
was 53.6% white, 22.6% black, 20% Hispanic, and 3.8% Asian and other. 
By October 1980 the demographic composition had altered radically: 23. 7% 
white, 23.3% black, 45.3% Hispanic, and 7. 7% Asian and other. See 
Crawford v. Board of Education , 113 Cal. App. 3d 633, 642 (1980). 
1982 
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stitutions. The court ordered the District to prepare a de-
segregation plan for immediate use. App. 139. 
On the District's appeal, the California Supreme Court af-
firmed, but on a different basis. Crawford v. Board of Edu-
cation, 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 P. 2d 28 (1976). While the trial 
court had found de jure segregation in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, see 
App. 117, 120-121, the California Supreme Court based its 
affirmance solely upon the Equal Protection Clause of the 
State Constitution. 2 The court explained that under the 
California Constitution "state school boards ... bear a con-
stitutional obligation to take reasonable steps to alleviate 
segregation in the public schools, whether the segregation be 
de facto or de jure in origin." 17 Cal. 3d, at 290, 551 P. 2d, at 
34. The court remanded to the trial court for preparation of 
a "reasonably feasible" plan for school desegregation. 17 
Cal. 3d, at 310, 551 P. 2d, at 48. 3 
2 "The findings in this case adequately support the trial court's conclu-
sion that the segregation in the defendant school district is de jure in na-
ture. We shall explain, however, that we do not rest our decision on this 
characterization because we continue to adhere to our conclusion in [Jack-
son v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P. 2d 878 (1963)) 
that school boards in California bear a constitutional obligation to take rea-
sonabl~ feasible steps to alleviate school segregation 'regardless of its 
cause.' Crawford v. Board of Education, 17 Cal. 3d 280, 285, 551 P. 2d 
28, 30 (1976). The court explained that federal cases were not controlling: 
"In focusing primarily on ... federal decisions ... defendant ignores a sig-
nificant line of California decisions, decisions which authoritatively estab-
lish that in this state school boards do bear a constitutional obligation to 
take reasonable steps to alleviate segregation in the public schools, 
whether the segregation be de facto or de jure in origin." 17 Cal. 3d, at 290, 
551 P. 2d, at 33-34. 
3 In stating general principles to guide the trial court on remand, the 
State Supreme Court discussed the 'busing' question: "While critics have 
sometimes attempted to obscure the issue, court decisions time and time 
again emphasized that 'busing' is not a constitutional end in itself but is 
simply one potential tool which may be utilized to satisfy a school district's 
constitutional obligation in this field. . . . [l]n some circumstances busing 
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On remand, the trial court rejected the District's mostly 
voluntary desegregation plan but ultimately approved a sec-
ond plan that included substantial mandatory school reassign-
ment and transportation-"busing''-on a racial and ethnic 
basis. 4 The plan was put into effect in the fall of 1978, but 
after one year's experience, all parties to the litigation were 
dissatisfied. See Crawford v. Board of Education, 113 Cal. 
App. 3d 633, 636 (1980). Although the plan continued in op-
eration, the trial court began considering alternatives in Oc-
tober 1979. 
In November 1979 the voters of the State of California rati-
fied Proposition I, an amendment to the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses of the State Constitution. 5 Propo-
will be an appropriate and useful element in a desegregation plan, while in 
other instances its 'costs,' both in financial and educational terms, will ren-
der its use inadvisable." 17 Cal. 3d, at 309, 551 P. 2d, at 47. It noted as 
well that a state court should not intervene to speed the desegregation 
process so long as the school board takes "reasonably feasible steps to alle-
viate school segregation,'' 17 Cal. 3d, at 305, 551 P. 2d, at 45, and that "a 
court cannot properly issue a 'busing' order so long as a school district con-
tinues to meet its constitutional obligations." 17 Cal. 3d, at 310, 551 P. 2d, 
at 48. 
' The plan provided for the mandatory reassignment of approximately 
40,000 students in the fourth through eighth grades. Some of these chil-
dren were bused over long distances requiring daily round-trip bus rides of 
as long as two to four hours. In addition, the plan provided for the volun-
tary transfer of some 30,000 students. 
Respondent Bustop, Inc. unsuccessfully sought to stay implementation 
of the plan. See Busto-p, Inc. v. Board of Education, 439 U. S. 1380 
(1978) (REHNQUIST, J., in chambers); Bustop, Inc. v. Board of Education, 
439 U. S. 1384 (1978) (POWELL, J., in chambers). 
• Proposition I was placed before the voters following a two-thirds vote 
of each house of the state legislature. Cal. Const. art. 18, § 1. The state 
senate approved the Proposition by a vote of 28 to 6, the state assembly by 
a vote of 62 to 17. The voters favored the Proposition by a vote of 
2,433,312 (68.6%) to 1,112,923 (31.4%). The Proposition received a major-
ity of the vote in each of the State's 58 counties and in 79 of the State's 80 
assembly districts. California Secretary of State, Statement of the Vote, 
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sition I conforms the power of state courts to order busing to 
that exercised by the federal courts under the Fourteenth 
Amendment: 
"[N]o court of this state may impose upon the State of 
California or any public entity, board, or official any ob-
ligation or responsibility with respect to the use of pupil 
school assignment or pupil transportation, (1) except to 
remedy a specific violation by such party that would also 
constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
and (2) unless a federal court would be permitted under 
federal decisional law to impose that obligation or 
responsibility upon such party to remedy the specific vi-
olation of the Equal Protection Clause. " 6 
November 6, 1979 Election, 3-6, 43-46. 
6 Proposition I added a lengthy proviso to article 1, § 7(a) of the Califor-
nia Constitution. Following passage of Proposition I, § 7 now provides, in 
relevant part: 
"(a) A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws; provided, that 
nothing contained herein or elsewhere in this Constitution imposes upon 
the State of California or any public entity, board, or official any obliga-
tions or responsibilities which exceed those imposed by the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution with 
respect to the use of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation. In 
enforcing this subdivision or any other provision of this Constitution, no 
court of this state may impose upon the State of California or any public 
entity, board, or official any obligation or responsibility with respect to the 
use of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation, (1) except to remedy 
a specific violation by such party that would also constitute a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, and (2) unless a federal court would be permitted under fed-
eral decisional law to impose that obligation or responsibility upon such 
party to remedy the specific violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
"Nothing herein shall prohibit the governing board of a school district 
from voluntarily continuing or commencing a school integration plan after 
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Following approval of Proposition I, the District asked the 
Superior Court to halt all mandatory reassignment and bus-
ing of pupils. App. 185. On May 19, 1980, the court denied 
the District's application. The court reasoned that Proposi-
tion I was of no effect in this case in light of the court's 1970 
finding of de jure segregation by the District in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Shortly thereafter, the court 
ordered implementation of a revised desegregation plan, one 
that again substantially relied upon mandatory pupil reas-
signment and transportation. 7 
The California Court of Appeal reversed. 113 Cal. App. 3d 
633 (1980). The court found that the trial court's 1970 find-
ings of fact would not support the conclusion that the District 
had violated the Federal Constitution through intentional 
segregation. 8 Thus, Proposition I was applicable to the trial 
the effective date of this subdivision as amended. 
"In amending this subdivision, the Legislature and people of the State of 
California find and declare that this amendment is necessary to serve com-
pelling public interests, including those of making the most effective use of 
the limited financial resources now and prospectively available to support 
public education, maximizing the educational opportunities and protecting 
the health and safety of all public school pupils, enhancing the ability of 
parents to participate in the educational process, preserving harmony and 
tranquility in this state and its public schools, preventing the waste of 
scarce fuel resources, and protecting the environment." 
7 The Superior Court ordered the immediate implementation of the re-
vised plan. The District was unsuccessful in its effort to gain a stay of the 
plan pending appeal. See Board of Education v. Superior Court, 448 
U. S. 1343 (1980) (REHNQUIST, J., in chambers). 
8 "When the 1970 findings of the trial court are reviewed in the light of 
the correct applicable federal law, it is apparent that no specific segre-
gative intent with discriminatory purpose was found. The thrust of the 
findings of the trial court was that passive maintenance by the Board of a 
neighborhood school system in the face of widespread residential racial im-
balance amounted to de jure segregation in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. . . . But a school board has no duty under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to meet and overcome the effect of population movements." 
Crawford v. Board of Education, supra, 113 Cal. App. 3d, at 641H>46. 
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court's desegregation plan and would bar that part of the plan 
requiring mandatory student reassignment and transporta-
tion. Moreover, the court concluded that Proposition I was 
constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 
654. The court found no obligation on the part of the State 
to retain a greater remedy at state law against racial seg-
regation than was provided by the Federal Constitution. 
Ibid. The court rejected the claim that Proposition I was 
adopted with a discriminatory purpose. Id., at 654-655. 9 
Determining Proposition I to be applicable and constitu-
tional, the Court of Appeal vacated the orders entered by the 
Superior Court. The California Supreme Court denied hear-
ing. App. to Pet. for Cert. C. 10 We granted certiorari. --
U.S. - (1981). 
"The Court of Appeal also rejected the claim that Proposition I deprived 
minority children of a "vested right" to desegregated education in violation 
of due process. See 113 Cal. App. 3d, at 655--656. Petitioners no longer 
advance this claim. 
10 On March 16, 1981, the District directed that mandatory pupil reas-
signment under the Superior Court's revised plan be terminated on April 
20, 1981. On that date, parents of children who had been reassigned were 
given the option of returning their children to neighborhood schools. Ac-
cording to respondent, approximately 7,000 pupils took this option of whom 
4,300 were minority students. Brief for Respondent, 10. 
The state courts refused to enjoin termination of the plan. On April 17, 
1980, however, the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California issued a temporary restraining order preventing termination of 
the plan. Los Angeles NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School District, 
513 F . Supp. 717 (CD Cal. 1981). The District Court found that there was 
a "fair chance" that intentional segregation by the District could be demon-
strated. Id. , at 720. The District Court's order was vacated on the fol-
lowing day by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
Los Angeles Unified School District v. District Court, 650 F. 2d 1004 (CA9 
1981). On remand the District Court denied the District's motion to dis-
miss. This ruling has been certified for interlocutory appeal. See Brief for 
Respondents 10, n. 4. 
On September 10, 1981, the Superior Court approved a new, voluntary 
desegregation plan. 
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II 
We agree with the California Court of Appeal in rejecting 
the contention that once a State chooses to do "more" than 
the Fourteenth Amendment requires, it may never recede. 11 
We reject an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment so 
destructive of a state's democratic processes and of its ability 
to experiment. This interpretation has no support in the de-
cisions of this Court. 
Proposition I does not inhibit enforcement of any federal 
law or constitutional requirement. Quite the contrary, by 
its plain language the Proposition seeks only to embrace the 
requirements of the Federal Constitution with respect to 
mandatory school assignments and transportation. It would 
be paradoxical to conclude that by adopting the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the voters of 
the State thereby had violated it. Moreover, even after 
Proposition I, the California Constitution still imposes a 
greater duty of desegregation than does the Federal Con-
stitution. The state courts of California continue to have an 
obligation under state law to order segregated school dis-
tricts to use voluntary desegregation techniques, whether or 
not there has been a finding of intentional segregation. The 
school districts themselves retain a state law obligation to 
take reasonably feasible steps to desegregate, and they re-
main free to adopt reassignment and busing plans to effectu-
ate desegregation. 12 
u Respondent Bustop, Inc. argues that far from doing "more" than the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires , the State actually violated the amend-
ment by assigning students on the basis of race when such assignments 
were not necessary to remedy a federal constitutional violation. See Brief 
for Respondent 10-18. We do not reach this contention. 
l 
12 In this respect this case differs from the situation presented in Wash-
ington v. Seattle School District No. 1, -- U. S. -- (1982). 
In an opinion delivered after Proposition I was enacted, the California 
Supreme Court stated that "the amendment neither releases school dis-
tricts from their state constitutional obligation to take reasonably feasible 
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Nonetheless, petitioners contend that Proposition I is un-
constitutional on its face. They argue that Proposition I em-
ploys an "explicit racial classification" and imposes a "race-
specific" burden on minorities seeking to vindicate state 
created rights. By limiting the power of state courts to en-
force the state created right to desegregated schools, peti-
tioners contend, Proposition I creates a "dual court system" 
that discriminates on the basis of race. 13 They emphasize 
that other state created rights may be vindicated by the state 
courts without limitation on remedies. Petitioners argue 
that the "dual court system" created by Proposition I is un-
constitutional unless supported by a compelling state 
interest. 
We would agree that if Proposition I employed a racial 
classification it would be unconstitutional unless necessary to 
further a compelling state interest. "A racial classification, 
regardless of purported motivation is presumptively invalid 
and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification." 
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 
U. S. 256, 272 (1979). See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 
U. S. 184, 196 (1964). But Proposition I does not embody a 
racial classification. It neither says nor implies that persons 
are to be treated differently on account of their race. It sim-
steps to alleviate segregation regardless of its cause, nor divests California 
courts of authority to order desegregation measures other than pupil 
school assignment or pupil transportation." McKinny v. Oxnard Union 
High School District Board of Trustees, -- Cal. 3d--, -- P. 2d--
(1982) (Slip. op. at 13-14). Moreover, the Proposition only limits state 
courts when enforcing the state constitution. Thus, the Proposition would 
not bar state court enforcement of state statutes requiring busing for de-
segregation or for any other purpose. Cf. Brown v. Califano, 627 F . 2d 
1221, 1230 (CADC 1980) (legislation limiting power of federal agency to re-
quire busing by local school boards held constitutional in view of the "effec-
tive avenues for desegregation" left open by the legislation). 
13 "[l]t is racial discrimination in the judicial apparatus of the state, not 
racial discrimination in the state's schools, that petitioners challenge under 
the Fourteenth Amendment in this case." Brief for Petitioner 48. 
81-38-OPINION 
CRAWFORD v. LOS ANGELES BOARD OF EDUCATION 9 
ply forbids state courts from ordering pupil school assign-
ment or transportation in the absence of a Fourteenth 
Amendment violation. The benefit it seeks to confer-
neighborhood schooling-is made available regardless of race 
in the discretion of school boards. 14 Indeed, even if Proposi-
tion I had a racially discriminatory effect, in view of the de-
mographic mix of the District it is not clear which race or 
races would be affected the most or in what way. 15 In addi-1 tion, this Court previously has held that even when a neutral 
law has a disproportionately adverse effect on a racial minor-
ity, the Fourteenth Amendment is violated only if a discrimi-
natory purpose can be shown. 16 
Similarly, the Court has recognized that a distinction may 
exist between state action that discriminates on the basis of 
race and state action that addresses, in neutral fashion, race 
related matters. 11 This distinction is implicit in the Court's 
14 A neighborhood school policy does not offend the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in itself. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 
U. S. 1, 28 (1971) ("Absent a constitutional violation there would be no 
basis for judicially ordering assignment of students on a racial basis. All 
things being equal, with no history of discrimination, it might well be desir-
able to assign pupils to schools nearest their homes."). Cf. 20 U. S. C. 
§ 1701: "(a) The Congress declares it to be the policy of the Unites States 
that-(1) all children enrolled in public schools are entitled to equal educa-
tional opportunity without regard to race, color, sex, or national origin; and 
(2) the neighborhood is the appropriate basis for determining public school 
assignments." 
15 In the Los Angeles school district, white students are now the racial 
minority, see note 1, supra. Similarly, in Los Angeles County, racial mi-
norities, including those of Spanish origin, constitute the majority of the 
population. See 1980 Census of Population and Housing, Advance Re-
ports 6. 
16 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-248 (1976); Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977); 
James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 141 (1971). 
11 Proposition I is not limited to busing for the purpose of racial deseg-
regation. It applies neutrally to "pupil school assignment or pupil trans- . 
portation" in general. Even so, it is clear that court ordered busing in ex-
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repeated statement that the Equal Protection Clause is not 
violated by the mere repeal of race related legislation or poli-
cies that were not required by the Federal Constitution in 
the first place. In Dayton Bd. of Education v. Brinkman, 
433 U. S. 406, 414 (1977), we found that the school board's 
mere repudiation of an earlier resolution calling for deseg-
regation did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 18 In 
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369, 376 (1967), and again in 
Hunter v. Erickson, supra, at 390, n. 5 (1969), we were care-
ful to note that the laws under review did more than 
"mere[ly] repeal" existing anti-discrimination legislation. 19 In 
sum, the simple repeal or modification of desegregation or 
anti-discrimination laws, without more, never has been 
viewed as embodying a presumptively invalid racial 
classification 20 
Were we to hold that the mere repeal of race related legis-
lation is unconstitutional, we would limit seriously the au-
thority of States to deal with the problems of our heteroge-
cess of that required by the Fourteenth Amendment, as one means of 
desegregating schools, prompted the initiation and probably the adoption 
of Proposition I. 
18 See Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman, 443 U. S. 526, 531, n. 5 (1979) 
("Racial imbalance, we noted in Dayton I, is not per sea constitutional vi-
olation, and rescission of prior resolutions proposing desegregation is un-
constitutional only if the resolutions were required in the first place by the 
Fourteenth Amendment."). 
1
• In Hunter we noted that "we do not hold that mere repeal of an exist-
ing [anti-discrimination] ordinance violates the Fourteenth Amendment." 
393 U. S., at 390, n. 5. In Reitman the Court held that California Propo-
sition 14 was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment not be-
cause it repealed two pieces of anti-discrimination legislation, but because 
the Proposition involved the State in private racial discrimination: "Here 
we are dealing with a provision which does not just repeal an existing law 
forbidding private racial discriminations. Section 26 was intended to au-
thorize, and does authorize, racial discrimination in the housing market." 
~ Of course, if the purpose of repealing legislation is to disadvantage a 
racial minority, the repeal is unconstitutional for this reason. See 
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 (1967). 
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neous population. States would be committed irrevocably to 
legislation that has proven unsuccessful or even harmful in 
practice. And certainly the purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment would not be advanced by an interpretation that 
discouraged the States from providing greater protection to 
racial minorities. 21 Nor would the purposes of the Amend-
ment be furthered by requiring the States to maintain legis-
lation designed to ameliorate race relations or to protect ra-
cial minorities but which has produced just the opposite 
effects. 22 Yet these would be the results of requiring a State 
to maintain legislation that has proven unworkable or harm-
ful when the State was under no obligation to adopt the legis-
lation in the first place. Moreover, and relevant to this case, 
we would not interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to re-
quire the people of a State to adhere to a judicial construction 
of their state constitution when that constitution itself vests 
final authority in the people. 
III 
Petitioners seek to avoid the force of the foregoing consid-
21 See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217, 228 (1971) ("To hold ... that 
every public facility or service, once opened, constitutionally 'locks in' the 
public sponsor so that it may not be dropped ... would plainly discourage 
the expansion and enlargement of needed services in the long run") (BUR-
G ER, C. J., concurring); Reitman v. Mulkey, supra, at 395 ("Opponents of 
state antidiscrimination statutes are now in a position to argue that such 
legislation should be defeated because, if enacted, it may be unrepealable") 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). 
22 In his dissenting opinion in R eitman v. Mulkey, supra, at 395, Justice 
Harlan remarked upon the need for legislative flexibility when dealing with 
the "delicate and troublesome problems of race relations." He noted: 
"The lines that have been and must be drawn in this area, fraught as it is 
with human sensibilities and frailties of whatever race or creed, are diffi-
cult ones. The drawing of them requires understanding, patience, and 
compromise, and is best done by legislatures rather than by courts. When 
legislation in this field is unsuccessful there should be wide opportunities 
for legislative amendment, as well as for change through such processes as 
the popular initiative and referendum." Id. , at 395-396. 
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erations by arguing that Proposition I is not a "mere repeal." 
Relying primarily on the decision in Hunter v. Erickson, 
supra, they contend that Proposition I does not simply repeal 
a state created right but fundamentally alters the judicial 
system so that "those seeking redress from racial isolation in 
violation of state law must be satisfied with less than full re-
lief from a state court." 23 We do not view Hunter as control-
ling here, nor are we persuaded by petitioners' characteriza-
tion of Proposition I as something more than a mere repeal. 
In Hunter the Akron city charter had been amended by the 
voters to provide that no ordinance regulating real estate on 
the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin could take 
effect until approved by a referendum. As a result of the 
charter amendment, a fair housing ordinance, adopted by the 
City Council at an earlier date, was no longer effective. In 
holding the charter amendment invalid under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court held that the charter amendment was 
not a simple repeal of the fair housing ordinance. The 
amendment "not only suspended the operation of the existing 
ordinance forbidding housing discrimination, but also re-
quired the approval of the electors before any future [anti-
discrimination] ordinance could take effect." 393 U. S., at 
389-390. Thus, whereas most ordinances regulating real 
property would take effect once enacted by the City Council, 
ordinances prohibiting racial discrimination in housing would 
be forced to clear an additional hurdle. 24 As such, the char-
23 Tr. of Oral Argument 6. See id. , at 7-8 ("The fact that a state may be 
free to remove a right or remove a duty, does not mean that it has the same 
freedom to leave the right in place but simply, in a discriminatory way we 
argue, provide less than full judicial remedy"). 
24 "In the case before us . . . the city of Akron has not attempted to allo-
cate governmental power on the basis of any general principle. Here, we 
have a provision that has the clear purpose of making it more difficult for 
certain racial and religious minorities to achieve legislation that is in their 
interest." 393 U. S., at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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ter amendment placed an impermissible, "special burden[] on 
racial minorities within the governmental process." Id., at 
391. 25 
Hunter involved more than a "mere repeal" of the fair 
housing ordinance; persons seeking anti-discrimination hous-
ing laws--presumptively racial minorities--were "singled out 
for mandatory referendums while no other group ... face[d] 
that obstacle." James v. Valtierra, supra, at 142. By con-
trast, even on the assumption that racial minorities benefit-
ted from the busing required by state law, Proposition I is 
less than a "repeal" of the California Equal Protection 
Clause. As noted above, after Proposition I, the state con-
stitution still places upon school boards a greater duty to de-
segregate than does the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Nor can it be said that Proposition I allocates govern-
mental or judicial power on the basis of a discriminatory prin-
ciple. "The Constitution does not require things which are 
different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they 
were the same." Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141, 147 (1940). 
Remedies appropriate in one area of legislation may not be 
desirable in another. The remedies available for violation of 
the antitrust laws, for example, are different than those 
available for violation of the Civil Rights Acts. Yet a "dual 
court system"-one for the racial majority and one for the ra-
cial minority-is not established simply because civil rights 
remedies are different from those available in other areas. 26 
Surely it was constitutional for the California Supreme Court 
25 The Hunter Court noted that although "the law on its face treats Ne-
gro and white, Jew and gentile in an identical manner," 393 U. S. , at 391, a 
charter amendment making it more difficult to pass anti-discrimination leg-
islation could only disadvantage racial minorities in the governmental 
process. 
26 Petitioners contend that Proposition I only restricts busing for the 
purpose of racial discrimination. The Proposition I is neutral on its face , 
however, and respondents-as well as the State in its amicus brief-take 
issue with petitioners' interpretation of the provision. 
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to caution that although "in some circumstances busing will 
be an appropriate and useful element in a desegregation 
plan," in other circumstances "its 'costs,' both in financial and 
educational terms, will render its use inadvisable." See note 
3, supra. It was equally constitutional for the people of the 
State to determine that the standard of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was more appropriate for California courts to 
apply in desegregation cases than the standard repealed by 
Proposition I. 'l:7 
In short, having gone beyond the requirements of the Fed-
eral Constitution, the State was free to return in part to the 
standard prevailing generally throughout the United States. 
It could have conformed its law to the Federal Constitution in 
every respect. That it chose to pull back only in part, and by 
preserving a greater right to desegregation than exists under 
the Federal Constitution, most assuredly does not render the 
Proposition unconstitutional on its face. 
IV 
The California Court of Appeal also rejected petitioners' 
claim that Proposition I, if facially valid, was nonetheless un-
constitutional because enacted with a discriminatory pur-
pose. The court reasoned that the purposes of the Proposi-
tion were well stated in the Proposition itself. 28 Voters may 
27 Similarly, a "dual constitution" is not established when the State 
chooses to go beyond the requirements of the Federal Constitution in some 
areas but not others. Nor is a "dual executive branch" created when an 
agency is given enforcement powers in one area but not in another. Cf. 
Braum v. Califano, 627 F. 2d 1221 (CADC 1980) (upholding federal legisla-
tion prohibiting a federal executive agency, but not local school officials or 
federal courts, from requiring busing). 
28 The Proposition contains its own statement of purpose: 
"[T]he Legislature and people of the State of California find and declare 
that this amendment is necessary to serve compelling public interests, in-
cluding those of making the most effective use of the limited financial re-
sources now and prospectively available to support public education, maxi-
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have been motivated by any of these purposes, chief among 
them the educational benefits of neighborhood schooling. 
The Court found that voters also may have considered that 
the extent of mandatory busing, authorized by state law, ac-
tually was aggravating rather than ameliorating the deseg-
regation problem. See note 1, supra. It characterized peti-
tioners' claim of discriminatory intent on the part of millions 
of voters as but "pure speculation." 113 Cal. App. 3d, at 655. 
In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 (1967), the Court 
considered the constitutionality of another California Propo-
sition. In that case, the California Supreme Court had con-
cluded that the Proposition was unconstitutional because it 
gave the State's approval to private racial discrimination. 
This Court agreed, deferring to the findings made by the 
California court. The Court noted that the California court 
was "armed ... with the knowledge of the facts and circum-
stances concerning the passage and potential impact" of the 
Proposition and "familiar with the milieu in which that provi-
sion would operate." Id., at 378. Similarly, in this case, 
again involving the circumstances of passage and the poten-
tial impact of a Proposition adopted at a state-wide election, 
we see no reason to differ with the conclusions of the state 
appellate court. 29 
Under decisions of this Court, a law neutral on its face still 
may be unconstitutional if motivated by a discriminatory pur-
pose. In determining whether such a purpose was the moti-
mizing the educational opportunities and protecting the health and safety 
of all public school pupils, enhancing the ability of parents to participate in 
the educational process, preserving harmony and tranquility in this state 
and its public schools, preventing the waste of scarce fuel, resources, and 
protecting the environment." 
29 Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) ("The extent of 
deference that one pays to the trial court's determination of the factual 
issue, and indeed, the extent to which one characterizes the intent issue as 
a question of fact or a question of law, will vary in different contexts.") 
(STEVENS, J ., concurring). 
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vating factor, the racially disproportionate effect of official 
action provides "an important starting point." Personnel 
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 
274 (1979), quoting Arlington Hei,ghts v. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Dev. Corp., supra, 429 U. S. 252, at 266. 
Proposition I in no way purports to limit the power of state 
courts to remedy the effects of intentional segregation with 
its accompanying stigma. The benefits of neighborhood 
schooling are racially neutral. This manifestly is true in Los 
Angeles where over 75% of the public school body is com-
posed of groups viewed as racial minorities. See notes 1 and 
15, supra. Moreover, the Proposition simply removes one 
means of achieving the state created right to desegregated 
education. School districts retain the obligation to alleviate 
segregation regardless of cause. And the state courts still 
may order desegregation measures other than pupil school 
assignment or pupil transportation. 30 
Even if we could assume that Proposition I had a dispro-
portionate adverse effect on racial minorities, we see no rea-
son to challenge the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the 
voters of the State were not motivated by a discriminatory 
purpose. See 113 Cal. App. 3d, at 654-655. In this case the 
Proposition was approved by an overwhelming majority of 
the electorate. 31 It received support from members of all 
30 In Brown v. Califano, supra, the Court of Appeals found that a fed-
eral statute preventing the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW) from requiring busing "to a school other than the school which is 
nearest the student's home," 42 U. S. C. § 2000d (1976), was not uncon-
stitutional. HEW retained authority to encourage school districts to de-
segregate through other means, and the enforcement powers of the De-
partment of Justice were left untouched. The court therefore concluded 
that the limits on HEW's ability to order mandatory busing did not have a 
discriminatory effect. And, having done so, it refused to inquire into leg-
islative motivation: "Absent discriminatory effect, judicial inquiry into leg-
islative motivation is unnecessary, as well as undesirable. " Id. , at 1234. 
31 Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 253 (1976) (STEVENS, J ., con-
curring) ("It is unrealistic ... to invalidate otherwise legitmate action sim-
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races. 32 The purposes of the Proposition are stated in its 
text and are legitimate, nondiscriminatory objectives. In 
these circumstances, we will not dispute the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal or impugn the motivation of the State's 
electorate. 
Accordingly the judgment of the California Court of Ap-
peal is 
Affirmed. 
ply because an improper motive affected the deliberation of a participant in 
the decisional process. A law conscripting clerics should not be invali-
dated because an atheist voted for it."). 
32 Proposition 1 received support from 73. 9% of the voters in Los Ange-
les county which has a "minority" population-including persons of Spanish 
origin-of over 50%. California Secretary of State, Statement of the 
Vote, November 6, 1979 Election, 3. See note 15 supra. By contrast, 
the Proposition received its smallest percentage of the vote in Humboldt 
and Marin counties which are nearly all-white in composition. 
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amendments, efach of which is admittedly designed to substan 
curtail, if nif-:ffrn./r?a/e( the use of mandatory student 
assignment or transportation as a remedy for de facto 
segregation. In Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 
ante at ___ , the Court concludes that Washington's Initiative 
350, which effectively prevents school boards from ordering 
mandatory school assignment in the absence of a finding of de 
jure segregation within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
is unconstitutional because "it uses the racial nature of an 
issue to define the governmental decisionmaking structure, and 
thus imposes substantial and unique burdens on racial 
~~~/-~~~ 
2 
minorities." Ante, at Inexplicably, the Court 
simultaneousli concludes that Calfornia's Proposition I, which 
effectively prevents a state court from ordering the same 
mandatory remedies in the absence of a finding of de jure 
segregation, is consti tuti'onal because _"having gone beyond the , ,.-: 
requirements of the Federal Constitution, the State was free to 
return in part to the standard prevailing generally throughout 
the United States." Ante, at Because I fail to see how a 
fundamental redefinition of the governmental decisionmaking 
structure with respect·to the same racial issue can be 
unconstitutional when the state seeks to remove the authority 
from local school boards, yet constitutional when the state 
attempts to achieve the same result by limiting the power of its 
courts, I must dissent from the Court's decision to uphold 
Proposition I. 
I 
In order to understand fully the implications of the 
Court's action today, it is necessary to place the facts 
concerning the adoption of Proposition I in their proper context. 
Nearly two decades ago, a unanimous California Supreme Court 
declared that "[t]he segregation of school children into separate 
schools because of their race, even though the physical 
facilities and the methods and quality of instruction in the 
several schools may be equal, deprives the children of the 
minority group of equal opportunities for education and denies 




Pasadena City School District, 59 Cal. 2d 876, 880, 382 P.2d 878, 
880-881 (1963) ·. Recognizing that the "right to an equal 
opportunity for education and the harmful consequences of 
segregation" do not differ according to the cause of racial 
isolation, the California Supreme Court declined to adopt the 
distinction between de facto and de jure segregation engrafted 
this Court on the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 881, 382 P.2d, 
by) 
at 881-882. Instead, the court clearly held that "school boards 
[must] take steps, insofar as reasonably feasible, to alleviate 
racial imbalance in schools regardlesss of its cause." Id., at 





As the California Supreme Court subsequently explained, the 
duty established in Jackson does not require that "each school in 
a district ..• reflect the racial composition of the district as 
a whole." Crawford v. Board of Education, 17 Cal. App. 3d 280, 
302, 551 P.2d 28, 42 (1976) (Crawford I). Rather, it is 
sufficient that school authorities "take reasonable and feasible 
steps to eliminate segregated schools, i.e., schools in which the 
minority student enrollment is so disproportionate as 
realistically to isolate minority students from other students 
and thus deprive minority students of an integrated educational 
experience." Id., at 303, 551 P.2d, at 43 (emphasis in 
original). Moreover, the California courts have made clear that 
the primary responsibility for implementing this state 
constitutional duty lies with local school boards. "[S]o long as 
a local school board initiates and implements reasonably feasible 
steps to alleviate school segregation in its district, and so 
4 
long as such steps produce meaningful progress in the alleviation 
of such segregation; and its harmful consequences, .•• the 
judiciary should [not] intervene in the desegregation process." 
Id., at 305-306, 551 P.2d, at 45. If, however, a school board 
neglects or refuses to implement meaningful programs designed to 
bring about an end to racial isolation in the public schools, 
"the court is left with no alternative but to intervene to 
protect the constitutional rights of minority children." Id., at 
307, 551 P.2d, at 45. When judicial intervention is necessary, 
the court "may exercise broad equitable powers in formulating and 
supervising a plan which the court finds will insure meaningful 
progress to alleviate the harmful consequences of school 
segregation in the district." Ibid, 551 P.2d, at 46. Moreover, 
"once a school board defaults in its constitutional task, the 
court, in devising a remedial order, is not precluded from 
requiring the busing of children as part of a reasonably feasible 
desegregation plan." Id., at 310, 551 P.2d, at 48. 
Like so many other decisions protecting the rights of 
minorities, California's decision to eradicate the evils of 
segregation regardless of cause has not been a popular one. In 
the nearly two decades since the state Supreme Court's decision 
in Jackson, there have been repeated attempts to restrain school 
boards and courts from enforcing this constitutional guarantee by 
means of mandatory student transfers or assignments. In 1970, 
shortly after the San Francisco Unified School District 
voluntarily adopted a desegregation plan involving mandatory 
student assignment, the California legislature enacted Education 
? ,, 
5 
Code §1009.5, Cal. Educ.· Code Ann. §1009.5 , currently codified 
at Cal. Educ. Code Ann. §35350 (West), which provides that "no 
governing board of a school district shall require any student or 
pupil to be transported for any purpose or for any reason without 
the written permission of the parent o~ guardian." In San -
Francisco Unified School District v. Johnson, 3 Cal.3d 937, 479 
P.2d 669 (1971), the California Supreme Court interpreted this 
provision only to bar a school district from compelling students, 
without parental consent, to use means of transportation 
furnished by the district. Construing the statute to prohibit 
nonconsensual assignment of students for the purpose of 
eradicating de jure or de facto segregation, the court concluded, 
would clearly violate both the state and the federal constitution 
by "exorcising a method that in many circumstances is the sole 
and exclusive means of eliminating racial segregation in the 
schools." Id., at 943, 479 P.2d, at 671. 
The very next year, opponents of mandatory student 
ass ~ ent for the purpose of achieving racial balance again 
attempted to eviscerate the state constitutional guarantee 
- r, 
recognized in Jackson. Proposition 21, which was enacted by · · 
referendum in November 1972, stated that "no public school ·, ~},.,; 
student shall, because of his race, creed, or color, be assign~ 
to or be required to attend a particular school." Predictably, 
the California Supreme Court struck down Proposition 21 "for the 
same reasons set forth by us in Johnson." Santa Barbara School 
District v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.3d 315, 324, 530 P.2d 605, 613 
(1975). 
6 
Finally, in 1979, the people of California enacted 
Proposition I. · That Proposition, like all of the previous 
~
initiatives, effectively deprived California courts of the 
A \' 
ability to enforce the ·Btate constitutional guarantee that 
minority children will not attend racia~ly isolated schools by 
use of what may be "the sole and exclusive means of eliminating 
racial segregation from the schools," San Francisco Unified 
School District v. Johnson,. 3 Cal.3d, at 943, 479 P.2d, at 671, 
mandatory student assignment and transfer. Unlike the earlier 
attempts to accomplish· this objective, however, Proposition I 
does not purport to prevent mandatory assignments and transfers 
when such fileasures are predicated on a violation of the Federal 
constitution. Therefore, the only question presented by this ----case is whether the fact that mandatory transfers may still be 
made to vindicate federal constitutional rights saves this 
initiative from the constitutional infirmity presented in the 
~ 
previous attempts to accomplish this same objective. In my view, 
the recitation of the obvious -- that a state constitutional 
amendment does not override federal constitutional guarantees 
cannot work to deprive minority children in California of their 
federally protected right to the equal protection of the laws. 
II 
A 
In the companion case of Washington v. Seattle School 
District No. 1, ante at , the Court exhaustively set out the 
7 
relevant principles that control the present inquiry. We there 
found that a series ·of precedents, exemplified by Hunter v. 
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) and Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 
710 (WDNY 1970) (three-judge court), summarily aff'd, 402 U.S. 
935 (1971), establish that the fourteen~h amendment prohibits a 
State from allocating "governmental power non-neutrally, by 
explicitly using the racial nature of a decision to determine the 
decisionmaking process." Ante, at __ (emphasis in original). 
We concluded that "State action of this kind ..• 'places special 
burdens on racial minorities within the governmental process' 
thereby 'making it more difficult for certain racial and 
religious minorities · [than for other members of the community] to 
achieve legislation that is in their interest.'" Ibid. (emphasis 
in original), quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S., at 391, 395 
(Harlan, J., concurring). 
It is therefore necessary to determine whether Proposition 
I works a "non-neutral" reallocation of governmental power on the 
basis of the racial nature of the decision. This determination 
is also informed by our decision i ~ In that. case we 5~ 
were presented with a state-wide initiative which effectively 
precluded local school boards from ordering mandatory student 
assignment or transfer except where required to remedy a 
constitutional violation. We concluded that the initiative 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment because it reallocated 
~-
/J-h,k.J... 
decisionmaking authority over racial issues from the local school 
board to a "new and remote level of government." Ante, at 
In reaching this conclusion, we specifically affirmed three 
8 
~~61'~--
principles that are particularly relevant to the present inquiry. 
~ we rejected the State's argument that a 
constitutional amendment prohibiting mandatory student assignment 
has no "racial overtones" simply because it does not mention the 
words "race" or "integration." Ante, a~ We noted that 
"[n]either the initiative's sponsors, nor the District Court, nor 
the Court of Appeals had any difficulty perceiving the racial 
nature of the issue settled by Initiative 350." Ibid. In light 
of its language and the history surrounding its adoption, we 
found it "beyond reasonable dispute .•. that the initiative was 
enacted '"because of," not merely "in spite of," its adverse 
effects upon' busing ·for integration." Ante, at __ , quoting 
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 
279 (1979). Moreover, we rejected the Solicitor General's 
remarkable contention, a contention also pressed here, that 
"busing for integration .•• is not a peculiarly 'racial' issue at 
all." Ante, at While not discounting the value of an 
integrated education to non-minority students, we concluded that 
Lee v. Nyquist, supra, definitively established that 
"desegregation of the public schools ... at bottom inures 
primarily to the benefit of the minority, and is designed for 
that purpose," thereby bringing it within the Hunter doctrine. 
Ante, at . 6 the Seattle Court determined that Initiative 350 
unconstitutionally reallocated power from local school boards to 
the state legislature or the state-wide electorate. After the 
enactment of Initiative 350, local school boards continued to 
9 
exercise considerable discretion over virtually all educational 
matters, including student assignment. Those seeking to 
eradicate de facto segregation, however, were forced to "surmount 
a considerably higher hurdle than persons seeking comparable 
legislative action," ante, ~t , for instead of seeking relief -- -
from the local school board, those pursuing this racial issue 
were forced to appeal to a different and more remote level of 
government. Just as in Hunter v. Erickson, supra, where those 
interested in enacting fair housing ordinances were compelled to 
gain the support of a majority of the electorate, we held that 
this reallocation of governmental power along racial lines 
offends the Equal Protection Clause. Our holding was not altered 
by the fact that those seeking to combat de facto segregation 
could still pursue their cause by petitioning local boards to 
enact voluntary measures or by seeking action from the state 
legislature. Nor were we persuaded by the argument that no 
transfer of power had occurred because the state was ultimately 
responsible for the educational policy of local school boards. 
We found it sufficient that Initiative 350 had deprived those 
seeking to redress a racial harm of the right to seek a 
particularly effective form of redress from the level of -
government ordinarily empowered to grant the remedy. 8'• the Court's decision in Seattle implicitly 
rejected the argument that state action that reallocates 
governmental power along racial lines can be immunized by the 
fact that it specifically leaves intact rights guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The fact that mandatory pupil reassignment 
10 
was still available as a remedy for de jure segregation did not 
alter the conclusion that an unconstitutional reallocation of 
power had occurred with respect to those seeking to combat de -facto racial isolation in the public schools. 
B 
In my view, these principles inexorably lead to the 
conclusion that California's Proposition I works an 
unconstitutional reallocation of state power by depriving 
California courts of the ability to grant meaningful relief to 
those seeking to vindicate the state's guarantee against de facto 
segregation in the public schools. Despite Proposition I's 
apparent neutrality, it is "beyond reasonable dispute," Seattle, 
ante, at __ , and the majority today concedes, that "court 
ordered busing in excess of that required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment ... prompted the initiation and probably the adoption 
of Proposition I." Ante, at 9, n. 17 (emphasis in original) . 1 
Because "minorities may consider busing for integration to be 
'legislation that is in their interest,'" Seattle, ante, at 
quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S., at 395 (Harlan, J., 
___ , 
1Just as in Seattle, the fact that other types of student 
transfers conceivably might be prohibited does not alter this 
conclusion: "Neither the intiative's sponsors, nor the District 
Court, nor the Court of Appeals had any difficulty perceiving the 
racial nature of the issue settled by" Proposition I. Id., at 
13. Indeed in their response to the petition for certiorari, 
respondents characterized Proposition I as addressing but "one 
narrow area: the power of a state court to order mandatory 
student assignment or transportation as desegregation remedy." 
Brief in Opposition to Pet. for Cert. 9. 
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concurring), Proposition I is sufficiently "racial" to invoke the 
Hunter doctrine. 2 
Nor can there be any doubt that Proposition I works a 
substantial reallocation of state power G to the enactment 
of Proposition I, those seeking to vindjcate the rights 
ennumerated by the California Supreme Court in Jackson v. 
Pasadena City School District, supra, just as those interested in 
attaining any other educational objective, followed a two-stage 
procedure. First, California's minority community could attempt 
to convince the local school board voluntarily to comply with its 
constitutional obligation to take reasonably feasible steps to 
eliminate racial isolation in the public schools. If the board 
was either unwilling or unable to carry out its constitutional 
duty, those seeking redress could petition the California state 
courts to require school officials to live up to their 
obligations. Busing could be required as part of a judicial 
remedial order. Crawford I, 17 Cal.3d, at 310, 551 P.2d, at 
Whereas Initiative 350 attempted to deny minority children 
the first step of this procedure, Proposition I eliminates by 
fiat the second stage: the ability of California courts to order 
meaningful compliance with the requirements of the state 
2It is therefore irrelevant whether the "benefits of 
neighborhood schooling are racially neutral," as the majority 
asserts. Ante, at 16; see id., at 9. In Washington v. Seattle 
School District No. 1, ante, at (Seattle), we specifically 
rejected the argument that beausesome minorities as well as 
whites supported the initiative, it could not be considered a 
racial classification. 
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constitution. After the adoption of Proposition I, the only 
method of enfoicing ·against a recalcitrant school board the state 
constitutional duty to eliminate racial isolation is to petition 
either the state legislature or the electorate as a whole. 
Clearly, the rules of the game have bee~ significantly changed 
--- =-= ,,_ 
for those attempting to vindicate this state constitutional 
right. 3 
The majority seeks to conceal the unmistakeable effects of 
Proposition I by calling it a "mere repeal" of the State's 
earlier commitment to do · "'more' than the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires." Ante, at 7. Although it is true that we have never 
held that the "mere repeal of an existing [anti-discrimination] 
3There can be no question that the practical effect of 
Proposition I will be to deprive state courts of "the sole and 
- exclusive means of eliminating racial segregation from the 
schools." San Francisco Unified School District v. Johnson, 3 
Cal.3d 937, 943, 479 P.2d 669, 671 (1971). As we have often 
noted "bus transportation has long been an integral part of all 
public educational systems, and it is unlikely that a truly 
effective remedy could be devised without continued reliance upon 
it." North Carolina Board of 'Ed. v. Swann, -402 U.S. 43, 46 
(1971). Moreover, Proposition I prevents a state court from 
ordering school officials to take any action respecting pupil 
school assignment, as well as pupil transportation. Presumably, 
state courts could not design a remedy involving the "pairing" or 
"clustering" of schools, even if such remedies did not involve 
~ "busing." In the present case, the state trial court found 
that the voluntary programs proposed by the Los Angeles school 
board were "constitutionally suspect" because they "place[d] the 
burden of relieving the racial isolation of the minority student 
upon the minority student." App. 160. Consequently, since "a 
voluntary program would not serve to integrate the community's 
schools," Seattle, ante, at , Proposition I, like the 
measures at issue in Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (WDNY 1970) 
(three-judge court), summarily aff'd, 402 U.S. 935 (1971), and 
Seattle, precludes the effective enjoyment by California's 
minority children of their right to eliminate racially isolated 
schools. 
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ordinance violates the Fourteenth Amendment," Hunter v. 
Erickson, 393 U.S., ·at 390, n.5, it is equally clear that the 
reallocation of governmental power created by Proposition I is 
not a "mere repeal" within the meaning of any of our prior 
decisions. 
In Dayton Bd. of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977} 
the new members of the Dayton Board of Education repudiated a 
resolution drafted by their predecessors admitting the Board's 
role in the establishment of a segregated school system and 
calling for various remedial actions. In concluding that the 
Board was constitutionally permitted to withdraw its own prior 
mea culpa, this Court was careful to note that "[t]he Board had 
not acted to undo operative regulations affecting the assignment 
of pupils or other aspects of the management of school affairs." 
Id., at 413 (emphasis added}. Therefore, the only time that this 
Court has squarely held that a "mere repeal" did not violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it was presented with a situation where a 
governmental .entity recinded its own prior statement of policy 
without affecting any existing educational policy. It is no 
surprise that such conduct passed constitutional muster. 
By contrast, in Seattle, Hunter, and Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 
U.S. 369 (1967} , 4 the three times that this Court has explicitly 
4In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967}, this Court 
struck down another California ballot measure, granting every 
resident the absolute constitutional right to sell or rent his 
property to whoever he or she chooses. We held that the provision 
amounted to an unconstitutional authorization of private 
discrimination. 
14 
rejected the argument that a proposed change constituted a "mere 
repeal" of an existing policy, the alleged rescission was 
accomplished by a governmental entity other than the entity that 
had taken the initial action, and resulted in a drastic 
alteration of the substantive effect of_ existing policy. This 
case falls squarely within this latter catagory. To be sure, the 
right to be free from racial isolation in the public schools 
I 
remains unaffected by Proposition I. See ante, at 7-8; see, 
McKinny v. Oxnard Union High School District Board of Trustees, 
Cal. 3d __ , . __ P~2d __ (1982) (slip op. at 13-14). But 
Proposition I does repeal the power of the state court to enforce 
this existing constitutional guarantee through the use of 
mandatory pupil assignment and transfer. 
The majority asserts that the Fourteenth Amendment does not . 
"require the people of a state to adhere to a judicial 
cons truction of their state constitution when that constitution 
itself vests final authority in the people." Ante, at 11. A 
state court's authority to order appropriate remedies for state 
constitutional violations, however, is no more based on the 
"final authority" of the people than the power of the local 
Seattle school board to make decisions regarding pupil assignment 
is premised on the State's ultimate control of the educational 
process. Rather, the authority of California courts to order, , 
mandatory student assignments in this context springs from the 
same source as the authority underlying other remedial measure 
adopted by state and federal courts in the absence of stautory 
authorization: the "courts power to provide equitable relief" to 
\_,- ) . . , ..... : .. 
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remedy a constitutional violation. Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 30 (1970); Crawford 
II, 17 Cal.3d, at 307, 551 P.2d, at 46 ("a trial court may 
exercise broad equitable powers in formulating and supervising a 
plan which the court finds will in sure_meaningful progress to 
alleviate .•. school segregation"). Even assuming that the 
source of a court's power to remedy a constitutional violation 
can be traced back to "the people," the majority's conclusion 
that "the people" can therefore confer that remedial power on a 
discriminatory basis is plainly inconsistent with our prior 
decisions. In Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S., at 392, we struck 
down the referendum at issue even though the people of Akron, 
Ohio undoubtedly retained "final authority" for all legislation. 
Similarly, in Seattle we concluded that the reallocation of power 
away from local school boards offended the Equal Protection 
_.;;:_ ==-:- -
_clause even though the State of Washington "is ultimately 
~ resp6sible for providing education within its borders." Ante, at 
The fact that this change was enacted through popular 
referendum, therefore, cannot immunize it from constitutional 
review. See Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 
736-737 (1964). 
As in _Seattle, Hunter, and Reitman, Proposition I's repeal 
of the state court's enforcement powers was the work of an 
independent governmental entity, and not of the state courts 
themselves. That this repeal drastically alters the substantive 
rights granted by existing policy is patently obvious from the 
facts of this litigation. 5 By prohibiting California courts from 
Footnote(s) 5 will appear on following pages. 
~~• I l ( ~ 
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ordering mandatory student assignment when necessary to eliminate 
racially isolated schools, Proposition I has placed an enormous 
barrier between minority children and the effective enjoyment of 
their constitutional rights, a barrier that is not placed in the 
path of those who seek to vindicate oth~r rights granted by state 
law. This Court's precedents demonstrate that, absent a 
compelling state interest, which respondents have hardly 
demonstrated, such a discriminatory barrier cannot stand. 6 
5 Indeed Proposition I by its express terms allows for the 
modification of existing plans upon the application of any 
interested person. Art. 1, §7(a). 
6As the majoriti notes, Proposition I states that "the 
people of California find and declare that this amendment is 
necessary to serve compelling public interests," including, inter 
alia, "making the most efficient use of ... limited financial 
resources," protecting the "health and safety" of all students, 
preserving "harmony and tranquility," and "protecting the 
environment." These purported justifications, while undoubtedly 
meritorious, are clearly insufficient to sustain the racial 
classification established by Proposition I. As we ~ ften 
no tea~ rac i al- classifications may only be upheld where 
"necessary, and not merely rationally ~related, to the •.\ , . J ,.111:: 
accomplishment of a permissible state policy." McLaughlin v. :~~ 
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964). It goes without saying that a -- -~ 
self-serving conclusory statement of necessity will not suffice 
to fulfill this burden. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board 
of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 28, 29-31 (1971) (rejecting a similar 
list of justifications for establishing a racial classification). 
"In any event, [respondents] have failed to show that the 
purpose[s] they impute to the [Proposition] could not be 
accomplished by alternative methods, not involving racial 
distinctions." Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp., at 720. 
Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that the 
allegedly compelling interest in establishing "neighborhood 
schools" so often referred to by the majority appears nowhere in 
the official list of justifications. The absence of any mention 
of this supposed justification is not surprising in light of the 
fact that the Proposition's ban on student "assignment" 
effectively prevents desegregation remedies that would not 
require a student to leave his "neighborhood." Seen. 3, infra. 
l./ 
The fact that California attempts to cloak its 
discrimination in the mantle of the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
alter this result. Although it might seem "paradoxical" to some 
members of this Court that a referendum that adopts the wording 
of the Fourteenth Amendment might viola~e it, the paradox is 
specious. Because of the Supremacy Clause, Proposition I would 
have precisely the same legal effect if it contained no reference 
to the Fourteenth Amendment. The lesson of Seattle is that a 
state, in prohibiting conduct that is not required by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, may nonetheless create a discriminatory 
reallocation of governmental power that does violate equal 
protection. The fact that some less effective avenues remain 
open to those interested in mandatory student assignment to 
eliminate racial isolation, like the fact that the voters in 
Hunter conceivably might have enacted fair housing legislation, 
or that those interested in busing to eliminate racial isolation 
in Seattle conceivably might use ,the state's referendum process, 
does not justify the discriminatory reallocation of governmental 
decisionmaking. 
In this case, the reallocation of power occurs in the 
I I ,> 




ensure the protection of rights "in their interest." Hunter v. 
Erickson, 383 U.S., at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
Certainly, Hunter and Seattle cannot be distinguished on the 
ground that they concerned the reallocation of legislative power, 
whereas Proposition I redistributes the inherent power of a court 
to tailor the remedy to the violation. As we have long 
-
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recognized, courts too often have been "the sole practicable 
avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of grievances." 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963). See Reitman v . 
Mulkey, 387 U.S., at 377 (invalidating stte constitutional 
amendment because "[t]he right to discrjminate, including th e 
right to discriminate on racial grounds, was now embodied in the 
State's basic charter, immune from legislative, executive, or 
judicial regulation at any level of the State government"} 
(emphasis added}. It is no wonder, as the present case amply 
illustrates, that whatever progress that has been made towards 
the elimination of de facto segregation has come from the 
California courts. Indeed, Proposition I, by denying full access 
to the only branch of government that has been willing to address 
this issue meaningfully, is far worse for those seeking to 
vindicate the plainly unpopular cause of racial integration in 
the public schools than a simple reallocation of an often 
unavailable and unresponsive legislative process. To paraphrase , 
"[i]t surely is an excessively formal excercise ••• to argue that 
the proceedural revisions at issue in Hunter [and Seattle] 
imposed special burdens on minorities, but that the selective 
allocation of decisionmaking authority created by [Proposition I] 
does not erect comparable political obstacles . " Seattle, ante, 
at 17, n. 17. 
III 
Even if the effects of Proposition I somehow can be 
distinguished from the enactments at issue in Hunter and Seattle, 
19 
the result reached by the majority today is still plainly 
inconsistent with our precedents. Because it found that the 
segregation of the California public schools violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the state trial court never considered 
whether Proposition I was itself unconstitutional because it was 
the product of discriminatory intent. Despite the absence of~ 
factual record on this issue, the Court of Appeals rejected 
I 
petitioner's argument that the law was motivated by a 
discriminatory intent on the ground that the recitation of 
several potentially legitimate purposes in the legislation's 
preamble rendered any claim that it had been enacted for an 
invidious purpose "pure speculation." Crawford v. Board of 
Education, 113 Cal. App. 3d 633, 654 (1980) (Crawford II). 
In Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development 
Corporation, 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977), we declared that 
"[d]etermining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a 
motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such 
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be -
available." Petitioners assert that the disproportionate impact 
of Proposition I, combined with the circumstances surrounding its 
adoption and the history of opposition to integration cited 
above, supra, at __ , clearly indicate the presence of 
discriminatory intent. See Brief for Petitioners 64-96. Yet 
despite the fact that no inquiry has been conducted into these 
allegations by either the trial or the appellate court, this 
Court, in its haste to uphold the banner of "neighborhood 
schools," affirms a factual determination that was never made. 
20 
Such blind allegince to the conclusory statements of a lower 
court is plainly forbidden by our prior decisions. 7 
IV 
Proposition I is in some sense "better" than the Washington 
initiative struck down in Seattle. 8 In their generosity, 
California voters have allowed those seeking racial balance to 
petition the very school officials who have steadfastly 
maintained the color line at the school house door to comply 
voluntary with their continuing state constitutional duty to 
desegregate. At the same time, the voters have deprived 
minorities of the only method of redress that has proven 
effective --the full remedial powers of the state judiciary. In 
the name of the State's "ability to experiment," ante, at 7, the 
Court today allows this placement of yet another burden in the 
path of those seeking to counter the effects of nearly three 
centuries of racial prejudice. Because this decision is neither 
justified by our prior decisions nor consistent with our duty to 
guarantee all citizens the equal protection of the laws, I must 
dissent. 
7The majority's reliance on Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 
369 (1967) is therefore misplaced. How can any deference be 
given to the State court's "knowledge of the facts and 
circumstances concerning the passage and potential passage" of 
Proposition I, id., at 378, when no such findings were ever made. 
8 Inititive 350, however, at least did "not hinder [the] 
State from enforcing the State Constitution." Seattle, ante, at 
__ (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
An amendment to the California Constitution provides that 
state courts shall not order mandatory pupil assignment or 
transportation unless a federal court would do so to remedy a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. The ques-
tion for our decision is whether this provision is itself in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
I 
This litigation began almost twenty years ago in 1963, 
when minority students attending school in the Los Angeles 
Unified School District (District) filed a class action in state 
court seeking desegregation of the District's schools. 1 The 
case went to trial some five years later, and in 1970 the trial 
court issued an opinion finding that the District was substan-
tially segregated in violation of the State and Federal Con-
1 In 1980 the District included 562 schools with 650,000 students in an 
area of 711 square miles. In 1968 when the case went to trial, the District 
was 53.6% white, 22.6% black, 20% Hispanic, and 3.8% Asian and other. 
By October 1980 the demographic composition had altered radically: 23. 7% 
white, 23.3% black, 45.3% Hispanic, and 7. 7% Asian and other. See 
Crawford v. Board of Education, 113 Cal. App. 3d 633, 642 (1980). 
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stitutions. The court ordered the District to prepare a de-
segregation plan for immediate use. App. 139. 
On the District's appeal, the California Supreme Court af-
firmed, but on a different basis. Crawford v. Board of Edu-
cation, 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 P. 2d 28 (1976). While the trial 
court had found de jure segregation in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, see 
App. 117, 120-121, the California Supreme Court based its 
affirmance solely upon the Equal Protection Clause of the 
State Constitution. 2 The court explained that under the 
California Constitution "state school boards . . . bear a con-
stitutional obligation to take reasonable steps to alleviate 
segregation in the public schools, whether the segregation be 
de facto or de jure in origin." 17 Cal. 3d, at 290, 551 P. 2d, at 
34. The court remanded to the trial court for preparation of 
a "reasonably feasible" plan for school desegregation. 17 
Cal. 3d, at 310, 551 P. 2d, at 48. 3 
2 ''The findings in this case adequately support the trial court's conclu-
sion that the segregation in the defendant school district is de jure in na-
ture. We shall explain, however, that we do not rest our decision on this 
characterization because we continue to adhere to our conclusion in [Jack-
son v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P . 2d 878 (1963)] 
that school boards in California bear a constitutional obligation to take rea-
sonably feasible steps to alleviate school segregation 'regardless of its 
cause.'" Crawford v. Board of Education, 17 Cal. 3d 280, 285, 551 P. 2d 
28, 30 (1976). The court explained that federal cases were not controlling: 
"In focusing primarily on . . . federal decisions . .. defendant ignores a sig-
nifi.cant line of California decisions, decisions which authoritatively estab-
lish that in this state school boards do bear a constitutional obligation to 
take reasonable steps to alleviate segregation in the public schools, 
whether the segregation be de facto or de jure in origin." 17 Cal. 3d, at 290, 
551 P. 2d, at 33-34. 
' In stating general principles to guide the trial court on remand, the 
State Supreme Court discussed the 'busing' question: ''While critics have 
sometimes attempted to obscure the issue, court decisions time and time 
again emphasized that 'busing' is not a constitutional end in itself but is 
simply one potential tool which may be utilized to satisfy a school district's 
constitutional obligation in this field. . . . [I]n some circumstances busing 
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On remand, the trial court rejected the District's mostly 
voluntary desegregation plan but ultimately approved a sec-
ond plan that included substantial mandatory school reassign-
ment and transportation-"busing''--on a racial and ethnic 
basis. 4 The plan was put into effect in the fall of 1978, but 
after one year's experience, all parties to the litigation were 
dissatisfied. See Crawford v. Board of Education, 113 Cal. 
App. 3d 633, 636 (1980). Although the plan continued in op-
eration, the trial court began considering alternatives in Oc-
tober 1979. 
In November 1979 the voters of the State of California rati-
fied Proposition I, an amendment to the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses of the State Constitution. 5 Propo-
will be an appropriate and useful element in a desegregation plan, while in 
other instances its 'costs,' both in financial and educational terms, will ren-
der its use inadvisable." 17 Cal. 3d, at 309, 551 P. 2d, at 47. It noted as 
well that a state court should not intervene to speed the desegregation 
process so long as the school board takes ''reasonably feasible steps to alle-
viate school segregation,'' 17 Cal. 3d, at 305, 551 P. 2d, at 45, and that "a 
court cannot properly issue a 'busing' order so long as a school district con-
tinues to meet its constitutional obligations." 17 Cal. 3d, at 310,551 P. 2d, 
at 48. 
• The plan provided for the mandatory reassignment of approximately 
40,000 students in the fourth through eighth grades. Some of these chil-
dren were bused over long distances requiring daily round-trip bus rides of 
as long as two to four hours. In addition, the plan provided for the volun-
tary transfer of some 30,000 students. 
Respondent Bustop, Inc. unsuccessfully sought to stay implementation 
of the plan. See Bustop, Inc. v. Board of Education, 439 U. S. 1380 
(1978) (REHNQUIST, J., in chambers); Bustop , Inc. v. Board of Education, 
439 U. S. 1384 (1978) (POWELL, J., in chambers). 
• Proposition I was placed before the voters following a two-thirds vote 
of each house of the state legislature. Cal. Const. art. 18, § 1. The state 
senate approved the Proposition by a vote of 28 to 6, the state assembly by 
a vote of 62 to 17. The voters favored the Proposition by a vote of 
2,433,312 (68.6%) to 1,112,923 (31.4%). The Proposition received a major-
ity of the vote in each of the State's 58 counties and in 79 of the State's 80 
assembly districts. California Secretary of State, Statement of the Vote, 
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sition I conforms the power of state courts to order busing to 
that exercised by the federal courts under the Fourteenth 
Amendment: 
"[N]o court of this state may impose upon the State of 
California or any public entity, board, or official any ob-
ligation or responsibility with respect to the use of pupil 
school assignment or pupil transportation, (1) except to 
remedy a specific violation by such party that would also 
constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
and (2) unless a federal court would be permitted under 
federal decisional law to impose that obligation or 
responsibility upon such party to remedy the specific vi-
olation of the Equal Protection Clause. . " 6 
November 6, 1979 Election, 3-4, 43-49. 
6 Proposition I added a lengthy proviso to art. 1, § 7(a) of the California 
Constitution. Following passage of Proposition I, § 7 now provides, in rel-
evant part: 
"(a) A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws; provided, that 
nothing contained herein or elsewhere in this Constitution imposes upon 
· the State of California or any public entity, board, or official any obliga-
tions or responsibilities which exceed those imposed by the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution with 
respect to the use of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation. In 
enforcing this subdivision or any other provision of this Constitution, no 
court of this state may impose upon the State of California or any public 
entity, board, or official any obligation or responsibility with respect to the 
use of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation, (1) except to remedy 
a specific violation by such party that would also constitute a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, and (2) unless a federal court would be permitted under fed-
eral decisional law to impose that obligation or responsibility upon such 
party to remedy the specific violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
"Nothing herein shall prohibit the governing board of a school district 
from voluntarily continuing or commencing a school integration plan after 
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Following approval of Proposition I, the District asked the 
Superior Court to halt all mandatory reassignment and bus-
ing of pupils. App. 185. On May 19, 1980, the court denied 
the District's application. The court reasoned that Proposi-
tion I was of no effect in this case in light of the court's 1970 
finding of de jure segregation by the District in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Shortly thereafter, the court 
ordered implementation of a revised desegregation plan, one 
that again substantially relied upon mandatory pupil reas-
signment and transportation. 7 
The California Court of Appeal reversed. 113 Cal. App. 3d 
633 (1980). The court found that the trial court's 1970 find-
ings of fact would not support the conclusion that the District 
had violated the Federal Constitution through intentional 
segregation. 8 Thus, Proposition I was applicable to the trial 
the effective date of this subdivision as amended. 
"In amending this subdivision, the Legislature and people of the State of 
California find and declare that this amendment is necessary to serve com-
pelling public interests, including those of making the most effective use of 
the limited financial resources now and prospectively available to support 
public education, maximizing the educational opportunities and protecting 
the health and safety of all public school pupils, enhancing the ability of 
parents to participate in the educational process, preserving harmony and 
tranquility in this state and its public schools, preventing the waste of 
scarce fuel resources , and protecting the environment." 
7 The Superior Court ordered the immediate implementation of the re-
vised plan. The District was unsuccessful in its effort to gain a stay of the 
plan pending appeal. See Board of Education v. Superior Court, 448 
u. s. 1343 (1980) (REHNQUIST, J. , in chambers). 
8 ''When the 1970 findings of the trial court are reviewed in the light of 
the correct applicable federal law, it is apparent that no specific segre-
gative intent with discriminatory purpose was found. The thrust of the 
findings of the trial court was that passive maintenance by the Board of a 
neighborhood school system in the face of widespread residential racial im-
balance amounted to de jure segregation in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. . . . But a school board has no duty under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to meet and overcome the effect of population movements. " 
Crau,ford v. Board of Education, supra, 113 Cal. App. 3d, at 645-646. 
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court's desegregation plan and would bar that part of the plan 
requiring mandatory student reassignment and transporta-
tion. Moreover, the court concluded that Proposition I was 
constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 
654. The court found no obligation on the part of the State 
to retain a greater remedy at state law against racial seg-
regation than was provided by the Federal Constitution. 
Ibid. The court rejected the claim that Proposition I was 
adopted with a discriminatory purpose. Id., at 654-655. 9 
Determining Proposition I to be applicable and constitu-
tional, the Court of Appeal vacated the orders entered by the 
Superior Court. The California Supreme Court denied hear-
ing. App. to Pet. for Cert. C. 10 We granted certiorari. --
U.S. - (1981). 
9 The Court of Appeal also rejected the claim that Proposition I deprived 
minority children of a "vested right" to desegregated education in violation 
of due process. See 113 Cal. App. 3d, at 655-656. Petitioners no longer 
advance this claim. 
10 On March 16, 1981, the District directed that mandatory pupil reas-
signment under the Superior Court's revised plan be terminated on April 
20, 1981. On that date, parents of children who had been reassigned were 
given the option of returning their children to neighborhood schools. Ac-
cording to respondent, approximately 7,000 pupils took this option of whom 
4,300 were minority students. Brief for Respondent, 10. 
The state courts refused to enjoin termination of the plan. On April 17, 
1980, however, the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California issued a temporary restraining order preventing termination of 
the plan. Los Angeles NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School District, 
513 F. Supp. 717 (CD Cal. 1981). The District Court found that there was 
a "fair chance" that intentional segregation by the District could be demon-
strated. Id., at 720. The District Court's order was vacated on the fol-
lowing day by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
Los Angeles Unified School District v. District Court, 650 F. 2d 1004 (CA9 
1981). On remand the District Court denied the District's motion to dis-
miss. This ruling has been certified for interlocutory appeal. See Brief for 
Respondents 10, n. 4. 
On September 10, 1981, the Superior Court approved a new, voluntary 
desegregation plan. 
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II 
We agree with the California Court of Appeal in rejecting 
the contention that once a State chooses to do "more" than 
the Fourteenth Amendment requires, it may never recede. 11 
We reject an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment so 
destructive of a state's democratic processes and of its ability 
to experiment. This interpretation has no support in the de-
cisions of this Court. 
Proposition I does not inhibit enforcement of any federal 
law or constitutional requirement. Quite the contrary, by 
its plain language the Proposition seeks only to embrace the 
requirements of the Federal Constitution with respect to 
mandatory school assignments and transportation. It would 
be paradoxical to conclude that by adopting the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the voters of 
the State thereby had violated it. Moreover, even after 
Proposition I, the California Constitution still imposes a 
greater duty of desegregation than does the Federal Con-
stitution. The state courts of California continue to have an 
obligation under state law to order segregated school dis-
tricts to use voluntary desegregation techniques, whether or 
not there has been a finding of intentional segregation. The 
school districts themselves retain a state law obligation to 
take reasonably feasible steps to desegregate , and they re-
main free to adopt reassignment and busing plans to effectu-
ate desegregation. 12 
" Respondent Bustop, Inc. argues that far from doing "more" than the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires, the State actually violated the amend-
ment by assigning students on the basis of race when such assignments 
were not necessary to remedy a federal constitutional violation. See Brief 
for Respondent 1~18. We do not reach this contention. 
12 In this respect this case differs from the situation presented in Wash-
ington v. Seattle School District No. 1, -- U. S. -- (1982). 
In an opinion delivered after Proposition I was enacted, the California 
Supreme Court stated that "the amendment neither releases school dis-
tricts from their state constitutional obligation to take reasonably feasible 
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Nonetheless, petitioners contend that Proposition I is un-
constitutional on its face. They argue that Proposition I em-
ploys an "explicit racial classification" and imposes a "race-
specific" burden on minorities seeking to vindicate state 
created rights. By limiting the power of state courts to en-
force the state created right to desegregated schools, peti-
tioners contend, Proposition I creates a "dual court system" 
that discriminates on the basis of race. 13 They emphasize 
that other state created rights may be vindicated by the state 
courts without limitation on remedies. Petitioners argue 
that the "dual court system" created by Proposition I is un-
constitutional unless supported by a compelling state 
interest. 
We would agree that if Proposition I employed a racial 
classification it would be unconstitutional unless necessary to 
further a compelling state interest. "A racial classification, 
regardless of purported motivation is presumptively invalid 
and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification." 
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 
U. S. 256, 272 (1979). See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 
U. S. 184, 196 (1964). But Proposition I does not embody a 
racial classification. 14 It neither says nor implies that per-
sons are to be treated differently on account of their race. It 
steps to alleviate segregation regardless of its cause, nor divests California 
courts of authority to order desegregation measures other than pupil 
school assignment or pupil transportation. " McKinny v. Oxnard Union 
High School District Board of Trustees , -- Cal. 3d--, -- P. 2d--
(1982) (Slip. op. at 13-14). Moreover, the Proposition only limits state 
courts when enforcing the state constitution. Thus, the Proposition would 
not bar state court enforcement of state statutes requiring busing for de-
segregation or for any other purpose. Cf. Brown v. Califano, 627 F . 2d 
1221 , 1230 (CADC 1980) (legislation limiting power of federal agency to re-
quire busing by local school boards held constitutional in view of the "effec-
tive avenues for desegregation" left open by the legislation). 
13 "[l]t is racial discrimination in the judicial apparatus of the state, not 
racial discrimination in the state's schools, that petitioners challenge under 
the Fourteenth Amendment in this case." Brief for Petitioner 48. 
"In Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S. 385 (1969), the Court invalidated a 
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simply forbids state courts from ordering pupil school assign-
ment or transportation in the absence of a Fourteenth 
Amendment violation. The benefit it seeks to confer-
neighborhood schooling-is made available regardless of race 
in the discretion of school boards. 15 Indeed, even if Proposi-
tion I had a racially discriminatory effect, in view of the de-
mographic mix of the District it is not clear which race or 
races would be affected the most or in what way. 16 In addi-
tion, this Court previously has held that even when a neutral 
law has a disproportionately adverse effect on a racial minor-
ity, the Fourteenth Amendment is violated only if a discrimi-
natory purpose can be shown. 11 
city charter amendment which placed a special burden on racial minorities 
in the political process. The Court considered that although the law was 
neutral on its face , ''the reality is that the law's impact falls on the minor-
ity. " In light of this reality and the distortion of the political process 
worked by the charter amendment, the Court considered that the amend-
ment employed a racial classification despite its facial neutrality. In this 
case the elements underlying the holding in Hunter are missing. See 
infra. 
15 A neighborhood school policy does not offend the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in itself. See Swann v. CIW-rlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed. , 402 
U. S. 1, 28 (1971) ("Absent a constitutional violation there would be no 
basis for judicially ordering assignment of students on a racial basis. All 
things being equal, with no history of discrimination, it might well be desir-
able to assign pupils to schools nearest their homes."). Cf. 20 U. S. C. 
§ 1701: "(a) The Congress declares it to be the policy of the Unites States 
that-(1) all children enrolled in public schools are entitled to equal educa-
tional opportunity without regard to race, color, sex, or national origin; and 
(2) the neighborhood is the appropriate basis for determining public school 
assignments." 
1
• In the Los Angeles school district, white students are now the racial 
. minority, see note 1, supra. Similarly, in Los Angeles County, racial mi-
norities, including those of Spanish origin, constitute the majority of the 
population. See 1980 Census of Population and Housing, Advance Re-
ports 6. 
11 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 238-248 (1976); Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 265 (1977); 
James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 141 (1971). 
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Similarly, the Court has recognized that a distinction may 
exist between state action that discriminates on the basis of 
race and state action that addresses, in neutral fashion, race 
related matters. 18 This distinction is implicit in the Court's 
repeated statement that the Equal Protection Clause is not 
violated by the mere repeal of race related legislation or poli-
cies that were not required by the Federal Constitution in 
the first place. In Dayton Bd. of Education v. Brinkman, 
433 U. S. 406, 414 (1977), we found that the school board's 
mere repudiation of an earlier resolution calling for deseg-
regation did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 19 In 
Reitman v. Mulkey , 387 U. S. 369, 376 (1967), and again in 
Hunter v. Erickson, supra, at 390, n. 5 (1969), we were care-
ful to note that the laws under review did more than 
"mere[ly] repeal" existing anti-discrimination legislation. 20 In 
sum, the simple repeal or modification of desegregation or 
18 Proposition I is not limited to busing for the purpose of racial deseg-
regation. It applies neutrally to "pupil school assignment or pupil trans-
portation" in general. Even so, it is clear that court ordered busing in ex-
cess of that required by the Fourteenth Amendment, as one means of 
desegregating schools, prompted the initiation and probably the adoption 
of Proposition I. 
" See Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 531 , n. 5 (1979) 
("Racial imbalance, we noted in Dayton I , is not per se a constitutional vi-
olation, and rescission of prior resolutions proposing desegregation is un-
constitutional only if the resolutions were required in the first place by the 
Fourteenth Amendment."). 
20 In H unter we noted that "we do not hold that mere repeal of an exist-
ing [anti-discrimination] ordinance violates the Fourteenth Amendment. " 
393 U. S. , at 390, n. 5. In Reitman the Court held that California Propo-
sition 14 was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment not be-
cause it repealed two pieces of anti-discrimination legislation, but because 
the Proposition involved the State in private racial discrimination: "Here 
we are dealing with a provision which does not just repeal an existing law 
forbidding private racial discriminations. Section 26 was intended to au-
thorize, and does authorize, racial discrimination in the housing market." 
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anti-discrimination laws, without more, never has been 
viewed as embodying a presumptively invalid racial 
classification 21 
Were we to hold that the mere repeal of race related legis-
lation is unconstitutional, we would limit seriously the au-
thority of States to deal with the problems of our heteroge-
neous population. States would be committed irrevocably to 
legislation that has proven unsuccessful or even harmful in 
practice. And certainly the purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment would not be advanced by an interpretation that 
discouraged the States from providing greater protection to 
racial minorities. 22 Nor would the purposes of the Amend-
ment be furthered by requiring the States to maintain legis-
lation designed to ameliorate race relations or to protect ra-
cial minorities but which has produced just the opposite 
effects. 23 Yet these would be the results of requiring a State 
21 Of course, if the purpose of repealing legislation is to disadvantage a 
racial minority, the repeal is unconstitutional for this reason. See 
Reitman v. Mulkey , 387 U. S. 369 (1967). 
22 See Palmer v. Thompson , 403 U. S. 217, 228 (1971) ("To hold ... that 
every public facility or service, once opened, constitutionally 'locks in' the 
public sponsor so that it may not be dropped . .. would plainly discourage 
the expansion and enlargement of needed services in the long run") (BUR-
GER, C. J ., concurring); Reitman v. Mulkey, supra, at 395 ("Opponents of 
state antidiscrimination statutes are now in a position to argue that such 
legislation should be defeated because, if enacted, it may be unrepealable") 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). 
23 In his dissenting opinion in R eitman v. Mulkey, supra, at 395, Justice 
Harlan remarked upon the need for legislative flexibility when dealing with 
the "delicate and troublesome problems of race relations. " He noted: 
"The lines that have been and must be drawn in this area, fraught as it is 
with human sensibilities and frailties of whatever race or creed, are diffi-
cult ones. The drawing of them requires understanding, patience, and 
compromise, and is best done by legislatures rather than by courts. When 
legislation in this field is unsuccessful there should be wide opportunities 
for legislative amendment, as well as for change through such processes as 
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to maintain legislation that has proven unworkable or harm-
ful when the State was under no obligation to adopt the legis-
lation in the first place. Moreover, and relevant to this case, 
we would not interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to re-
quire the people of a State to adhere to a judicial construction 
of their state constitution when that constitution itself vests 
final authority in the people. 
III 
Petitioners seek to avoid the force of the foregoing consid-
erations by arguing that Proposition I is not a "mere repeal." 
Relying primarily on the decision in Hunter v. Erickson, 
supra, they contend that Proposition I does not simply repeal 
a state created right but fundamentally alters the judicial 
system so that "those seeking redress from racial isolation in 
violation of state law must be satisfied with less than full re-
lief from a state court." 24 We do not view Hunter as control-
ling here, nor are we persuaded by petitioners' characteriza-
tion of Proposition I as something more than a mere repeal. 
In Hunter the Akron city charter had been amended by the 
voters to provide that no ordinance regulating real estate on 
the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin could take 
effect until approved by a referendum. As a result of the 
charter amendment, a fair housing ordinance, adopted by the 
City Council at an earlier date, was no longer effective. In 
holding the charter amendment invalid under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court held that the charter amendment was 
not a simple repeal of the fair housing ordinance. The 
amendment "not only suspended the operation of the existing 
ordinance forbidding housing discrimination, but also re-
the popular initiative and referendum." Id. , at 395-396. 
24 Tr. of Oral Argument 6. See id., at 7-8 (''The fact that a state may be 
free to remove a right or remove a duty, does not mean that it has the same 
freedom to leave the right in place but simply, in a discriminatory way we 
argue, provide less than full judicial remedy"). 
t 
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quired the approval of the electors before any future [anti-
discrimination] ordinance could take effect." 393 U. S., at 
389-390. Thus, whereas most ordinances regulating real 
property would take effect once enacted by the City Council, 
ordinances prohibiting racial discrimination in housing would 
be forced to clear an additional hurdle. 25 As such, the char-
ter amendment placed an impermissible, "special burden[] on 
racial minorities within the governmental process." Id., at 
391. 26 
Hunter involved more than a "mere repeal" of the fair 
housing ordinance; persons seeking anti-discrimination hous-
ing laws-presumptively racial minorities-were "singled out 
for mandatory referendums while no other group ... face[d] 
that obstacle." James v. Valtierra, supra, at 142. By con-
trast, even on the assumption that racial minorities benefit-
ted from the busing required by state law, Proposition I is 
less than a "repeal" of the California Equal Protection 
Clause. As noted above, after Proposition I, the state con-
stitution still places upon school boards a greater duty to de-
segregate than does the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Nor can it be said that Proposition I distorts the political 
process for racial reasons or that it allocates governmental or 
judicial power on the basis of a discriminatory principle. 
"The Constitution does not require things which are different 
in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the 
same." Tigner v. Texas , 310 U. S. 141, 147 (1940). Reme-
"'"In the case before us ... the city of Akron has not attempted to allo-
cate governmental power on the basis of any general principle. Here, we 
have a provision that has the clear purpose of making it more difficult for 
certain racial and religious minorities to achieve legislation that is in their 
interest." 393 U. S., at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
26 The Hunter Court noted that although "the law on its face treats Ne-
gro and white, Jew and gentile in an identical manner," 393 U. S. , at 391, a 
charter amendment making it more difficult to pass anti-discrimination leg-
islation could only disadvantage racial minorities in the governmental 
process. 
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dies appropriate in one area of legislation may not be desir-
able in another. The remedies available for violation of the 
antitrust laws, for example, are different than those available 
for violation of the Civil Rights Acts. Yet a "dual court 
system"-one for the racial majority and one for the racial 
minority-is not established simply because civil rights reme-
dies are different from those available in other areas. 'l:I 
Surely it was constitutional for the California Supreme Court 
to caution that although "in some circumstances busing will 
be an appropriate and useful element in a desegregation 
plan," in other circumstances "its 'costs,' both in financial and 
educational terms, will render its use inadvisable." See note 
3, supra. It was equally constitutional for the people of the 
State to determine that the standard of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was more appropriate for California courts to 
apply in desegregation cases than the standard repealed by 
Proposition I. 28 
In short, having gone beyond the requirements of the Fed-
eral Constitution, the State was free to return in part to the 
standard prevailing generally throughout the United States. 
It could have conformed its law to the Federal Constitution in 
every respect. That it chose to pull back only in part, and by 
preserving a greater right to desegregation than exists under 
the Federal Constitution, most assuredly does not render the 
Proposition unconstitutional on its face. 
27 Petitioners contend that Proposition I only restricts busing for the 
purpose of racial discrimination. The Proposition I is neutral on its face , 
however, and respondents-as well as the State in its amicus brief-take 
issue with petitioners' interpretation of the provision. 
28 Similarly, a "dual constitution" is not established when the State 
chooses to go beyond the requirements of the Federal Constitution in some 
areas but not others. Nor is a "dual executive branch" created when an 
agency is given enforcement powers in one area but not in another. Cf. 
Braum v. Califano, 627 F. 2d 1221 (CADC 1980) (upholding federal legisla-
tion prohibiting a federal executive agency, but not local school officials or 
federal courts, from requiring busing). 
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IV 
The California Court of Appeal also rejected petitioners' 
claim that Proposition I, if facially valid, was nonetheless un-
constitutional because enacted with a discriminatory pur-
pose. The court reasoned that the purposes of the Proposi-
tion were well stated in the Proposition itself. 29 Voters may 
have been motivated by any of these purposes, chief among 
them the educational benefits of neighborhood schooling. 
The Court found that voters also may have considered that 
the extent of mandatory busing, authorized by state law, ac-
tually was aggravating rather than ameliorating the deseg-
regation problem. See note 1, supra. It characterized peti-
tioners' claim of discriminatory intent on the part of millions 
_ of voters as but "pure speculation." 113 Cal. App. 3d, at 655. 
In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 (1967), the Court 
considered the constitutionality of another California Propo-
sition. In that case, the California Supreme Court had con-
cluded that the Proposition was unconstitutional because it 
gave the State's approval to private racial discrimination. 
This Court agreed, deferring to the findings made by the 
California court. The Court noted that the California court 
was "armed . .. with the knowledge of the facts and circum-
stances concerning the passage and potential impact" of the 
Proposition and "familiar with the milieu in which that provi-
sion would operate. " Id., at 378. Similarly, in this case, 
29 The Proposition contains its own statement of purpose: 
"[T]he Legislature and people of the State of California find and declare 
that this amendment is necessary to serve compelling public interests, in-
cluding those of making the most effective use of the limited financial re-
sources now and prospectively available to support public education, maxi-
mizing the educational opportunities and protecting the health and safety 
of all public school pupils, enhancing the ability of parents to participate in 
the educational process, preserving harmony and tranquility in this state 
and its public schools, preventing the waste of scarce fuel, resources, and 
protecting the environment. " 
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again involving the circumstances of passage and the poten-
tial impact of a Proposition adopted at a state-wide election, 
we see no reason to differ with the conclusions of the state 
appellate court. 30 
Under decisions of this Court, a law neutral on its face still 
may be unconstitutional if motivated by a discriminatory pur-
pose. In determining whether such a purpose was the moti-
vating factor, the racially disproportionate effect of official 
action provides "an important starting point. " Personnel 
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 
274 (1979), quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Dev. Corp. , supra, 429 U. S. 252, at 266. 
Proposition I in no way purports to limit the power of state 
courts to remedy the effects of intentional segregation with 
its accompanying stigma. The benefits of neighborhood 
schooling are racially neutral. This manifestly is true in Los 
Angeles where over 75% of the public school body is com-
posed of groups viewed as racial minorities. See notes 1 and 
15, supra. Moreover, the Proposition simply removes one 
means of achieving the state created right to desegregated 
education. School districts retain the obligation to alleviate 
segregation regardless of cause. And the state courts still 
may order desegregation measures other than pupil school 
assignment or pupil transportation. 31 
YiCf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) ("The extent of 
deference that one pays to the trial court's determination of the factual 
issue, and indeed, the extent to which one characte~es the intent issue as 
a question of fact or a question of law, will vary in different contexts.") 
(STEVENS, J. , concurring). 
31 In Braum v. Califarw, supra, the Court of Appeals found that a fed-
eral statute preventing the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW) from requiring busing ''to a school other than the school which is 
nearest the student's home," 42 U. S. C. § 2000d (1976), was not uncon-
stitutional. HEW retained authority to encourage school districts to de-
segregate through other means, and the enforcement powers of the De-
partment of Justice were left untouched. The court therefore concluded 
; 
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Even if we could assume that Proposition I had a dispro-
portionate adverse effect on racial minorities, we see no rea-
son to challenge the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the 
voters of the State were not motivated by a discriminatory 
purpose. See 113 Cal. App. 3d, at 654-655. In this case the 
Proposition was approved by an overwhelming majority of 
the electorate. 32 It received support from members of all 
races. 33 The purposes of the Proposition are stated in its 
text and are legitimate, nondiscriminatory objectives. In 
these circumstances, we will not dispute the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal or impugn the motivation of the State's 
electorate. 
Accordingly the judgment of the California Court of Ap-
peal is 
Affirmed. 
that the limits on HEW's ability to order mandatory busing did not have a 
discriminatory effect. And, having done so, it refused to inquire into leg-
islative motivation: "Absent discriminatory effect, judicial inquiry into leg-
islative motivation is unnecessary, as well as undesirable." Id., at 1234. 
32 Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (STEVENS, J., con-
curring) ("It is unrealistic ... to invalidate otherwise legitmate action sim-
ply because an improper motive affected the deliberation of a participant in 
the decisional process. A law conscripting clerics should not be invali-
dated because an atheist voted for it. "). · 
33 Proposition 1 received support from 73.9% of the voters in Los Ange-
les county which has a ''minority" population-including persons of Spanish 
origin-of over 50%. California Secretary of State, Statement of the 
Vote, November 6, 1979 Election, 3. See note 15 supra. By contrast, 
the Proposition received its smallest percentage of the vote in Humboldt 
and Marin counties which are nearly all-white in composition. 
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J USTICE BLACKMUN, concurring. 
While I join the opinion of the Court, J write separately to 
address what I beli e ve are the critical distinctions between this 
c a se and Washington v. Se attle School District No. 1, ante. 
The Court always has r e cognized that distortions of the 
political process have spe cial implications for attempts to 
achi e ve equal p r otection of the l a ws. Thus the Court has found 
particularly pernicious those cl a ssifications that threaten the 
ability of minorities to involve themselves in the process of 
self-governme nt, for if l a ws a re not drawn within a "just 
framework," Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S. 385, 393 (1969) 
(Harlan, J., concurring), it is unlikely that they will be drawn 
on just principles. 
The Court's conclusion in Seattle followed inexorably from 
these considerations. In that case the statewide electorate 
reallocated decisionmaking authority to "mak[e] it more difficult 
for certain racial and religious minorities [than for other 
members of the community] to achieve legislation that is in their 
interest."' Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, ante, 
at (emphasis in original), quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. 
S., at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring) (slip op. 12). The Court 





if a class cannot participate effectively in the process by which 
those rights and remedies that order society are created, that 
class necessarily will be "relegated, by state fiat, in a most 
basic way to second-class status ." Plyler v. Doe, U. S. 
, (1982) (BLACKMUN, J., concurring) (slip op. 4). 
In my view, something significantly different is involved in 
this case. State courts do not create the _rights they enforce; 
those rights originate elsewhere in the state legislature, in 
the State's political subdivisions, or in the state constitution 
itself. When one of those rights is repealed, and therefore is 
rendered unenforceable in the courts, that action hardly can be 
said to restructure the State's decisionmaking mechanism. While 
the California electorate may have made it more difficult to 
achieve desegregation when it enacted Proposition I, to my mind 
it did so not by working a structural change in the political 
process so much as . by simply repealing the right to invoke a 
judicial busing remedy. Indeed, ruling for petitioners on a 
Hunter theory seemingly would mean that statutory affirmative 
action or antidiscr imination programs never could · be repealed , 
for a repeal of the enactment would mean that enforcement 
authority previously lodged in the state courts was being removed 
by another political entity. 
In short, the people of California -- the same "entity" that 
put in place the state constitution, and created the enforceable 
obligation to desegregate -- have made the desegregation 
obligation judicially unenforceable. The "political process or 
the decisionmaking mechanism used to address racially conscious 
~ 
- 3 -
legislation" has not been "singled out for peculiar and 
disadvantageous treatment," Washington v. Seattle School District 
No. 1, ante , at (emphasis in original) (slip op. 27), for 
those political mechanisms that create and repeal the rights 
ultimately enforced by the courts were left entirely unaffected 
by Proposition I. And I cannot conclude that the repeal of a 
state-created right -- or, analogously , the removal of the 
judicary's ability to enforce that righ t -- "curtail[s] the 
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied 
upon to protect minorities." Ibid., quoting United States v. 
Carolene Products Co., 304 u. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4. 
Because I find Seattle distinguishable from this case, I 
join the opinion and judgment of the court. 
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4th DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-38 
MARY ELLEN CRAWFORD, A MINOR, ETC., ET AL., PE-
TITIONERS v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY 
OF LOS ANGELES ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALI-
FORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 
[June-, 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
An amendment to the California Constitution provides that 
state courts shall not order mandatory pupil assignment or 
transportation unless a federal court would do so to remedy a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. The ques-
tion for our decision is whether this provision is itself in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
I 
This litigation began almost twenty years ago in 1963, 
when minority students attending school in the Los Angeles 
Unified School District (District) filed a class action in state 
court seeking desegregation of the District's schools. 1 The 
case went to trial some five years later, and in 1970 the trial 
court issued an opinion finding that the District was substan-
tially segregated in violation of the State and Federal Con-
'In 1980 the District included 562 schools with 650,000 students in an 
area of 711 square miles. In 1968 when the case went to trial, the District 
was 53.6% white, 22.6% black, 20% Hispanic, and 3.8% Asian and other. 
By October 1980 the demographic composition had altered radically: 23. 7% 
white, 23.3% black, 45.3% Hispanic, and 7. 7% Asian and other. See 
Crawford v. Board of Education, 113 Cal. App. 3d 633, 642 (1980). 
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stitutions. The court ordered the District to prepare a de-
segregation plan for immediate use. App. 139. 
On the District's appeal, the California Supreme Court af-
firmed, but on a different basis. Crawford v. Board of Edu-
cation, 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 P. 2d 28 (1976). While the trial 
court had found de jure segregation in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, see 
App. 117, 120-121, the California Supreme Court based its 
affirmance solely upon the Equal Protection Clause of the 
State Constitution. 2 The court explained that under the 
California Constitution "state school boards . . . bear a con-
stitutional obligation to take reasonable steps to alleviate 
segregation in the public schools, whether the segregation be 
de facto or de jure in origin." 17 Cal. 3d, at 290, 551 P. 2d, 
at 34. The court remanc_led to the trial court for preparation 
of a ''reasonably feasible" plan for school desegregation. 17 
Cal. 3d, at 310, 551 P. 2d, at 48. 3 
2 "The findings in this case adequately support the trial court's conclu-
sion that the segregation in the defendant school district is de jure in na-
ture. We shall explain, however, that we do not rest our decision on this 
characterization because we continue to adhere to our conclusion in [Jack-
son v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P . 2d 878 (1963)) 
that school boards in California bear a constitutional obligation to take rea-
sonably feasible steps to alleviate school segregation 'regardless of its 
cause.'" Crawford v. Board of Education, 17 Cal. 3d 280,285,551 P. 2d 
28, 30 (1976). The court explained that federal cases were not controlling: 
"In focusing primarily on . . . federal decisions . . . defendant ignores a sig-
nificant line of California decisions, decisions which authoritatively estab-
lish that in this state school boards do bear a constitutional obligation to 
take reasonable steps to alleviate segregation in the public schools, 
whether the segregation be de facto or de jure in origin.'' 17 Cal. 3d, at 290, 
551 P. 2d, at 33-34. 
1 In stating general principles to guide the trial court on remand, the 
State Supreme Court discussed the 'busing' question: "While critics have 
sometimes attempted to obscure the issue, court decisions time and time 
again emphasized that 'busing' is not a constitutional end in itself but is 
simply one potential tool which may be utilized to satisfy a school district's 
constitutional obligation in this field. . . . [I]n some circumstances busing 
,, 
81-38--0PINION 
CRAWFORD v. LOS ANGELES BOARD OF EDUCATION 3 
On remand, the trial court rejected the District's mostly 
voluntary desegregation plan but ultimately approved a sec-
ond plan that included substantial mandatory school reassign-
ment and transportation-"busing''~n a racial and ethnic 
basis. 4 The plan was put into effect in the fall of 1978, but 
after one year's experience, all parties to the litigation were 
dissatisfied. See Crawford v. Board of Education, 113 Cal. 
App. 3d 633, 636 (1980). Although the plan continued in op-
eration, the trial court began considering alternatives in Oc-
tober 1979. 
In November 1979 the voters of the State of California rati-
fied Proposition I, an amendment to the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses of the State Constitution. 5 Propo-
will be an appropriate and useful element in a desegregation plan, while in 
other instances its 'costs,' both in financial and educational terms, will ren-
der its use inadvisable." 17 Cal. 3d, at 309, 551 P. 2d, at 47. It noted as 
well that a state court should not intervene to speed the desegregation 
process so long as the school board takes "reasonably feasible steps to alle-
viate school segregation,'' 17 Cal. 3d, at 305, 551 P. 2d, at 45, and that "a 
court cannot properly issue a 'busing' order so long as a school district con-
tinues to meet its constitutional obligations." 17 Cal. 3d, at 310, 551 P. 2d, 
at 48. 
• The plan provided for the mandatory reassignment of approximately 
40,000 students in the fourth through eighth grades. Some of these chil-
dren were bused over long distances requiring daily round-trip bus rides of 
as long as two to four hours. In addition, the plan provided for the volun-
tary transfer of some 30,000 students. 
Respondent Bustop, Inc. unsuccessfully sought to stay implementation 
of the plan. See Busfnp, Inc. v. Board of Education, 439 U. S. 1380 
(1978) (REHNQUIST, J., in chambers); Bustnp, Inc. v. Board of Education, 
439 U. S. 1384 (1978) (POWELL, J ., in chambers). 
6 Proposition I was placed before the voters following a two-thirds vote 
of each house of the state legislature. Cal. Const. art. 18, § 1. The state 
senate approved the Proposition by a vote of 28 to 6, the state assembly by 
a vote of 62 to 17. The voters favored the Proposition by a vote of 
2,433,312 (68.6%) to 1,112,923 (31.4%). The Proposition received a major-
ity of the vote in each of the State's 58 counties and in 79 of the State's 80 
assembly districts. California Secretary of State, Statement of the Vote, 
V 
81-38--0PINION 
4 CRAWFORD v. LOS ANGELES BOARD OF EDUCATION 
sition I conforms the power of state courts to order busing to 
that exercised by the federal courts under the Fourteenth 
Amendment: 
"[N]o court of this state may impose upon the State of 
California or any public entity, board, or official any ob-
ligation or responsibility with respect to the use of pupil 
school assignment or pupil transportation, (1) except to 
remedy a specific violation by such party that would also 
constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
and (2) unless a federal court would be permitted under 
federal decisional law to impose that obligation or 
responsibility upon such party to remedy the specific vi-
olation of the Equal Protection Clause .... " 6 
November 6, 1979 Election, 3-4, 43-49. 
1 Proposition I added a lengthy proviso to art. 1, § 7(a) of the California 
Constitution. Following passage of Proposition I, § 7 now provides, in rel-
evant part: 
"(a) A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws; provided, that 
nothing contained herein or elsewhere in this Constitution imposes upon 
the State of California or any public entity, board, or official any obliga-
tions or responsibilities which exceed those imposed by the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution with 
respect to the use of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation. In 
enforcing this subdivision or any other provision of this Constitution, no 
court of this state may impose upon the State of California or any public 
entity, board, or official any obligation or responsibility with respect to the 
use of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation, (1) except to remedy 
a specific violation by such party that would also constitute a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, and (2) unless a federal court would be permitted under fed-
eral decisional law to impose that obligation or responsibility upon such 
party to remedy the specific violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
"Nothing herein shall prohibit the governing board of a school district 
from voluntarily continuing or commencing a school integration plan after 
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Following approval of Proposition I, the District asked the 
Superior Court to halt all mandatory reassignment and bus-
ing of pupils. App. 185. On May 19, 1980, the-court denied 
the District's application. The court reasoned that Proposi-
tion I was of no effect in this case in light of the court's 1970 
finding of de jure segregation by the District in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Shortly thereafter, the court 
ordered implementation of a revised desegregation plan, one 
that again substantially relied upon mandatory pupil reas-
signment and transportation. 7 
The California Court of Appeal reversed. 113 Cal. App. 3d 
633 (1980). The court found that the trial court's 1970 find-
ings of fact would not support the conclusion that the District 
had violated the Federal Constitution through intentional 
segregation. 8 Thus, Pr~position I was applicable to the trial 
the effective date of this subdivision as amended. 
"In amending this subdivision, the Legislature and people of the State of 
California find and declare that this amendment is necessary to serve com-
pelling public interests , including those of making the most effective use of 
the limited financial resources now and prospectively available to support 
public education, maximizing the educational opportunities and protecting 
the health and safety of all public school pupils, enhancing the ability of 
parents to participate in the educational process, preserving harmony and 
tranquility in this state and its public schools, preventing the waste of 
scarce fuel resources, and protecting the environment." 
7 The Superior Court ordered the immediate implementation of the re-
vised plan. The District was unsuccessful in its effort to gain a stay of the 
plan pending appeal. See Board of Education v. Superior Court, 448 
U. S. 1343 (1980) (REHNQUIST, J ., in chambers). 
8 ''When the 1970 findings of the trial court are reviewed in the light of 
the correct applicable federal law, it is apparent that no specific segre-
gative intent with discriminatory purpose was found. The thrust of the 
findings of the trial court was that passive maintenance by the Board of a 
neighborhood school system in the face of widespread residential racial im-
balance amounted to de jure segregation in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. . . . But a school board has no duty under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to meet and overcome the effect of population movements." 
Crawford v. Board of Education, supra, 113 Cal. Apl). 3d, at 645--646. 
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court's desegregation plan and would bar that part of the plan 
requiring mandatory student reassignment and transporta-
tion. Moreover, the court concluded that Proposition I was 
constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 
654. The court found no obligation on the part of the State 
to retain a greater remedy at state law against racial seg-
regation than was provided by the Federal Constitution. 
Ibid. The court rejected the claim that Proposition I was 
adopted with a discriminatory purpose. Id., at 654-655. 9 
Determining Proposition I to be appµcable and constitu-
tional, the Court of Appeal vacated the orders entered by the 
Superior Court. The California Supreme Court denied hear-
ing. App. to Pet. for Cert. C. 10 We granted certiorari. --
U. S. - (1981). 
• The Court of Appeal also rejected the claim that Proposition I deprived 
minority children of a "vested right" to desegregated education in violation 
of due process. See 113 Cal. App. 3d, at 655-656. Petitioners no longer 
advance this claim. 
10 On March 16, 1981, the District directed that mandatory pupil reas-
signment under the Superior Court's revised plan be terminated on April 
20, 1981. On that date, parents of children who had been reassigned were 
given the option of returning their children to neighborhood schools. Ac-
cording to respondent, approximately 7,000 pupils took this option of whom 
4,300 were minority students. Brief for Respondent, 10. 
The state courts refused to enjoin termination of the plan. On April 17, 
1980, however, the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California issued a temporary restraining order preventing termination of 
the plan. Los Angeles NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School District, 
513 F. Supp. 717 (CD Cal. 1981). The District Court found that there was 
a ''fair chance" that intentional segregation by the District could be demon-
strated. Id., at 720. The District Court's order was vacated on the fol-
lowing day by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
Los Angeles Unified School District v. District Court, 650 F. 2d 1004 (CA9 
1981). On remand the District Court denied the District's motion to dis-
miss. This ruling has been certified for interlocutory appeal. See Brief for 
Respondents 10, n. 4. 
On September 10, 1981, the Superior Court approved a new, voluntary 
desegregation plan. 
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II 
We agree with the California Court of Appeal in rejecting 
the contention that once a State chooses to do "more" than 
the Fourteenth Amendment requires, it may never recede. 11 
We reject an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment so 
destructive of a state's democratic processes and of its ability 
to experiment. This interpretation has no support in the de-
cisions of this Court. 
Proposition I does not inhibit enforcement of any federal 
law or constitutional requirement. Quite the contrary, by 
its plain language the Proposition seeks only to embrace the 
requirements of the Federal Constitution with respect to 
mandatory school assignments and transportation. It would 
be paradoxical to conclude that by adopting the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the voters of 
the State thereby had violated it. Moreover, even after 
Proposition I, the California Constitution still imposes a 
greater duty of desegregation than does the Federal Con-
stitution. The state courts of California continue to have an 
obligation under state law to order segregated school dis-
tricts to use voluntary desegregation techniques, whether or 
not there has been a finding of intentional segregation. The 
school districts themselves retain a state law obligation to 
take reasonably feasible steps to desegregate, and they re-
main free to adopt reassignment and busing plans to eff ectu-
ate desegregation. 12 
11 Respondent Bustop, Inc. argues that far from doing ''more" than the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires, the State actually violated the amend-
ment by assigning students on the basis of race when such assignments 
were not necessary to remedy a federal constitutional violation. See Brief 
for Respondent 10-18. We do not reach this contention. 
1% In this respect this case differs from the situation presented in Wash-
ington v. Seattle School District No. 1, -- U. S. - (1982). 
In an opinion delivered after Proposition I was enacted, the California 
Supreme Court stated that "the amendment neither releases school dis-
tricts from their State Constitutional obligation to take reasonably feasible 
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Nonetheless, petitioners contend that Proposition I is un-
constitutional on its face. They argue that Proposition I em-
ploys an "explicit racial classification" and imposes a "race-
specific" burden on minorities seeking to vindicate state 
created rights. By limiting the power of state courts to en-
force the state created right to desegregated schools, peti-
tioners contend, Proposition I creates a "dual court system" 
that discriminates on the basis of race. 13 They emphasize 
that other state created rights may be vindicated by the state 
courts without limitation on remedies. Petitioners argue 
that the "dual court system" created by Proposition I is un-
constitutional unless supported by a compelling state 
interest. 
We would agree that if Proposition I employed a racial 
classification it would be _unconstitutional unless necessary to 
further a compelling state interest. "A racial classification, 
regardless of. purported motivation is presumptively invalid 
and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification." 
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 
U. S. 256, 272 (1979). See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 
U. S. 184, 196 (1964). But Proposition I does not embody a 
racial classification. 14 It neither says nor implies that per-
sons are to be treated differently on account of their race. It 
steps to alleviate segregation regardless of its cause, nor divests California 
courts of authority to order desegregation measures other than pupil 
school assignment or pupil transportation." McKinny v. Oxnard Union 
Hi,gh School District Board of Trustees, - Cal. 3d-, -- P. 2d--
(1982) (Slip. op. at 13-14). Moreover, the Proposition only limits state 
courts when enforcing the state constitution. Thus, the Proposition would 
not bar state court enforcement of state statutes requiring busing for de-
segregation or for any other purpose. Cf. Brown v. Califano, 627 F. 2d 
1221, 1230 (CADC 1980) (legislation limiting power of federal agency to re-
quire busing by local school boards held constitutional in view of the "effec-
tive avenues for desegregation" left open by the legislation). 
11 "[I]t is racial discrimination in the judicial apparatus of the state, not 
racial discrimination in the state's schools, that petitioners challenge under 
the Fourteenth Amendment in this case." Brief for Petitioner 48. 
1
' In Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S. 385 (1969), the Court invalidated a 
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simply forbids state courts from ordering pupil school assign-
ment or transportation in the absence of a Fourteenth 
Amendment violation. The benefit it seeks to confer-
neighborhood schooling-is made available regardless of race 
in the discretion of school boards. 10 Indeed, even if Proposi-
tion I had a racially discriminatory effect, in view of the de-
mographic mix of the District it is not clear which race or 
races would be affected the most or in what way. 16 In addi-
tion, this Court previously has held that even when a neutral 
law has a disproportionately adverse effect on a racial minor-
ity, the Fourteenth Amendment is violated only if a discrimi-
natory purpose can be shown. 17 
city charter amendment which placed a special burden on racial minorities 
in the political process. The Court considered that although the law was 
neutral on its face, "the reality is that the law's impact falls on the minor-
ity." In light of this reality and the distortion of the political process 
worked by the charter amendment, the Court considered that the amend-
ment employed a racial classification despite its facial neutrality. In this 
case the elements underlying the holding in Hunter are missing. See 
infra. 
15 A neighborhood school policy does not offend the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in itself. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 
U. S. 1, 28 (1971) ("Absent a constitutional violation there would be no 
basis for judicially ordering assignment of students on a racial basis. All 
things being equal, with no history of discrimination, it might well be desir-
able to assign pupils to schools nearest their homes."). Cf. 20 U. S. C. 
§ 1701: "(a) The Congress declares it to be the policy of the Unites States 
that-(1) all children enrolled in public schools are entitled to equal educa-
tional opportunity without regard to race, color, sex, or national origin; and 
(2) the neighborhood is the appropriate basis for determining public school 
assignments." 
1
• In the Los Angeles school district, white students are now the racial 
minority, .see note 1, supro,. Similarly, in Los Angeles County, racial mi-
norities, including those of Spanish origin, constitute the majority of the 
population. See 1980 Census of Population and Housing, Advance Re-
ports 6. 
11 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 238-248 (1976); Arlington 
Hei,ghts v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 265 (1977); 
James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 141 (1971). 
I 
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Similarly, the Court has recognized that a distinction may 
exist between state action that discriminates on the basis of 
race and state action that addresses, in neutral fashion, race 
related matters. 18 This distinction is implicit in the Court's 
repeated statement that the Equal Protection Clause is not 
violated by the mere repeal of race related legislation or poli-
cies that were not required by the Federal Constitution in 
the first place. In Dayton Bd. of Education v. Brinkman, 
433 U. S. 406, 414 (1977), we found that the school board's 
mere repudiation of an earlier resolution calling for deseg-
regation did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 19 In 
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369, 376 (1967), and again in 
Hunter v. Erickson, supra, at 390, n. 5 (1969), we were care-
ful to note that the laws under review did more than 
"mere Dy] repeal" existing anti-discrimination legislation. 20 In 
sum, the simple repeal or modification of desegregation or 
anti-discrimination laws, without more, never has been 
1B Proposition I is not limited to busing for the purpose of racial deseg-
regation. It applies neutrally to "pupil school assignment or pupil trans-
portation" in general. Even so, it is clear that court ordered busing in ex-
cess of that required by the Fourteenth Amendment, as one means of 
desegregating schools, prompted the initiation and probably the adoption 
of Proposition I. 
'" See Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman, 443 U. S. 526, 531, n. 5 (1979) 
("Racial imbalance, we noted in Dayton I , is not per sea constitutional vi-
olation, and rescission of prior resolutions proposing desegregation is un-
constitutional only if the resolutions were required in the first place by the 
Fourteenth Amendment."). 
ai In H unter we noted that ''we do not hold that mere repeal of an exist-
ing [anti-discrimination] ordinance violates the Fourteenth Amendment. " 
393 U. S., at 390, n. 5. In Reitman the Court held that California Propo-
sition 14 was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment not be-
cause it repealed two pieces of anti-discrimination legislation, but because 
the Proposition involved the State in private racial discrimination: "Here 
we are dealing with a provision which does not just repeal an existing law 
forbidding private racial discriminations. Section 26 was intended to au-
thorize, and does authorize, racial discrimination in the housing market." 
387 U. S., at 380-381. 
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viewed as embodying a presumptively invalid racial 
classification 21 
Were we to hold that the mere repeal of race related legis-
lation is unconstitutional, we would limit seriously the au-
thority of States to deal with the problems of our heteroge-
neous population. States would be committed irrevocably to 
legislation that has proven unsuccessful or even harmful in 
practice. And certainly the purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment would not be advanced by an interpretation that 
discouraged the States from providing greater protection to 
racial minorities. 22 Nor would the purposes of the Amend-
ment be furthered by requiring the States to maintain legis-
lation designed to ameliorate race relations or to protect ra-
cial minorities but which has produced just the opposite 
effects. 23 Yet these would be the results of requiring a State 
to maintain legislation that has proven unworkable or harm-
tt Of course, if the purpose of repealing legislation is to disadvantage a 
racial minority, the repeal is unconstitutional for this reason. See 
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 (1967). 
: See Palmer v. Thompson , 403 U. S. 217, 228 (1971) ("To hold . . . that 
every public facility or service, once opened, constitutionally 'locks in' the 
public sponsor so that it may not be dropped . . . would plainly discourage 
the expansion and enlargement of needed services in the long run") (BUR-
GER, C. J., concurring); Reitman v. Mulkey, supra, at 395 ("Opponents of 
state antidiscrimination statutes are now in a position to argue that such 
legislation should be defeated because, if enacted, it may be unrepealable") 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). 
Z3 In his dissenting opinion in Reitman v. Mulkey, supra, at 395, Justice 
Harlan remarked upon the rieed for legislative flexibility when dealing with 
the "delicate and troublesome problems of race relations. " He noted: 
"The lines that have been and must be drawn in this area, fraught as it is 
with human sensibilities and frailties of whatever race or creed, are diffi-
cult ones. The drawing of them requires understanding, patience, and 
compromise, and is best done by legislatures rather than by courts. When 
legislation in this field is unsuccessful there should be wide opportunities 
for legislative amendment, as well as for change through such processes as 
the popular initiative and referendum." Id. , at 395--396. 
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ful when the State was under no obligation to adopt the legis-
lation in the first place. Moreover, and relevant to this case, 
we would not interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to re-
quire the people of a State to adhere to a judicial construction 
I 
of their State Constitution when that Constitution itself vests 
final authority in the people. 
III 
Petitioners seek to avoid the force of the foregoing consid-
erations by arguing that Proposition I is not a "mere repeal." 
Relying primarily on the decision in Hunter v. Erickson, 
supra, they contend that Proposition I does not simply repeal 
a state created right but fundamentally alters the judicial 
system so that ''those seeking redress from racial isolation in 
violation of state law must be satisfied with less than full re-
lief from a state court." 24 We do not view Hunter as control-
ling here, nor are we persuaded by petitioners' characteriza-
tion of Proposition I as something more than a mere repeal. 
In Hunter the Akron city charter had been amended by the 
voters to provide that no ordinance regulating real estate on 
the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin could take 
effect until approved by a referendum. As a result of the 
charter amendment, a fair housing ordinance, adopted by the 
City Council at an earlier date, was no longer effective. In 
holding the charter amendment invalid under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court held that the charter amendment was 
not a simple repeal of the fair housing ordinance. The 
amendment "not only suspended the operation of the existing 
ordinance forbidding housing discrimination, but also re-
quired the approval of the electors before any future [anti-
discrimination] ordinance could take effect." 393 U. S., at 
" Tr. of Oral Argument 6. See id. , at 7-S (''The fact that a state may be 
free to remove a right or remove a duty, does not mean that it has the same 
freedom to leave the right in place but simply, in a discriminatory way we 
argue, provide less than full judicial remedy''). 
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389--390. Thus, whereas most ordinances regulating real 
property would take effect once enacted by the City Council, 
ordinances prohibiting racial discrimination in housing would 
be forced to clear an additional hurdle. 25 As such, the char-
ter amendment placed an impermissible, "special burden[] on 
racial minorities within the governmental process." Id., at 
391. 26 
Hunter involved more than a ''mere repeal" of the fair 
housing ordinance; persons seeking anti-discrimination hous-
ing laws-presumptively racial minorities-were "singled out · 
for mandatory referendums while no other group . . . face[ d] 
that obstacle." James v. Valtierra, supra, at 142. By con-
trast, even on the assumption that racial minorities benefit-
ted from the busing required by state law, Proposition I is 
less than a ''repeal" of. the California Equal Protection 
Clause. As noted above, after Proposition I, the state con-
stitution still places upon school boards a greater duty to de-
segregate than does the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Nor can it be said that Proposition I distorts the political 
process for racial reasons or that it allocates governmental or 
judicial power on the basis of a discriminatory principle. 
"The Constitution does not require things which are different 
in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the 
same." Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141, 147 (1940). Reme-
dies appropriate in one area of legislation may not be desir-
able in another. The remedies available for violation of the 
5 "In the case before us .. . the city of Akron has not attempted to allo-
cate governmental power on the basis of any general principle. Here, we 
have a provision that has the clear purpose of making it more difficult for 
certain racial and religious minorities to achieve legislation that is in their 
interest." 393 U. S., at 395 (Harlan, J ., concurring). 
5 The Hunter Court noted that although "the law on its face treats Ne-
gro and white, Jew and gentile in an identical manner," 393 U. S., at 391, a 
charter amendment making it more difficult to pass anti-discrimination leg-
islation could only disadvantage racial minorities in the governmental 
process. 
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antitrust laws, for example, are different than those available 
for violation of the Civil Rights Acts. Yet a "dual court 
system"-one for the racial majority and one for the racial 
minority-is not established simply because civil rights reme-
dies are different from those available in other areas. rr 
Surely it was constitutional for the California Supreme Court 
to caution that although ''in some circumstances busing will 
be an appropriate and useful element in a desegregation 
plan," in other circumstances "its 'costs,' both in financial and 
educational terms, will render its use inadvisable." See note 
3, supra. It was equally constitutional for the people of the 
State . to determine that the standard of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was more appropriate for California courts to 
apply in desegregation cases than the standard repealed by 
Proposition I. 28 
In short, having gone beyond the requirements of the Fed-
eral Constitution, the State was free to return in part to the 
standard prevailing generally throughout the United States. 
It could have conformed its law to the Federal Constitution in 
every respect. That it chose to pull back only in part, and by 
preserving a greater right to desegregation than exists under 
the Federal Constitution, most assuredly does not render the 
Proposition unconstitutional on its face. 
IV 
. ., Petitioners contend that Proposition I only restricts busing for the 
purpose of racial discrimination. The Proposition I is neutral on its face, 
however, and respondents-as well as the State in its ainicus brief-take 
issue with petitioners' interpretation of the provision. 
•Similarly, a "dual constitution" is not established when the State 
chooses to go beyond the requirements of the Federal Constitution in some 
areas but not others. Nor is a "dual executive branch" created when an 
agency is given enforcement powers in one area but not in another. Cf. 
Braum v. Califano, 627 F. 2d 1221 (CADC 1980) (upholding federal legisla-
tion prohibiting a federal executive agency, but not local school officials or 
federal courts, from requiring busing). 
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The California Court of Appeal also rejected petitioners' 
claim that Proposition I, if facially valid, was nonetheless un-
constitutional because enacted with a discriminatory pur-
pose. The court reasoned that the purposes of the Proposi-
tion were well stated in the Proposition itself. 29 Voters may 
have been motivated by any of these purposes, chief among 
them the educational benefits of neighborhood schooling. 
The Court found that voters also may have considered that 
the extent of mandatory busing, authorized by state law, ac-
tually was aggravating rather than ameliorating the deseg-
regation problem. See note 1, supra. It characterized peti-
tioners' claim of discriminatory intent on the part of millions 
of voters as but "pure speculation." 113 Cal. App. 3d, at 655. 
In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 (1967), the Court 
considered the constitutionality of another California Propo-
sition. In that case, the California Supreme Court had con-
cluded that the Proposition was unconstitutional because it 
gave the State's approval to private racial discrimination. 
This Court agreed, deferring to the findings made by the 
California court. The Court noted that the California court 
was "armed ... with the knowledge of the facts and circum-
stances concerning the passage and potential impact" of the 
Proposition and "familiar with the milieu in which that provi-
sion would operate." Id., at 378. Similarly, in this case, 
again involving the circumstances of passage and the poten-
29 The Proposition contains its own statement of purpose: 
"[T]he Legislature and people of the State of California find and declare 
that this amendment is necessary to serve compelling public interests, in-
cluding those of making the most effective use of the limited financial re-
sources now and prospectively available to support public education, maxi-
mizing the educational opportunities and protecting the health and safety 
of all public school pupils, enhancing the ability of parents to participate in 
the educational process, preserving harmony and tranquility in this state 
and its public schools, preventing the waste of scarce fuel, resources, and 
protecting the environment." 
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tial impact of a Proposition adopted at a state-wide election, 
we see no reason to cliff er with the conclusions of the state 
appellate court. 30 
Under decisions of this Court, a law neutral on its face still 
may be unconstitutional if motivated by a discriminatory pur-
pose. In determining whether such a purpose was the moti-
vating factor, the racially disproportionate effect of official 
action provides "an important starting point." Personnel 
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 
274 (1979), quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Dev. Corp., supra, 429 U. S. 252, at 266. 
Proposition I in no way purports to limit the power of state 
courts to remedy the effects of intentional segregation with 
its accompanying stigma. The benefits of neighborhood 
schooling are racially neutral. This manifestly is true in Los 
Angeles where over 75% of the public school body is com-
posed of groups viewed as racial minorities. See notes 1 and 
15, supra. Moreover, the Proposition simply removes one 
means of achieving the state created right to desegregated 
education. School districts retain the obligation to alleviate 
segregation regardless of cause. And the state courts still 
may order desegregation measures other than pupil school 
assignment or pupil transportation. 31 
111 Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 253 (1976) (''The extent of 
deference that one pays to the trial court's determination of the factual 
issue, and indeed, the extent to which one characterizes the intent issue as 
a question of fact or a question of law, will vary in different contexts.") 
(STEVENS, J., concurring). . 
31 In Broum v. Califa1W, supra, the Court of Appeals found that a fed-
eral statute preventing the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW) from requiring busing ''to a school other than the school which is 
nearest the student's home," 42 U. S. C. § 2000d (1976), was not uncon-
stitutional. HEW retained authority to encourage school districts to de-
segregate through other means, and the enforcement powers of the De-
partment of Justice were left untouched. The court therefore concluded 
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Even if we could assume that Proposition I had a dispro-
portionate adverse effect on racial minorities, we see no rea-
son to challenge the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the 
voters of the State were not motivated by a discriminatory 
purpose. See 113 Cal. App. 3d, at 654-655. In this case the 
Proposition was approved by an overwhelming majority of 
the electorate. 32 It received support from members of all 
races. 33 The purposes of the Proposition are stated in its 
text and are legitimate, nondiscriminatory objectives. In 
these circumstances, we will not dispute the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal or impugn the motives of the State's 
electorate. 
Accordingly the judgment of the California Court of Ap-
peal is 
Affirmed. 
discriminatory effect. And, having done so, it refused to inquire into leg-
islative motivation: "Absent discriminatory effect, judicial inquiry into leg-
islative motivation is unnecessary, as well as undesirable." Id., at 1234. 
32 Cf._ Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (STEVENS, J. , con-
' 
curring) ("It is unrealistic ... to invalidate otherwise legitimate action 
simply because an improper motive affected the deliberation of a partici-
pant in the decisional process. A law conscripting clerics should not be 
invalidated because an atheist voted for it."). 
aa Proposition 1 received support from 73.9% of the voters in Los Ange-
les county which has a ''minority'' population-including persons of Spanish 
ori~f over 50%. California Secretary of State, Statement of the 
Vote, November 6, 1979 Election, 3. See note 16, supra. By contrast, 
the Proposition received its smallest percentage of the vote in Humboldt 
and Marin counties which are nearly all-white in composition. 
~~ 
lfp/ss 6/29/~J 81-38 Crawford v. Los ~les Board of Education 
This case is here on writ of certiorari to the 
Court of Appeal of California. In November 1979, the voters -
of that state overwhelmingly adopted Proposition l , as an 
amendment to the state constitution. 
This amendment provides that state courts, in 
enforcing the equal protection clause of the ~e ~ 
constitution / may ~ require tho Yso ef mandatory ~ ing /\ 
/ unless a f~al court would order busing/ to enforce the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution. 
A Prior to the adoption of Proposition 1, California 
~e courts had rejected the distinction / recognized by 
federal courts / between de facto and de jure segregation, and ~ --~~ ~ ~ ~ 
held that school districts must achieve integration by 
~
busing; f this ~ ecess~ry. Thus, the effect of the 
popular referendum/ wasA~ re state court;Jto conform to 
the federal constitutional rule. 
Proposition 1 was sustained by the California 
Court of Appeal/ and we affirm its decision. 
The stated purposes of the Proposition are 
legitimate / and nondiscriminatory/ and we find no violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution. 
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